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Introduction: Religion and Care 
 
 
     In a work published in 1882 Friedrich Nietzsche famously declared that “God is dead.”  Now, 
in the early part of the twenty-first century, we might paraphrase Mark Twain and say that 
reports of God’s death have been greatly exaggerated. Religion endures because it speaks to 
something fundamental to human concern, something not easily dismissed or dispensed with. 
Nevertheless, the way we can intelligently think about God has drastically changed. The sciences 
have made it clear that the natural world, once thought the domain of God or the gods, operates 
in accordance with its own immanent logic; a logic that often seems to have little regard for 
human affairs and concerns. The globalization of culture, advances in the study of biology, 
history, and anthropology, the development of the sociological and psychological sciences, etc., 
have all had the effect of forcing us to see the contingency and relativity of human cultural 
forms, of which religion is one. All of this, and more (as we will discuss),  has led to an erosion 
in our ability to trust that religious teachings can do what they profess: reveal to us the truth 
about our lives, provide us with sound guidance as to how to live, and conduct us to a place of 
true peace and fulfillment. In the modern age God has not so much died as grown feeble, and 
fallen under a cloud of suspicion. Many thoughtful people don’t quite know how to relate to 
religious teachings anymore; even if we continue to embrace them on some level, we do so 
queasily, apologetically, with a host of reservations and qualifications.     
     Then why not simply abandon them? Why does belief in God not go the way of belief in the 
geocentric model of the universe? Why not simply throw it onto the trash heap of history, 
together with such obsolete ideas as phlogiston and ether? Of course there are some who propose 
that we do just this. But for others, like myself, it is not so simple – the idea of God points to 
something of vital significance to human concern that no other idea is quite able to capture in the 
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same way. There is a claim embedded in the idea of God, a claim that may or may not be true,  
but that nevertheless commands our attention, our fascination, even, for many, our deepest 
commitment: It is the claim that the basic dilemmas of human life can be resolved;  that we can 
be brought to a state of peace and harmony with ourselves, with our world, and with one another.  
     What are these dilemmas, and in what way may religion resolve them? How can we, in the 
twenty-first century, read anew religion’s claims? These are the central questions of the present 
work. I propose to explore them through an examination of two interpretations of human 
existence; the one presented by Martin Heidegger in his epochal work Being and Time, the other 
presented in the Hebrew and Christian Bible. The first half of our work presents a reading of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time with special emphasis on his treatment of conscience and death. 
The second half is an interpretive exploration of the  Bible’s account of human existence, 
conducted in close association with our reading of Heidegger. I believe that, by comparing the 
two,  new light can be shed on both.       
     But why Heidegger? Heidegger is not generally classed among religious thinkers; in fact, 
some might even see his work as antagonistic to religion. Nevertheless, as some religious 
thinkers have noted, and as I hope to show, Heidegger’s Being and Time provides a conceptual 
framework that allows for a new interpretive approach to core religious beliefs, a framework that 
enables us to penetrate into their meaning in new and fruitful ways. At the same time, stark 
differences can be found between Heidegger’s and the Bible’s assessment of human possibility, 
leading to quite different conclusions as to the way in which human life may be authentically 
lived. An examination of these differences will also help us highlight and explore the religious 
issues we wish to consider. We will, then, use Heidegger’s existential analytic of the human 
being (Dasein) as a hermeneutical key for entry into the biblical account, but then contrast what 
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we find there with Heidegger’s own assessment of the ‘truth’ of human Being. Specifically, we 
will contrast Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein as essentially bound by finitude (Being-
towards-death) with what we take to be the biblical characterization of Man/Woman as 
essentially, if not always existentially, open to the infinitude of God (Being-towards-life).       
    In this introduction I briefly consider in what way Heidegger’s work affords us this new 
approach to religious ideas, and then provide a brief chapter by chapter overview of our work as 
a whole.  
 
I.  The Dimension of Care.  
    At the core of Heidegger’s relevance to religious thought is his recognition that Being is 
primarily manifest in terms of relations of care or concern. Speaking of Being and Time in his 
Letter on Humanism Heidegger writes: “In the poverty of its first breakthrough, the thinking that 
tries to advance thought into the truth of Being brings only a small part of that wholly other 
dimension to language”1 (my emphasis). What is this ‘wholly other dimension’ of which 
Heidegger here speaks? I suggest it is the dimension Heidegger dubs ‘Care.’ This is a dimension 
religious thought has always been aware of and attuned to. What Heidegger has shown, through 
his careful phenomenological investigations, is confirmatory of the religious contention that 
relations of care or concern are fundamental to the character of Being itself. From this 
perspective, the modern ‘scientistic’ tendency to marginalize and privatize such concernfulness 
by dismissing it as ‘merely subjective’ constitutes a distortion of the meaning of Being at a most 
profound level; a distortion, furthermore, that undermines the ability of religion to make its 
meanings clear.     
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    Religion is concerned to express the way in which Being ‘matters’ to us, and takes such 
‘mattering’ to be fundamental to Being itself. When religion says that God is holy, for instance, it 
is not locating God in space and time, but in the dimension of mattering. It is saying that God 
matters supremely. It is, of course, tautologous to say that what matters most about God is just 
this mattering itself. In other words, what matters about God is not where, when, or how God is, 
etc., but how God matters. The where, when, and how of God matter only to the extent that they 
bear upon God’s mattering. This may seem obvious when said in this way, but it is often 
forgotten; as one or another metaphysical assertion about God is given absolute status in the 
dogmas of religion. This tendency of religion to focus on that which does not matter supremely, 
e.g., God’s metaphysical attributes, may itself be recognized as symptomatic of the difficulties of 
speaking about mattering in general.     
    To the extent that it is difficult to think about, or speak about, mattering in general, then, it is 
difficult to think and speak about matters of religion. This, of course, creates a problem for 
religious discourse. Religion is forced to speak in symbolical, metaphorical terms, i.e., to employ 
spatio-temporal accounts in suggestive ways so as to give body to that which matters; ever in the 
hope that the listener will have the ‘ears to hear’; i.e., the discernment with which to grasp the 
meaning behind the outward verbiage. As Paul Tillich notes, religion is always in danger of 
elevating that which is of only secondary concern to a position of supremacy and becoming, in 
its own words, ‘idolatrous.’ The Bible is a primary example of this. It is, at once, profoundly 
disclosive of  human meanings and perennially subject to absolutistic distortion and abuse. This 
is why it is ever in need of interpretation; i.e., an account through which its core meaning is 
brought before us.   
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    It is Heidegger’s great insight to see that what biblical hermeneuticists have long recognized to 
be true about the Bible is more generally true about the world at large. It is not simply the Bible 
that is in need of, and subject to, interpretation, but Being itself. Indeed, for the religious person, 
who regards the Bible as revelatory of truth, biblical interpretation is just a special instance of the 
interpretation of Being. Primarily, then, it is Being that matters, and demands interpretation in 
respect to its mattering. A man and woman sit across a restaurant table from one another. 
Perhaps they are on a first date. Perhaps they have a sick child. Perhaps they are pondering 
divorce. What is true about this situation cannot be rendered in strictly spatio-temporal terms. To 
reduce our cognition of the world to these terms is to exclude from it the very meaning it has to 
us.  
    Our world, then, which presents itself to us sensorily in terms of spatio-temporal relations, is 
ever in need of interpretation with respect to its mattering. Such interpretation is something we 
do constantly in the ordinary course of living. To reflect upon these interpretations, to bring them 
to cognition, to discover the conditions for them, and, I would say, to evaluate them, is a primary 
task of philosophy. In this respect, philosophy may be called ‘hermeneutical ontology’; it 
endeavors to understand the meaning(s) of Being. Under the general umbrella of hermeneutical 
ontology the specific areas of philosophy – metaphysics, ethics, phenomenology, linguistics, 
political philosophy, etc. – may each be said to have its place.  
    Heidegger has criticized the Western theological and metaphysical tradition, dubbing it ‘onto-
theology,’ and meaning by this the reduction of the philosophical and theological enterprise to 
the investigation of a ‘ground’ of Being, in the sense of a first cause or condition, naming this 
ground ‘God.’ He sees in this an instance of the general Western technological ethos which seeks 
to dominate, rather than appreciate, Being. Our work does not enter into the discussion of onto-
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theology, except briefly in the last chapter. We take our stance from the conviction that the 
Bible, read deeply, is not onto-theological in quite the sense Heidegger has in mind. On the other 
hand, we must acknowledge that the God of the Bible is indeed presented as a ‘ground’ of sorts; 
but primarily a ground of meaning. To the extent that God is also presented as a causal ground, 
God’s significance as causal ground is just to negate the claim of any mere causal ground to 
supremacy in meaning. To say that Spirit created the universe (as opposed to, say, the Big Bang) 
is to say that relations of meaning, of mattering, are ontologically fundamental. This, it seems to 
me, is what Heidegger also wishes to say.  
    On the other hand, the Bible is quite bold in insisting that not all interpretations of Being are 
of equal merit. Some are better than others, truer than others, more worthy of affirmation and 
allegiance. Christ’s pronouncement ‘I am the truth’ claims priority for a certain interpretation of 
Being. To evaluate this claim we must first of all endeavor to understand what it means. This, of 
course, is a theological task, insofar as theology is interested in exploring the meaning of its 
central assertions. But it is also a philosophical task, insofar as philosophy is interested in 
investigating and evaluating ontological truth-claims. In this the two disciplines may be said to 
overlap.  
    Our work intends to be a philosophical engagement with the Bible. That is, we do not 
approach the Bible with a commitment to any given religious creed, but merely with the desire to 
understand its view of human existence, as it may be gleaned from our own interpretive reading 
of the texts. We make no claim to provide the one ‘correct,’ best, or authoritative reading of the 
Bible; nor do we endeavor to ground our reading in any established theological tradition 
(although it may, of course, show closer affinity to some than to others). We approach the Bible 
as a book (divinely inspired or not) in which we find a particular existential-ontological 
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hermeneutic, i.e., a particular interpretation of human Being, whose meaning we wish to explore 
with the help of Heidegger.     
    Although Heidegger’s later writings have their own relevance to the questions we will be 
considering, I have chosen to restrict our engagement with Heidegger to the Heidegger of Being 
and Time.  In Being and Time Heidegger introduces the term ‘Being-towards-death’ to refer to 
the authentic mode of human existence. In Heidegger’s later work this term largely drops out.  
Nevertheless, we find in Heidegger’s concept of Being-towards-death an interpretation of human 
existence highly relevant to the biblical portrayal of human beings. In effect, Being and Time 
presents, with great penetration, the existential dilemma that religion seeks to address. 
Restricting ourselves to Being and Time will allow us to bring this out more sharply and with 
less complication than if we tried to range over Heidegger’s entire corpus. To the extent that this 
may seem an unfair reduction of Heidegger’s overall philosophy, I can only plead that my aim is 
not to provide a treatment or assessment of Heidegger’s work as such, but rather to employ 
elements of Heidegger’s thought as an opening into the biblical view of human Being. Our focus 
on Being and Time will help us to do so.      
    A word should be said about the relation of this work to other attempts to employ Heidegger’s 
early thought as an entrée into religious hermeneutic. The two names that spring immediately to 
mind in this regard are Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Rahner. Both have found in Heidegger’s ‘non-
objectifying’ language a medium for rearticulating the Christian message as they understand it.  2 
From one perspective, this work may be viewed as another attempt to do the same. On the other 
hand, our work differs from theirs in two significant ways. First, as already said, it is intended as 
a work in philosophy, not theological dogmatics. We do not begin with the assumptions of faith, 
nor with commitment to a particular confessional tradition, but with ‘the question of Being’ and 
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proceed from there. Hopefully, this will permit us a fresh look at some traditional material. 
Second, our aim is not simply to apply Heidegger’s new conceptuality to theological concepts,  
but to contrast Heidegger’s existential ontology with that found in the Bible. Whereas the 
biblical account affirms many of Heidegger’s phenomenological insights, it then places these in a 
broader context that changes their meaning dramatically. One of our principle goals is to explore 
these differences.
 
 
    Throughout this work I use the hyphenated phrase ‘Judeo-Christian’ when speaking of views 
that I take to be reflective of both Judaism and Christianity, otherwise I speak specifically of ‘the 
Jewish view’ or ‘the Christian view.’ Naturally, whether presenting views that I take to be 
‘Christian,’ ‘Jewish,’ or ‘Judeo-Christian’ I am always presenting my understanding of these 
views. Since it is awkward to continuously write ‘In my interpretation of the Judeo-Christian 
view of human existence . . . etc.’ I will, for the most part, simply write, ‘From the Judeo-
Christian point of view . . . ’. This is just for the sake of convenience and not intended as a 
general claim about historical Jewish and/or Christian belief. The aim of this work is not to make 
historical claims about religious traditions but to explore the meaning of two contrasting views of 
human Being, one which I read in Heidegger’s Being and Time, and one which I glean from 
Jewish and Christian sources.  I realize, of course, that there are many differing opinions as to 
what the ‘Jewish’ and/or ‘Christian’ view of human existence is or should be, and not all will 
agree with my own assessments. Indeed, it is one of the goals of this work to employ 
Heidegger’s phenomenology to penetrate into Jewish and Christian notions in new ways; it may 
be expected, then, that we will at times diverge from some traditional views.  
   In this context, let me anticipate a possible objection to my frequent use of the term ‘Judeo-
Christian.’ Some may feel that this term conflates two traditions, the Jewish and the Christian, 
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that ought rightly to be kept distinct. My own view, a view whose full articulation, consideration, 
and defense would take us beyond the bounds of this work, is that these two traditions are best 
seen as complementary. I do not argue for this here, although the biblical interpretations I offer 
suggest it. Indeed, I believe that the phenomenological approach to religious interpretation in 
general, as explored and presented in this work, will frequently allow us to see complementarity 
and concord where we hitherto saw only discord and division. This, I believe, is one of its great 
merits.             
    I have adopted the convention of capitalizing Being when it would correspond to  Heidegger’s 
use of Sein, and using the lowercase being when it would correspond to Seiendes. The distinction 
between these two is important in Heidegger’s philosophy.  Expressed briefly, ‘being’ (Seiendes) 
refers to discrete entities, and Being (Sein) refers to the ontological ‘way’ of those entities; i.e., 
the way they comport themselves in their own self-relation and/or in relation to others. If we 
speak of a human being, then, we are referring to a discrete entity, if we speak of human Being, 
however, we are speaking of the specific human way of Being. When the word Being is used by 
itself, without qualification, it refers to the general ‘space’ (or milieu) ‘in which’ or ‘through 
which’ beings have their concernful relation.  
 
II.  Summary of Chapters   
    Philosophy, says Heidegger, asks after the ‘meaning of Being.’ In order to understand what 
this itself means we must first of all examine the meaning of meaning itself.  Such is especially 
important in considering religious philosophy, because, as we will discuss, the truth-claims of 
religion primarily pertain to questions of meaning rather than questions of bare factuality. 
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Clarifying the relationship of meaning to fact, then, is of some significance to our work. Our first 
two chapters are devoted to this task.  
    In the first chapter we examine the way in which the philosophy of Descartes has helped to 
condition the displacement, in modern thought, of questions of meaning by questions of efficient 
causality; a displacement challenged implicitly by the existentialists and explicitly by Heidegger 
in Being and Time. We discuss the bearing this has had on our understanding of the subject-
object relation, and consider the significance of Heidegger’s notion of Being-in-the-world in 
respect to this.    
    In the second chapter we explore the relationship between the idea of ‘value’ and the idea of 
‘meaning.’ Heidegger shies away from any overt development of an ontology of value, a stance 
that may have some strategic utility in countering the Western tendency to substantialize value, 
but one that is, I argue, ultimately inadequate. Value language, although it may need to be 
modified to express relationality as opposed to substantiality, cannot simply be dispensed with, 
for it addresses a dimension of Being that cannot be adequately considered without it. This 
dimension of Being, the axiological dimension, is critical to an understanding of meaning in 
general, and of religious meaning in particular. Chapter two ends with a discussion of the 
Heideggerian concept of ‘truth’ as unconcealment. I argue that there is an unacknowledged 
normativity implicit in Heidegger’s distinction between truth and untruth, and suggest that 
Heidegger’s understanding of truth bears strong analogy to that found in religion.      
    Meaning, we maintain (with Heidegger), has its (proximal) basis in the concernfulness of 
human Being. In order to understand the meaning of Being, then, it is necessary to explore the 
nature of human concernfulness. This Heidegger sets out to do through his analytic of Dasein in 
Being and Time. Chapters three through five of our study are devoted to a reading of Being and 
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Time. Chapter three gives a general treatment of Being and Time up to Heidegger’s introduction 
of the question of death. Chapter four is a detailed consideration of Heidegger’s treatment of 
Being-towards-death. Chapter five considers Heidegger’s phenomenology of conscience, 
through which, according to Heidegger, Dasein’s character as Being-towards-death is ‘attested 
to.’   
    For Dasein to be authentically itself, says Heidegger, it must live in acknowledgement of itself 
as ‘Being-towards-death.’ There are questions that arise from this view, however. Being-
towards-death, we are told, is accompanied by a sense of angst and ‘not-at-homeness’ 
(Unheimlichkeit). Why, we ask, should Dasein feel ‘not-at-home’ in its very Being? Though 
Heidegger’s Being and Time never addresses this question we find a response to it in the Judeo-
Christian interpretation of human existence. Part two of our work, then, is an exploration of this 
interpretation in relation to Heidegger’s.  
    Chapter six again considers the question of meaning, now with an eye toward an explication of 
the biblical message. It argues that Heidegger’s hermeneutical-phenomenology provides a more 
adequate language for understanding the biblical message than traditional metaphysical-
objectivist conceptualities. We consider the issues involved in applying Heidegger’s 
methodology to biblical hermeneutic. This, then, prepares us for our interpretation of the biblical 
message in relation to Heidegger’s work. Chapters seven through nine explore the Judeo-
Christian understanding of human Being as Being-towards-life through an interpretation of the 
biblical narrative. Chapter seven considers the meaning of Creation and Fall, chapter eight the 
meaning of Law, chapter nine the meaning of Christ.  
    Finally, chapter ten presents a summary and reflection on all that has preceded it. We consider 
the philosophical significance of the religious challenge to Heidegger’s interpretation of Dasein. 
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We conclude with some discussion as to the meaning of the philosophical pursuit of ‘truth’ in 
this light.    
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Chapter I: The Question of Meaning 
 
I.  Facts and Meanings 
    The question before us is how to arrive at a healthful understanding of human existence.  
    It is only relatively recently that philosophers have come to see that such an understanding 
involves two distinguishable elements: facts and their meanings. For the sake of a preliminary 
designation, which we will have to refine as we proceed, let us understand by facts: ‘empirical 
data.’  Let us understand by meanings: ‘the way in which such data matters to us.’ An 
interpretation, we will say, provides an account of meaning.  
    For much human history, especially pre-modern history, the category of fact was simply 
subsumed in the category of  meaning. To state a fact was almost always to state it within the 
context of some interpretation of that fact. We see this most clearly in the mythopoetic traditions 
of so-called ‘primitive’ cultures. We see a formalized and reified version of it in the Aristotelian 
concept of final causality. With the onset of modernism, and related to the subject/object-
mind/matter schism associated with Cartesianism, an effort has been made to subsume the 
category of meaning under the category of fact. This tendency reaches its apex with the logical 
positivist’s attempt to reduce the category of meaning to ‘that which can be empirically verified.’ 
    This positivist criterion of meaning broke down, and had to break down, because it failed to 
recognize that human language is largely, if not primarily, expressive of meanings rather than 
empirical data. Language, for the most part, expresses our interpretations of ourselves and our 
world, and such interpretations are not as such susceptible to empirical verification, but are 
nevertheless meaningful; indeed, lie at the very core of what meaning is. Such meanings are not 
grounded in the empirical. 
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    Where are they grounded? Phenomenology has shown them to be grounded in the intentional 
structure of human subjectivity (or, in Heidegger’s terms, ‘temporality’). This structure has been 
dubbed by Heidegger ‘Care.’  
    In other words, meanings express the perceived relevance of a fact or nexus of facts to the 
intentional structure of human subjectivity – ‘Care.’ Or, to put this more simply, meanings 
express our caring about things, and the relevance of things to our caring in general. It is 
Heidegger’s contention that our primordial experience of the world is not as a world of bare fact 
(Vorhandenheit) but as a world of meaning (Zuhandenheit). The awareness of things as mere 
facts (i.e., ‘present-at-hand,’ ‘vorhanden’),  itself arises only as an abstraction from our prior 
awareness of things in their meaning. Reflection is able to step back and isolate the purely 
factual, i.e., purely empirical, element in those things that we more ordinarily perceive in terms 
of their meanings. But this is only possible through just such an active ‘stepping back’ away 
from or out of our more usual immersion in the world as a world of meaning.  The empirical 
scientist takes off her lab coat and, with it, the detached attitude demanded by empirical 
investigation, and goes home to her kids, husband, etc., i.e., goes home to her world of meanings.      
    The priority of meanings over facts in our basic apprehension of the world should not surprise 
us, given that meanings express the way in which the world matters to us. What is perhaps more 
surprising is that this natural priority seems, until recently, to have been contravened in modern 
scientific thought; where the ‘true’ has become virtually synonymous with the ‘factual,’ and the 
ontological status of meaning has been denied or marginalized. And yet, upon realizing that this 
reversal is itself a specific and historically-bound interpretation, we see that the original priority 
of meaning over fact hasn’t really been effaced. It has just, so to speak, gone underground. The 
belief that facts are ontologically prior to meanings, which is a correlate of the belief that matter 
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is metaphysically prior to mind, is itself an interpretation; i.e., a ‘meaning,’ with vast 
implications for human self-understanding.      
    Some meanings are of greater import than others. The meaning of this fork, for instance, is as 
an implement serving my desire/need to eat. The fork has meaning strictly as a utensil, and any 
one fork is easily replaced by another. The meanings of ‘mother,’ ‘father,’ ‘sister,’ ‘lover’ pertain 
to aspects of my ‘life-world’ of far greater moment to me.  
    Religion is concerned with ultimate meanings; i.e., meanings of supreme import.
3
 To the 
extent that the modern mind is confused over the ontological status of meanings, it will be 
confused, as well, in its understanding of  religion; a point confirmed for us by the positivist 
designation of virtually all religious language as ‘meaningless.’ Heidegger’s enduring relevance 
for religious thought is that he has given us a phenomenologically grounded analysis of what 
may be called the ‘ontology of meaning.’ He has shown thereby that the tendency to live in terms 
of meanings is a primordial and unavoidable feature of human Being. Thus, the positivist project 
of reducing all meanings to facts proves to be a futile one. We will live in terms of meanings. 
The only question is which meanings we will live in terms of, and how aware of those meanings 
we will be. The endeavor to escape meaning is itself meaningful: Kierkegaard diagnoses it as a 
symptom of despair.  
    With Heidegger’s Being and Time, then,  we have the beginnings of what might be called ‘the 
reversal of the reversal’ of the Western recognition of meaning as ontologically fundamental. 
This restitution of meaning to the center stage of philosophical reflection has its ethical or 
‘geistlich’ roots in the thought of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and its methodological and 
epistemological roots in the work of  Kant and Husserl. It takes the form, in Being and Time, of 
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an explicit repudiation of Cartesian dualism. In this chapter we will look at how this overcoming 
of Cartesianism proceeds.    
 
II.  Cartesian Dualism    
    Heidegger’s Being and Time begins with the statement that we have, ‘today,’ forgotten the 
question of the meaning of Being. And, of course, it is no wonder that we have forgotten this 
question since we seem to have forgotten, or to have never properly posed, the question of the 
meaning of meaning itself. Being and Time endeavors to explore the question of the meaning of 
Being through an examination of that being for whom Being has meaning; i.e., the human being, 
‘Dasein.’   
    In order to do so Heidegger employs a modified form of the phenomenological method 
developed by Husserl. This methodology itself bears a significant relationship to the 
methodology Descartes employs in his Meditations. Indeed, Husserl writes of Descartes that “he 
stands on the threshold of the greatest of all discoveries – in a certain manner, has already made 
it – yet he does not grasp its proper sense.”4  
    The discovery to which Husserl refers is that of the ‘transcendental subject’; the subject in 
whom the world is manifest as intended object. Descartes approaches this discovery, according 
to Husserl, through his quest for apodictic certainty; his endeavor, in his words, to rid himself of 
“false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true.”5 This desire leads Descartes to 
his famous procedure of radical doubt in which “I suppose  . . . that all the things I see are 
false…I consider that I possess no senses; I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement and 
place are but the fictions of my mind.”6 But however false the things of experience may be, that 
there is an I who both thinks about and experiences them cannot itself be doubted, thus Descartes 
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concludes: “I am, I exist, that is certain.”7 But what is the nature of this ‘I am’ that I am certain 
of? It is, Descartes asserts, “A thing which thinks . . . a thing which doubts, understands, 
[conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses.”8 But not only that, I am also a thing who “imagines 
and feels . . . that is to say, who perceives certain things . . . I see light, I hear noise, I feel heat. 
But it will be said that these phenomena are false and that I am dreaming. Let it be so; still it is at 
least quite certain that it seems to me that I see light, that I hear noise and that I feel heat. That 
cannot be false.”9 
    We have arrived, thus, at the domain of apodictic certainty. I cannot doubt that I exist and that 
I perceive certain things, even if these things have no standing beyond the ‘I am’ who perceives 
them. Descartes’ error, according to both Husserl and Heidegger, was in not dwelling reflectively 
with this ‘I am’ and the world revealed to it, but rather in employing it as the first premise in a 
deductive argument with which to establish the independent existence of that world.    
    And yet, this ‘error,’ if it is to be called that, might more properly be recognized as a function 
of Descartes’ very project; which was not to establish a procedure whereby we might grasp the 
ultimate meaning of things, but rather to clear the way for a systematic examination of just this 
‘objective world’ in its factual character. Indeed, Descartes writes: “We shall not stop to consider 
the ends which God has set before Himself in the creation of the world and we shall entirely set 
aside from our philosophy the search for final causes; for we should not take so much upon 
ourselves as to believe that God could take us into His counsels. But regarding Him as the 
efficient cause of all things, we shall merely try to discover . . . what must be concluded 
regarding the effects that we perceive by the senses.”10   
    Descartes, situated at the dawn of modern science and the twilight of Scholasticism, has had 
enough of ‘meanings’ for the time being. God is not to be considered in his aspect of providing a 
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telos, i.e., a purpose or meaning, for human life, but merely as the primary efficient cause of the 
world. Descartes is pleased to relegate considerations of purpose to theology so as to liberate his 
thought for the investigation of that which can be known with mathematical certainty; free from 
the vagaries of faith. Thus, Descartes quite explicitly bars from consideration any contemplation 
of final causality, i.e., the meaning of Being, not because he doesn’t believe such meaning is 
real,
11
 but in order to clear the way for an unprejudiced examination of efficient causality, which 
is his primary concern. With this we have, so to speak, the birth of the category of pure  ‘fact.’  
    The famous Cartesian dualism, thus, may be recognized as a strategic dualism. Descartes 
asserts that mind and matter, though substantively distinct from our perspective, have an ultimate 
ontological relation through God. He writes: “By substance, we can understand nothing else than 
a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist. And in fact only one single 
substance can be understood which clearly needs nothing else, namely, God. We perceive that all 
other things can exist only by the help of the concourse of God.”12 Created substances, then, are 
called substances only by way of a kind of analogy with God, insofar as “they are things which 
need only the concurrence of God to exist.”13 A created substance, then, is one whose existence 
depends upon no other created thing, analogously to God’s substance, which depends upon 
nothing else whatsoever.   
    Thus, even from Descartes’ perspective, the ‘Cartesian dualism’ of mind and matter is not 
absolute. Presumably, if we wished to consider questions of final causality, which are the 
province of theology, we would need to think beyond such dualism to that supreme mind
14
 in 
whom all dualities converge. Meta-physically, then, Descartes is a monist and idealist – there is 
only one absolute substance and it is of the nature of mind; all proceeds from and depends upon 
the mind of God.    
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    We might say, then, that Descartes hasn’t so much forgotten the question of the meaning of 
Being as shelved it in order to ask a different question: the question of the mechanics of beings. 
The question of meaning is the province of the Church, and Descartes is content to leave it there. 
The question of the mechanics of beings is best addressed through a conceptual differentiation 
between res cogitans and res extensa, a differentiation that is possible because they do not 
depend upon one another mechanically; i.e., one is not the efficient cause of the other, rather God 
is the efficient cause of both.  
    For Descartes, then, the meaning of Being is simply not in question, at least not overtly. The 
only thing in question is the ‘how’ of Being or, better, of ‘beings.’ In order to investigate this 
question Descartes, along with all modern science after him, has found it convenient to 
distinguish sharply between that about the object that can be recognized as relative to the subject, 
and that which seems to stand in a certain independence of the subject; namely, its mathematical 
properties. It is just such a distinction that allows for detached analysis and manipulation of the 
material world. This procedure has been hugely successful in providing the modern world with 
instrumental mastery over physical processes, and to this extent Descartes’ project must be 
deemed a grand success.
15
 But it is not, and if we take Descartes’ pronouncements about God 
seriously, is not intended to be, a radical ontology. Such could only proceed from a 
consideration of the Being of God.    
    Husserl’s project, then, is dramatically different from Descartes’. Husserl writes: 
“Epistemological reflection first brings to light that the sciences of a natural sort are not yet the 
ultimate science of being. We need a science of being in the absolute sense.”16 To secure this “a 
new science, the critique of cognition, is called for. Its job is to resolve confusions and to clarify 
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the essence of cognition. Upon the success of this science depends the possibility of metaphysics, 
a science of being in the absolute and fundamental sense.”17   
    But why do we need ‘a science of being in the absolute sense’? We certainly don’t need it in 
order to ‘ground’ empirical science, as Husserl sometimes suggests. Empirical science is able to 
get along quite nicely without such a grounding, and there is every reason to think that it will 
continue to do so.  
    But, in fact, the question has changed. Husserl is implicitly, and Heidegger explicitly, asking a 
question that Descartes had explicitly set aside. The question of ‘being in the absolute and 
fundamental sense,’ i.e., the question of Being qua Being, is just what Aristotle dubbed 
‘theology.’ This is a study that seeks, not the ‘how’ of beings, but the good of Being. Aristotle, 
considering what should count as ‘first philosophy’ writes: “The science which knows to what 
end [telos] each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more 
authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good of that thing, and in general the 
supreme good in the whole of nature.”18 For both Aristotle and Plato philosophy is defined and 
motivated by the search for ‘the good.’ But this is just what Descartes is not seeking, on the 
grounds that it is presumptuous to search for final causes, since “we should not take so much 
upon ourselves as to believe that God could take us into His counsels.” The Greek pursuit of  
‘the good,’ i.e., the telos or meaning of Being, has, for Descartes, been satisfied (at least 
ostensibly) by the Church. Descartes’ pursuit is of another sort.   
    Somewhere between Descartes and Husserl something has happened such that the question of 
meaning has come again to the fore. The distinction between res cogitans and res extensa, 
perfectly serviceable when the question is one of mechanics, is no longer serviceable when the 
Richard Oxenberg; Being-Towards-Life/Being-Towards-Death 
 
25  
question is one of meaning. For this we need another vocabulary, which Heidegger sets out to 
provide in Being and Time.  
 
III. The Existentialist Protest 
    What has led to the resurgence of the question of meaning? The answer to this is historically 
complex and here we can provide only the briefest suggestion. But it seems clear that 
Cartesianism itself, in its failure to provide terms in which traditional expressions of meaning 
could be integrated with the mechanical-empirical conception of the world it has fostered, has 
led to an increasing inability to appropriate, and be nurtured by, such traditional expressions of 
meaning. This, in turn, has led to what we might call a ‘crisis of meaning’ (or, in religious terms, 
a ‘crisis of faith’). In their own ways, the philosophies of both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche may 
be seen as expressions of, and responses to, this crisis. Nietzsche’s famous pronouncement that 
‘God is dead’ is perhaps the most striking expression of this. Although Nietzsche is famous for 
his strident atheism, he is perspicacious enough to realize that the death of God leaves a gaping 
hole in human life; on what are we now to hang human strivings and values: “Are we not now 
plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or 
down?”19 Previously God, as the supreme telos, was that from which human value and meaning 
could be derived. But no more. Nietzsche’s solution is that the individual must take up 
responsibility for creating her own values; a responsibility that had previously been the province 
of religion and God.  
    It is neglect of the question of meaning, neglect of even the basic attitude that would permit 
the question to be asked, that may be seen to underlie Kierkegaard’s protest against modern 
rationalism as well:    
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Two ways, in general, are open for an existing person: Either he can do his utmost to forget 
that he is an existing individual, by which he becomes a comic figure, since existence has 
the remarkable trait of compelling an existing individual to exist whether he wills it or 
not…Or he can concentrate his entire energy upon the fact that he is an existing individual. 
It is from this side, in the first instance, that objection must be made to modern philosophy; 
not that it has a mistaken presupposition, but that it has a comical presupposition, 
occasioned by its having forgotten, in a sort of world-historical absent-mindedness, what it 
is to be a human being.
20
 
 
    The ‘modern philosophy’ Kierkegaard has in mind in this passage is Hegel’s, but the attitude 
he critiques has its roots in Cartesianism, as we have seen. With the Cartesian disregard of final 
causality the question of what a human life is for has been cast aside. For Kierkegaard, the 
existing individual is, as such, concerned to achieve some  resolution to the issues pertaining to 
his or her existence. To disregard this concern, to divert one’s attention to merely ‘objective’ 
matters, is tragi-comic. Such disregard is named by Kierkegaard ‘objective reflection,’ to which 
he contrasts ‘subjective reflection’:  
The way of objective reflection leads to abstract thought, to mathematics, to historical 
knowledge of different kinds; and it always leads away from the subject, whose existence or 
non-existence, and from the objective point of view quite rightly, becomes infinitely 
indifferent. 
21
  
 
On the other hand; 
 
Subjective reflection turns its attention inwardly to the subject, and desires in this 
intensification of inwardness to realize the truth. And it proceeds in such a fashion that…the 
subjectivity of the subject becomes the final stage, and objectivity a vanishing factor. 
22
    
 
    Kierkegaard’s statement that the ‘subjectivity of the subject’ is the final stage of ‘truth’ is 
reminiscent of Christ’s proclamation: ‘I am the Truth.’ Truth here is not a matter of abstract 
cognition, but refers to a state of the subject. Truth is, in other words, a way of Being, the ‘right’ 
way of Being, and is related to what the Hebrew Bible calls ‘righteousness.’ This is, we might 
say, a religious understanding of the meaning of ‘truth,’ in which the True and the Good are 
considered coincident.  
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    But this conception of truth is not confined to the Judeo-Christian tradition. It is also, it may 
be noted, in close conformity to that of classical philosophy.     
    For both Plato and Aristotle the goal of philosophy is knowledge of the Good. This supreme 
Good, for Aristotle, is the ‘final cause’ toward which all things are drawn: “The final cause is an 
end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake of something else, but for whose sake 
everything else is.” 23 Those who maintain that there is no final cause, Aristotle continues; 
“eliminate the Good without knowing it.”24 And in eliminating the Good they also eliminate 
reason: “ . . . nor would there be reason in the world; the reasonable man, at least, always acts for 
a purpose.”25 The Good, thus, is the proper goal of reason. 
    The ideal of knowledge and reason that we find in the ancients, then, is quite other than, even 
opposed to, the attitude of detached reflection Kierkegaard critiques.
 26
 And we can trace this 
difference, again, to Descartes’ renunciation of concern for final causality (a kind of 
irrationalism, according to Aristotle) and the consequent divorce of subject and object which it 
permits. Of course, there is something gained from such detachment: technical mastery of the 
physical world.  
    The existentialist protest against rationalism, then, is a protest in the name of what, prior to 
Descartes, had hitherto counted as reason itself; it is a protest in the name of the meaning of 
Being (even if, at times, it expresses itself as the despair of finding such meaning). Such meaning 
is not to be found apart from consideration of the subject; indeed, apart from consideration of the 
subject’s relation to the object; and if we do not find explicit discussion of the subject as such in 
the ancients, it is because they did not yet separate out subject from object so as to allow the 
former to stand in stark relief.   
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    In this respect Kierkegaard’s insistence upon subjectivity, freedom, and absurdity in 
opposition to objectivity, mediation, and reason is, in its own way, but another legacy of 
Cartesian dualism; it appears, indeed, to be its negative image. Kierkegaard, or at least his 
pseudonym Climacus, remains something of a Cartesian despite himself. He never seems to fully 
understand what the nature of the ‘subjective truth’ is, as desperately as he longs to find it. As a 
consequence he appears to glamorize subjectivity per se; where ‘subjectivity’ is itself understood 
as in essential discord with objectivity and reason, a point of view in sharp contrast to the 
classical conception. Thus ‘faith,’ which might best be characterized as commitment to the 
Good, becomes, for Kierkegaard, commitment to the ‘objective uncertainty’ of existence for the 
purpose, apparently, of intensifying feeling. He writes: “Faith is the objective uncertainty due to 
the repulsion of the absurd held fast by the passion of inwardness, which in this instance is 
intensified to the utmost degree.”27 This is a strange understanding of Christian faith, where the 
affirmation of ‘absurdity’ (rather than love) is elevated to a supreme principle, and ‘intensity’ is 
heralded as a good in itself.
28
  
    As a result of his radical subjectivism, itself a legacy of Cartesian dualism, Kierkegaard also 
fails to provide any real entry into the question of meaning, and the existentialist movement, 
reaching a crescendo with the stark dualism of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, seems to dissolve 
in pure pessimism.   
 
IV.  Overcoming Cartesianism 
    We must now endeavor to get clearer about the problem Cartesian dualism presents for the 
question of meaning, how this is related to the question of ‘final causality,’ and what all of this 
may have to do with the religious perspective and Heidegger’s philosophy.  
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    If we say there is a difference of substance between subject and object what exactly are we 
saying? As Husserl’s investigations have revealed, consciousness always presents itself as 
consciousness of something. This suggests a duality in the very nature of consciousness that we 
will do well to consider. Ordinarily I identify myself with ‘my’ consciousness. I am my 
consciousness.
29
 But if my consciousness is always consciousness of something, something 
‘other’ (say, this desk) then my consciousness always contains within it something that is, in 
some sense, alien to me, or, at least, other than me. I am not the desk, nor is the desk me. But the 
desk is presented to me ‘by’ my consciousness and, in some sense, appears in my consciousness. 
So there seems to be an ambiguity inherent to the very reality of consciousness as such; my 
consciousness is, at once, me and not me; it contains ‘within it’ both that which is me and that 
which is other than me. This ambiguity, it might be pointed out, is also the precondition for a 
non-solipsistic universe. If there is to be more than just me in ‘my’ universe, then I must be 
presented with an other.   
    Husserl acknowledges this ambiguity in his distinction between the ‘transcendental ego’ and 
the ‘empirical ego.’ The ‘transcendental ego’ is my conscious ‘self’ as comprehensive of all that 
my consciousness is directly conscious of (including otherness, e.g., the desk), whereas my  
‘empirical ego’ is, so to speak, that part of my transcendental ego that I take to be just ‘me.’ But 
even the transcendental ego is not inclusive of all Being, and I know this because the other 
person’s consciousness does not, and cannot, appear within my own, not even within my 
transcendental ego.  Husserl discusses the problem of coming to know the other person, qua 
subjective being, in his fifth Cartesian Meditation. He concludes, interestingly, that it is only 
through recognizing the otherness of the other person that I truly come to recognize the otherness 
Richard Oxenberg; Being-Towards-Life/Being-Towards-Death 
 
30  
of the material world; for I recognize it as, in some sense, shared with one who is other than me, 
and thereby realize that it too must be other than me.  
    Thus my conscious life presents itself to me as a complex of relations in which ‘I’ am only one 
element. The question may now be asked: how are we to represent this complex of relations in 
thought? Descartes divides it in two, distinguishing radically between res cogitans and res 
extensa, as two distinct ‘substances.’ How have these two substances come into relation? What is 
the medium of their relation? Descartes nowhere tells us; he, quite literally, leaves the matter to 
God – and God, for Descartes, seems to serve no other function than to permit Descartes to set 
the problem aside. Descartes is not interested in this problem, he is interested in exploring the 
laws of efficient causality; which are most easily examined when the object is considered as 
wholly passive, wholly independent of the subject’s spontaneity, and, thereby, wholly calculable. 
Indeed, we see Descartes’ passion for the calculable in his denial of any kind of spontaneity to 
animals. Whatever Descartes can even conceivably reduce to the mechanical he does. This 
allows him to focus his exclusive attention on the question of efficient causality.      
    But if I now ask another question – if I ask: What does this desk mean to me? What does this 
sun mean to me? What does this sky mean to me?  I am now asking a question that cannot be 
asked except through consideration of the relation between subject and object, for I am, in effect, 
asking a question pertaining to the relation itself. The question of how I represent this relation 
now becomes critical. I can try – and Western thought has tried – to continue to represent it in 
Cartesian terms. The physicalist can give an account of how the light bounces from the object to 
the retina, resulting in neurological impulses delivered to the brain, which then – somehow – turn 
into consciousness of the object. (In this account, it will be noted, ‘somehow’ replaces Descartes’ 
God, who was never very much more than a ‘somehow’ to begin with.) The problem with this 
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account, besides its very questionable ‘somehow,’  is that it provides, to use Dilthey’s 
distinction, an explanation with no understanding. I am not now asking about the mechanics of 
the relation but about the meaning.   
    Meaning pertains to the way in which I care about things, the way in which they matter to me. 
Try as we might we cannot give a strictly mechanical account of meaning. There is that about 
meaning that is simply not reducible to some version of ‘discrete nodes in spatio-temporal 
relation’ (which is what a mechanical account basically amounts to). Meaning pertains to what 
we may call the ‘axiological’ dimension of Being. The Greek word axios means ‘worth.’ Things 
have ‘worth’ to me to the extent that they impact upon that which I care about. The axiological 
dimension, then, is the dimension of ‘care.’ This dimension is not reducible to any other and 
must be seen in its own terms. But it is seen easily enough when we stop to consider it. I prick 
my finger and it hurts. How are we to represent this hurt to ourselves? The biologist, of course, 
can give us a very detailed account of the mechanics of the body’s reaction to the prick. But this 
does not express the hurt as such. I think it is safe to say that a being incapable of simply feeling 
such hurt would never be able to understand it; however elaborate a mechanical account she is 
given of the hurt body. The hurt is not reducible to the mechanics of the body; it is something in 
itself, it exists within its own dimension of Being.  
    I use the phrase ‘dimension’ advisedly. A three dimensional object exists in all three spatial 
dimensions at once; it does not exist sometimes in this dimension and sometimes in that. It is 
defined, spatially, by its extension in all three dimensions. Nevertheless, the three spatial 
dimensions are distinguishable from one another, and we can, if we like, consider any one of 
them in isolation from the others. Likewise, phenomenological reflection reveals a world in 
which the axiological dimension is ontologically integrated with, but also distinguishable from, 
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the other, spatio-temporal, dimensions. The desk can be described in terms of its spatio-temporal 
attributes as well as in terms of its meaning or ‘value’ as a desk. We can neglect the axiological 
dimension through a discipline of thought, and if our conceptual representations of the world are 
such as to systematically direct us away from consideration of it, we can all but forget it. 
    Meaning pertains, then, to the axiological dimension of Being, and this dimension, whether we 
thematize it or not, pervades our experience of the world. The words we use for things express, 
by and large, their meaning, that is, the way in which the things matter to us, not their empirical 
characteristics; and it is for just this reason that the positivist criterion of meaning was a non-
starter. Cartesianism, by conceptually severing the relation between subject and object, 
eliminates, for thought, the ‘space’ (or, as Heidegger might say, the ‘time’) of relation in which 
meaning abides. We must now assign meaning to either the subject or the object. But the idea of 
the object, as res extensa,  has been created for thought as precisely that from which the 
axiological dimension has been excluded. Thus we assign the axiological to the subject. 
Assigned to the subject, meaning is now understood as a  projection of the subject upon the 
inherently alien object. Meaning is thus privatized, relativized, and marginalized. The ‘atomic 
subject’ now lives in an inherently ‘meaningless’ world. If we now go further and represent the 
subject as itself just another kind of object, we exclude the axiological dimension from our 
formal conception of Being altogether.
30
  
    Of course, this is a possible way of looking at things. Metaphysical materialism, which 
corresponds to this way, is an intellectually viable metaphysic (if we are willing to accept its 
promise to one day resolve its ‘somehow’). But it is not the only way of looking at things, nor, if 
we can judge from ancient and medieval philosophy and religion, is it the way human beings 
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have looked at things for most of human history. Nor, if we are persuaded by Husserl’s and 
Heidegger’s investigations, is it the way in which the world actually presents itself to us.   
    The severing of subject from object, which eliminates the space of relation in which meaning 
abides, is only possible through a dismissal of the classical concern for ‘final causality.’ Let us 
recall Aristotle’s definition of ‘final cause’: “The final cause is an end, and that sort of end which 
is not for the sake of something else, but for whose sake everything else is.”31 The key phrase 
here is ‘for the sake of.’ Heidegger uses just this phrase to express a similar idea in Being and 
Time. But Heidegger never makes the axiological implications of this phrase explicit, which, as 
we said above, is a peculiarity of his account which we will need to explore.  Aristotle, in this 
respect, is clearer: “It [the Prime Mover, i.e., the universal ‘final cause’] is a life such as the best 
which we enjoy . . . since its actuality is also pleasure.”32 
    For Aristotle, pleasure is a correlate of actuality; it has ontological status, and beings, defined 
in terms of ‘final causality,’ are ontologically oriented toward it. Thus, the final cause of 
anything, that ‘for the sake of which’ something is, which is its actualization and its ‘pleasure,’ is 
also its good. The word ‘good’ implies more than that toward which a thing tends. It is that 
which satisfies it. It is its happiness and joy. But such words, ‘happiness,’  ‘joy,’ ‘satisfaction,’ 
cannot be understood except by reference to an axiological (i.e., caring) subject. Their meanings 
are not representable in mechanical terms; i.e., in terms of ‘discrete nodes in spatio-temporal 
relation.’ They must be charted, so to speak, on another diagonal of the ontological map; an 
axiological diagonal.   
    Thus, if the Cosmos (‘world’) is to be construed in terms of final causality, it must be  
construed in terms of an ontological relation between subject and object. Traditionally, of course, 
God has been understood as ‘Spirit.’33  ‘Spirit’ here cannot be thought of as merely the subject 
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side of the subject-object polarity, for such would divorce it from the objective Cosmos itself. 
Spirit must be thought of along the lines of Husserl’s ‘transcendental subjectivity,’ which 
comprehends both subject-pole and object-pole.   
    Our aim here is not to indulge in a speculative metaphysic. We wish merely to indicate how 
the Cartesian dismissal of final causality, and its correlate divorce of subject from object, has 
impacted our capacity to understand Being in terms of meaning, and to understand deeply the 
meaning of meaning. Classically, the subject is impelled toward its object in pursuit of its telos, 
its good. The meaning of the object is tied up with this pursuit. In denying the ontological 
primordiality of the subject-object relation we impact the way in which we can understand such 
meaning. As a strategy for isolating questions of efficient causality there is nothing inherently 
wrong with this. But as a fundamental ontological orientation it has vast ethical and spiritual 
consequences. In effect, any ontological integration of self and other is denied. The universe 
comes to be viewed as a radical plurality of inherently isolated and disconnected beings, with 
every individual human being a little ethical fiefdom unto itself. This view, of course, is 
inherently at odds with Monotheism. Nor is the problem corrected by imagining God to be the 
‘most powerful’ little ethical fiefdom in the universe. God must be the supreme good, which 
means, ultimately, the supreme well-being and joy for all – but this requires that the universe as a 
whole be ontologically integrated along the axiological dimension. Such cannot be the case if 
there is a radical, metaphysical, schism between subject and object.  
    With Heidegger’s concept of Being-in-the-world, in which subject and object are recognized 
as ontologically integrated, we are able to resume a perspective from which religion can once 
again make sense; a perspective lost to us in Cartesianism.  It is a basic claim of Judeo-Christian 
theism that God is not only the supreme being, but the supreme good. It is as the supreme good 
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that God is able to provide moral and spiritual direction to human life. Thus, implicit to theism is 
the belief that Being as such has an axiological dimension, a dimension that must be respected 
by human beings if they are to fare well. Heidegger’s ontological re-integration of subject and 
object allows us to consider this axiological dimension phenomenologically, as it is manifest in 
the individual Dasein. 
    And yet Heidegger’s conception of this integration, as presented in Being and Time, leaves us 
with certain questions. Specifically, Heidegger’s conception of Being-in-the-world, taken in 
itself, does not seem to deal adequately with the problem of the other subject.  Although the 
world may present itself to me, phenomenally, as integrated with my Being, I must recognize, if I 
am not a solipsist, that its actual structure transcends me, insofar as I share it with others. The 
same desk, which is here for me and has meaning for me, is also there for you and has meaning 
for you. And yet your subjectivity is not present to me as such, nor mine to you. I cannot 
conceptually integrate the ‘subject-object’ reality immediately present to me without also 
considering the ‘subject-object-subject’ reality inclusive, but also transcendent, of me. It is this 
subject-object-subject reality that must ultimately be integrated if we are to finally overcome 
Cartesian dualism. Any attempt to integrate this subject-object-subject reality, furthermore, must 
appeal to some principle of integration transcendent of any one of its terms, and yet,  somehow, 
inclusive of all of them.
34
 We will explore, in following chapters, how the Judeo-Christian 
conception of God, whose essence, as ‘love,’ may be understood as just such an axio-ontological 
principle of integration, can serve us in this. First, however, we must clarify our understanding of 
what we have been calling the axiological dimension of Being. It is to this we will turn in the 
next chapter.   
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                                    Chapter II: The Axiological Dimension 
 
I.  Meanings and Facts 
    Our aim is to give an account of the Judeo-Christian mythos in relation to Heidegger’s 
existential analytic of Dasein in Being and Time, in the hope of shedding light on that mythos. 
By the ‘Judeo-Christian mythos’ we refer to the story the Bible tells about Creation, Fall, Law, 
Christ, and Redemption. We will look at this story as an integral unit that must be dealt with as 
such; it constitutes an interpretation of the meaning of human existence. In calling it a mythos we 
suggest that its primary significance lies in the sphere of meaning rather than in the sphere of 
fact.
35
 But to get clear about what this itself means we must explore more fully the relation of 
meaning to fact, and this itself will require deeper insight into what we have called the 
‘axiological’ – i.e., value-laden – dimension of being.  
    In distinguishing meaning from fact we must be careful not to imagine an oversimple 
dichotomy between the two. Rather, ‘fact’ may be regarded as a species of meaning. In stating 
the meaning of a thing, as we have said, we state the way in which that thing matters to us. 
Something can only matter to me, however, insofar as I am a being who exists as a self-relation; 
i.e., a subject. But merely to say that I am a being who exists as a self-relation, i.e., as a self-
aware being, or as a being present to itself, does not yet express what is critical in respect to the 
phenomenon of mattering. For the meaning of mattering is not captured in the idea of self-
relation as such, but only in the idea of a certain kind of self-relation, an axiological self-relation. 
Heidegger makes a great advance over previous elaborations of the nature of subjectivity when 
he describes Dasein as a being who is – not a presence to itself – but an issue to itself. In this 
word issue is expressed the axiological dimension of Being.  
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    In saying that Dasein is an issue to itself Heidegger suggests that Dasein’s self-relation is also 
a self-concern. Something is to be worked out, and it can go well or poorly. The terms ‘well’ and 
‘poorly’ are themselves axiological terms and not reducible to value-neutral terms. For 
something to go ‘well’ is for it to promote well-being. For something to go ‘poorly’ is for it to 
detract from well-being. Well-being is inherently desirable, that which detracts from it to be 
avoided. The desirability of well-being is implicit in the character of well-being itself; it is not 
derived from elsewhere. That Being presents us with the possibility of well-being and its 
opposite indicates that it is inherently axiological. It is our contention that meaning itself is 
rooted in the axiological character of Being.  
    This is an important point, and it reveals a significant shortcoming in Heidegger’s account. 
Heidegger takes pains to distance himself from previous value theories that treat values as 
‘ontical’ attributes of things. He writes: “Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at 
all new about the Being of goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure 
presence-at-hand as their kind of  Being. Values would then be determinate characteristics which 
a Thing possesses, and they would be present-at-hand. They would have their sole ultimate 
ontological source in our previously laying down the actuality of Things as their fundamental 
stratum.”36 But, having rejected such a substantialistic interpretation of value, Heidegger never 
considers (explicitly) what should replace it. If values are not to be understood as attributes of 
things, how are they to be understood?   Heidegger’s answer seems to be a conflation of the 
axiological with the temporal.  What had previously been spoken of in terms of discrete values is 
now to be understood in terms of temporal relations. But in this, I contend, he misrepresents the 
axiological in important ways. Indeed, this conflation may itself be seen as another legacy of the 
mechanistic-empirical worldview fostered by Cartesianism. In having made space and time the 
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only ontologically respectable categories, it has all but forced Heidegger to slip the axiological 
into one of them in order to indicate its reality at all. Heidegger makes a great advance in 
restoring the axiological to the ontological picture (regardless of his failure to name it as such), 
but now we must endeavor to give it its proper status. Axiology is not reducible to temporality.   
    Let’s take an example. I am playing a game of tennis. In order to do so I employ certain items 
of equipment (Zeug): a tennis racket, a net, a tennis ball, tennis shoes, etc. These items of 
equipment have, as Heidegger indicates, an ‘in-order-to’ relation to one another. The tennis 
racket is in-order-to hit the tennis ball. The tennis ball is in-order-to volley with my tennis 
partner, etc. All of this equipment, and all of these relations, are for the sake of playing the game 
of tennis. The game has a superordinate relation to the items of equipment, which have a 
subordinate relation to it. But in what ‘dimension’ of Being are these relations so ordered? 
Heidegger, who has taken most of his examples from the workshop, maintains that these 
relations are best understood through a modification of our understanding of temporality. 
Temporality, according to Heidegger, gives us the primary meaning of Being as such, and 
everything, presumably, can be rendered in its terms. The for-the-sake-of-which, then, is best 
thought of as to the future of the in-order-to. The in-order-to relations resolve themselves, and 
have their meaning, in a futural anticipation of that ‘for the sake of which’  these relations are.  
    This, of course, is true as far as the workshop goes, where the aim of the activity is to produce 
a product whose actualization stands to the future of the activity itself. But this way of describing 
things breaks down when we consider a tennis game; where the in-order-to activities are really 
simultaneous with that-for-the-sake-of-which they are done. True, we hit the ball for-the-sake-of 
playing the game, we do not play the game for-the-sake-of (just) hitting the ball. The playing of 
the game is superordinate to the hitting of the ball, and the hitting of the ball is subordinate to 
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playing the game, but these ordered relations are axiological, not temporal. We enjoy the game, 
and we play the game for the sake of this enjoyment. Joy has meaning in the axiological 
dimension of Being. It is a good, it is a species of well-being, and it is not reducible to, nor fully 
expressible in terms of, mere temporal relations.   
    This, of course, is not to deny that the joy of playing the game (which, in this case, is the 
good) takes place through time. The joy itself has a temporal structure. The satisfaction of hitting 
the ball on any given volley is a moment in the enjoyment of the overall game. This, in turn, can 
be analyzed into its constituent moments. I see the ball coming toward me over the net. I run to 
where I calculate the ball will land. I swing my racket and connect with the ball, which glides 
over the net toward my opponent. This sequence of moments have, in turn, a sequence of states-
of-mind associated with it: anticipation, attentiveness, excitement, finally, satisfaction upon 
feeling my racket strike the ball. The satisfaction is not independent of the anticipation, 
attentiveness, excitement, but their fulfillment. These prior moods are not mere means to the end 
of the satisfaction, but elements within it, bearing a certain order in relation to it.  Had I not 
undergone the anticipation, attentiveness, excitement, I would not have had the same quality of 
satisfaction.   
    On the other hand, I might miss the ball. Then the experience is one of frustration. The 
possibility of such frustration, and its overcoming in the satisfaction of striking the ball, is also a 
constituent element in the satisfaction. The satisfaction ‘knows’ itself as having overcome the 
possibility of frustration and this knowledge is a factor in the satisfaction itself. It too, like the 
anticipation, attentiveness, excitement, contributes to the quality of the satisfaction. Moreover, 
the possibility of both frustration and satisfaction are present as axiological qualities of my 
volleying. The excitement is not merely excitement at the prospect of satisfaction, but is also 
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excitement over the possibility of frustration. The play is characterized by both the good it seeks 
and the bad it seeks to avoid. How could we make this clear without language that makes an 
axiological distinction? The satisfaction is a ‘positive’ outcome, the frustration a ‘negative’ 
outcome. But positive and negative with respect to what? Not with respect to mere futurity. 
Temporally, the frustration is realized just as positively as the satisfaction; it is its own, positive, 
state-of-mind, and any careful reflection reveals that the temporal activity takes its character 
from both the possibility of satisfaction and the possibility of frustration, as two distinct 
possibilities that may be realized.  These possibilities bear a meaningful relation to one another, 
but it is not a temporal relation. 
    One might say – and Heidegger sometimes uses this kind of language – that the frustration is a 
deficient mode of the satisfaction. But deficient in what? It is not as if the frustration is a weaker, 
paler, or less intensive form of satisfaction – indeed, the experience of frustration can often be 
more intensive than the experience of satisfaction; one can hate losing more than one enjoys 
winning. Thus, the frustration is very much ‘there,’ positively, just as surely as the satisfaction. 
Then in respect to what is the frustration ‘negative’ and the satisfaction ‘positive’? It seems that 
only value-language will do here. The satisfaction is the positive realization of what is valued, 
i.e., a good. The frustration is the (temporally positive) realization of the failure to realize this 
good. It is indeed negative as an absence, but the absence of a good. It is the positive (temporally 
realized) presence of this absence. The not here is axiological, not temporal. It is the good that is 
not realized. But this failure to realize the good is realized. The failure to realize the good is itself 
a mode of Being. For sure, this all occurs temporally. But what occurs temporally is a drama that 
can only be adequately expressed in axiological terms.   
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    If these reflections are correct then temporal language cannot substitute for axiological 
language; in fact, the attempt to make it do so will obstruct our understanding of the key 
existential phenomena with which we are concerned.  
     But when we say that the axiological is to be distinguished from the temporal we do not mean 
to challenge Heidegger’s important insight that all the dimensions of Being constitute an 
interdependent, articulated, unity. The various existentialia of Dasein are, to use Heidegger’s 
expression, equiprimordial. Human Being is, at once, axio-spatio-temporal, and a full 
determination of the Being of anything that appears within it involves giving an account of its 
status in all of these dimensions. Nor can these dimensions be properly conceived in isolation 
from one another (except, perhaps, for special purposes; e.g., to isolate questions of efficient 
causality). Thus, Heidegger’s conflation of the axiological with the temporal, as well as his overt 
conflation of the spatial with the temporal, is not illegitimate. Ultimately, all the dimensions are 
‘conflatable’ insofar as they constitute an interdependent unity. But in failing to name and 
conceptually distinguish the axiological from the other dimensions, Heidegger misses something 
of critical importance: for we would say that it is not temporality that gives us the primary 
meaning of Being, and in terms of which all else is best understood, but axiology. Axiology is, so 
to speak, the governing dimension of Being, in terms of which all the other dimensions receive 
their fullest meaning. 
    This insight is an old one. Plato suggests as much when he says that all beings ‘participate’ in 
the Good and that their true form, their meaning, is in some sense predicated on this 
participation. Aristotle’s concept of final causality is, in many respects, a more elaborated 
expression of the same. Indeed, when Heidegger asks after the ‘meaning’ of a being ‘in its 
Being’ he seems to be appealing to a conception of Being first elaborated in Aristotle’s theory of 
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causes. Aristotle’s ‘causes,’ of course, are not to be understood as causes in the modern sense, 
but as ontological determinants. Aristotle asks what we need to know in order to fully determine 
a being as what it is (i.e., in its Being), and answers that we need to know how it is constituted 
with respect to four ontological determinants: the material, the efficient, the formal, and the final. 
The final cause is the good of the thing, which, for Aristotle, corresponds to its full actuality. But 
this final cause must not be thought of as something a thing realizes at some temporally final 
moment. On the contrary, for Aristotle the supreme final cause is also eternal, and temporally 
prior to much else. To the extent that we speak of it as ‘final’ in a temporal sense we are using 
temporality as a metaphor for its axiological status. The final cause is the ‘fulfillment’ of the 
thing, its finality is axiological not temporal. It is the good.  
    These distinctions will allow us to better understand the relation of fact to meaning. To give an 
account of the full meaning of a thing, we will now say, is to define it in terms of all the 
ontological dimensions pertaining to it, including the axiological. But the axiological dimension 
cannot be considered, literally does not exist, apart from the caring subject. This is just why it is 
illegitimate to treat values as if they are attributes of things. Value, and hence meaning, exists in 
the relation between a caring subject and its world, as an expression of the caring subject’s 
caring. And yet there is not just one caring subject to whom things have meaning, but a 
multiplicity of subjects who differ in significant ways from one another. Communication among 
caring subjects requires a common language. ‘Facts’ emerge as an expression of such 
commonality.  
    Let’s take another example. I am eating dinner and using a fork. The fork has meaning for me 
as an implement I use for conducting the food to my mouth. You are sitting across from me. 
Let’s say (to employ a somewhat gruesome example) that you have previously seen someone 
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stabbed to death with just such a fork as I am using. The fork will have a cluster of meanings for 
you that it will not have for me. You will associate the fork with violence and loss. You may 
become fearful upon seeing the fork, or angry, or begin to weep. I will make none of these 
associations. There is, thus, a certain variability in the sphere of meaning having to do with the 
specific relations pertaining between a given person and the meaningful object.  But you and I do 
not exist in wholly isolated worlds. The fork is there for me as it is for you. You also understand 
the fork as an implement for eating, and the fork has a shared, culturally established, meaning in 
this respect (although someone from another culture might not be able to participate in this, our, 
shared meaning). And beyond this, the fork has certain spatio-temporal characteristics that are 
fixed. These spatio-temporal characteristics also, so to speak, have meanings (or are meanings). 
Given this or that spatio-temporal characteristic of the fork there are things I can do with the fork 
and things I cannot do with it. But these spatio-temporal characteristics are universal; that is, 
everyone who encounters the fork encounters (or can be brought to encounter) at least these 
spatio-temporal characteristics. These spatio-temporal characteristics constitute, in other words, a 
lowest common denominator of meaning. These, we say, are facts. When we isolate the factual, 
we abstract out the lowest common denominator of meaning, which is universal for all.  
    The ‘factual,’ then, is that meaning of the phenomenon that is available to all observers. In 
stating the factual I seek to remove from my account anything about the phenomenon that might 
be relative to someone in particular. But the factual is a cognitive construction out of a more 
primordial relation to beings, and it is a construction that itself has a meaning and use. To see 
this let’s consider an example Heidegger himself employs.37 Heidegger gives the example of 
picking up a hammer and finding it to be too heavy (for a given task). Of course, what is too 
heavy for me may not be too heavy for you. In stating that the hammer is too heavy (for me) I do 
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not provide you with useful information concerning whether or not the hammer will be too heavy 
for you. But if I say that the hammer weighs ‘a pound,’ and define ‘a pound’ in terms of the 
extent to which the hammer will depress a spring-scale built to a common standard, you are now 
able to assess how the hammer’s weight will be for you – so long as you have had experience 
with other things weighing ‘a pound.’    
    I have now given the hammer’s weight as an objective measure, i.e., in ‘factual’ terms. Insofar 
as the aim of the factual account is to say what is so about the phenomenon for all observers, I no 
longer express the ‘fact’ in terms of its relativity to any observer. I say that the hammer itself has 
the ‘property’ of weighing a pound. We have now removed the subject from our picture 
altogether.  
    But we have still done so for the sake of the potential user of the hammer. The factual account 
has enormous practical value. It allows human beings to effectively communicate about features 
of our common spatio-temporal environment across cultures and across generations. It allows for 
the amassing of great quantities of  ‘empirical data’ which can then be put to use in a huge 
variety of ways. The ‘fact,’ thus, is an enormously potent cognitive construction from a more 
primordial relation to beings.     
    But it is not itself expressive of this primordial relation; indeed, it tends to obscure it, and, 
thus, provides us with an ontologically limited, even distorted, representation of Being. Indeed, it 
is of the essence of the factual account to minimize the relational as far as possible so as to 
maximize the usability of the information proffered. But it is to the relational that the fullness of 
meaning belongs. The significance of the hammer’s weight is not expressed in the statement that 
it weighs a pound, but in the statement that it may, therefore, be too heavy to use. The factual is a 
construction in service to the relational.  
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    Heidegger expresses the relational nature of Dasein’s Being through his analysis of 
temporality. If the hammer is too heavy it is too heavy for some project I am engaged in. If I am 
engaged in a project I am so for the sake of actualizing some potentiality of my Being. Let us say 
I am using the hammer to build a house. I do not build the house for no reason, nor am I 
mechanically impelled to build it. Rather, I build the house because I desire a home. I seek to 
actualize my potentiality for ‘being-homed.’ Being-homed is not just ‘having a house,’ but is a 
potential state of my Being with a wide variety of implications for how I may live. My project of 
being-homed is what renders the hammer meaningful to me. It is serviceable (or not) for this 
project. Ultimately, then, my relation to the hammer (and nails, and wood, etc.) is part of a 
relational complex (a complex of ‘involvements,’ as Heidegger puts it) through which I am 
related to myself; i.e., to my ‘ownmost’ potentiality for, in this case, being-homed. 
    Heidegger understands this self-relation in terms of temporality, and he understands authentic 
temporality as primarily futural. But his understanding of the futural is not the conventional one. 
He writes “By the term ‘futural,’ we do not here have in view a ‘now’ which has not yet become 
‘actual’ and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in view the coming [Kunft] in 
which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes toward itself.”38  
    The futural is inherent in the potentiality that Dasein already is. Hence, Dasein ‘comes to 
itself’ in realizing it. This understanding of temporality, we note, bears a close relation to 
Aristotle’s notion of the precedence of act over potency. Aristotle writes: “From the potentially 
existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually existing  
thing . . . there is always a first mover, and the first mover already exists actually” (my 
emphasis). 
39
 The future actuality, for Aristotle, is implicit in the present potency, and can be so 
because it has been put there by a prior actuality. Thus the future has, in some sense, already 
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been, and is implicit in the present potency. The first mover is also the final cause. Potency can 
only be such as the privation of an actuality that is ontologically prior to it. This requires that the 
Eternal, the First, be ‘pure actuality.’ Thus everything that can be, according to Aristotle, has, in 
some sense, always already been.
40
  
    Heidegger, of course, does not engage in such speculative metaphysics, but he seems to be 
functioning from a similar intuition.
41
 Dasein’s future actuality (being-homed) is implicit in its 
potency, and, hence, is already there rendering Dasein’s activity meaningful. Dasein, thus, in 
realizing this potency, is ‘coming toward itself.’ My potentiality for being-homed is drawing me 
toward its actualization.  
    But again, Heidegger neglects to make explicit the axiological significance of these temporal 
relations. True, I am drawn toward being-homed. But I am not drawn toward being-homed as a 
piece of iron is drawn toward a magnet (a mechanistic relation), but as a free agent is drawn 
toward a good. I choose to actualize this, rather than other, potentialities, and I choose to do so 
on an axiological basis; i.e., because I consider it to be the greater good. Temporality, here, is the 
medium through which the axiological is, so to speak, expressed. But the primary meaning of the 
relation, of the self-relation, of my ‘coming towards myself,’ is obscured in a strictly temporal 
account. I value the state of being-homed, and this is why I work for it. It is the value of being-
homed that is drawing me towards it, and rendering my activity, and the world in which it 
occurs, meaningful. The relation is axiological, not simply temporal. This is something Aristotle 
understands when he calls the final cause the good. Heidegger, for the most part, also seems to 
understand it, but he shies away from making it explicit. He imports the axiological into his 
account almost on the sly – through such terms as ‘care,’ and ‘concern,’ and ‘issue,’ but he 
refuses to name the axiological as such; and thereby presents us with a distorted picture.     
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    This understanding of ‘fact’ as the ‘lowest common denominator’ of meaning also allows us to 
shed some light on the Diltheyan distinction between explanation and understanding. Simply put, 
a Diltheyan ‘explanation’ is a factual, mechanical, account. Sometimes that is all the 
understanding we are interested in. If the toaster is broken and we wish to make toast, we need a 
factual explanation as to what is wrong with it and how to fix it. We wish to understand the 
toaster mechanically, not axiologically (although, of course, we wish to do so because the toaster 
matters to us; the axiological dimension is never altogether missing from our concern). An 
explanation of the mechanics of the toaster, then, constitutes one aspect of a full understanding 
of the toaster. A full understanding of the toaster would require a complete account of how the 
toaster matters to us, an account of the toaster’s meaning along the axiological dimension. A 
person who had never seen a toaster would not understand the toaster through a mere mechanical 
account of how it works; she would need to know what it is good for.   
    It is, then, the axiological dimension of Being that lies at the core of meaning in its fullness. It 
can do so only because Dasein is an axiological self-relation, a being who cares about itself, a 
being who experiences its Being as of worth, a being whose Being is therefore, as Heidegger 
says, an issue to itself. Dasein’s caring about itself renders the world meaningful. The world is 
meaningful in relation to Dasein’s caring and in terms of it. Even the ‘factual,’ as we have seen, 
is derivative of the wider category of meaning and has axiological import. But the world is not 
only meaningful in respect to practical concerns. It is meaningful as beauty. It is meaningful as 
love. These are relational states of supreme, intrinsic, worth. Their value is not reducible to 
anything else; we cannot express the value of beauty as a mere temporal relation. There are non-
utilitarian vistas of value that are simply not expressible in any other than axiological terms.    
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II.  Subjects, Objects and Subjects  
    But if meaning is only given fully through an account of the relation between subject and 
object, is it possible to speak of the meaning of Being? Must we not rather speak of the meanings 
of Being, and recognize that Being will have as many meanings as there are subjects to whom it 
has such meanings? Our pursuit of meaning drives us beyond the subject-object schism of 
Cartesianism, but does it do so only to present us with a new schism, a subject-subject schism? It 
is to this question we will now turn.  
    Heidegger’s primary ontological designation for the human being is ‘Being-in-the-world.’  In 
saying that Dasein is Being-in-the-world Heidegger indicates that Dasein is related to itself 
through its relation to the world. The self-relation of Dasein is not closed in on itself; it includes 
its relation to its world and cannot properly be thought without it. For this very reason a factual 
account of Being, i.e., one which endeavors to minimize or discount the world’s relation to 
Dasein, provides us with a distorted representation of Being, one in which the issue that Dasein 
is to itself cannot be adequately expressed and/or addressed.   
    The integrality of Dasein and its world forces us to inquire into the ontological basis of this 
relation. How does Dasein come to be related to its world? When we approach this question with 
Cartesian assumptions we find that we run into difficulties.   
    If mind and matter are two distinct substances the question becomes: what is the medium of 
their relation? To say that they are in physical contact with one another will not work because 
only physical things can be in physical contact; such an answer subsumes the mental under the 
material. To say that they are in ‘mental’ contact with one another will not work for only mental 
things can be mentally related (e.g., one thought to another); such an answer subsumes the 
material under the mental. We might suggest that there is some third substance, of which they 
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are both, in some sense, species, and through which they are related. Descartes suggests as much 
when he attributes their relatedness to God. But, then, what is this third substance and how does 
it relate the two?  
    This problem is pressing because we live in the midst of, indeed, in some sense, we are, their 
very relation. But in this very fact Heidegger sees a solution. Descartes, according to Heidegger, 
has imposed an interpretation upon the world that is not consonant with our actual experience of 
it, and this is what has produced our problem: “The kind of Being which belongs to entities 
within-the-world is something which they themselves might have been permitted to present; but 
Descartes does not let them do so. Instead he prescribes for the world its ‘real’ Being, as it were, 
on the basis of an idea of Being whose source has not yet been unveiled and which has not been 
demonstrated in its own right . . . ”42 
    Heidegger’s phenomenology reveals that our ‘minds’ are always already ‘in touch’ with the 
‘material’ world. We do not need to reconcile the one with the other because our primordial 
experience is that they are already reconciled: “The world is disclosed essentially along with the 
Being of Dasein.”43 The problem itself is an artificial one, which emerges only because we have 
misinterpreted, or really just neglected, our primordial experience of the world as always already 
there for us. We have, in reflection, conceptually divorced ourselves from the world and then 
puzzled over how to relate ourselves to it again, while being all the time always related to it. 
    For Heidegger, then, the problem is not in answering how we have come to be related to the 
world but in answering how we have come to think of ourselves as detached from it. The 
problem is that we suppose there to be a problem. But this itself is a real problem, which 
Heidegger takes some pains to address.  
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    We will, as our work proceeds, consider Heidegger’s treatment of this second problem. But 
for now I would like to remain with Heidegger’s solution to the first, and consider whether it 
really works.  
    “The world,” Heidegger writes, “is disclosed essentially along with the Being of Dasein.”44 
This is certainly true. The question, however, is: what is the ontological status of the ‘along 
with’? Whose ‘Being’ does the ‘along with’ belong to? Heidegger’s answer would seem to be 
that the ‘along with’ belongs to the Being of Dasein itself. “Dasein is its disclosedness.” 45 If 
Dasein is its disclosedness, and the world is disclosed in this disclosedness, and there is no need 
to question how the world comes to be disclosed in this disclosedness, then this implies that the 
world, somehow, is inseparable from this disclosedness. Thus Dasein’s Being and the Being of 
its world are, in some sense, one. But what about the other person to whom the world is also 
disclosed? The implication seems to be that my world, the world disclosed through me, is 
identical with my Being. That’s fine so long as I am sitting alone in my room. But what about 
when I go out to meet you? You are also disclosed in ‘my’ world. Are you, then, also identical 
with my Being? Certainly we would not wish to say so. But if I except you from identity with my 
Being, what of the world between us? Whose world is this? These problems are not as easily 
dispensed with as Heidegger seems to suggest.    
    Let us consider. You and I sit across the table from one another. I see the table from one 
perspective, you from another. Nevertheless, we see the same table. Not only must we assume 
that we see the same table in order to meaningfully communicate with one another, but, if we 
should ever doubt it, we could amass overwhelming evidence to the effect that we do, indeed, 
see the same table. I push the salt shaker from my side of the table to your side of the table. You 
pick it up. Clearly we are in the same world and dealing with the same things. The saltshaker that 
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I see is the saltshaker that you pick up. But you do not see it as I see it. You see it from your 
perspective, I from mine. 
   Clearly, then, the Being of the table cannot be simply identical with our perspectives on it, 
since these perspectives are not themselves identical. The Being of the table exceeds, in some 
sense, our perspectives on it. It transcends us.  
    So, then, where is it? What is the ontological ‘space’ of its Being? The Being of the table is 
not identical with my disclosedness of it, nor with yours. It is, thus, not simply identical with our 
Beings. It is transcendent of us. Its Being abides in an ontological ‘space’ that is not simply 
identical with ours. And yet it is certainly related to ours. We each have a perspective on it. It 
coincides with us to some degree but exceeds us. The only alternative to this conclusion is 
solipsism.  
   Does this drive us back to Cartesian dualism? Must we return to the notion that the table and 
saltshaker are essentially ‘material’ entities abiding in an ‘objective’ space which our ‘minds,’ 
somehow, consciously ‘respond’ to – with all the problems of relating mind to matter that we’ve 
considered? 
    Perhaps.  
    And yet even Descartes, as we have seen, was not a ‘Cartesian’ in quite the sense we’ve been 
using the term. Descartes never posited an absolute dichotomy between mind and matter, 
between res extensa and res cogitans. Rather, they are resolved, for Descartes, in the mind of 
God. In the mind of God. Ultimately, for Descartes, res cogitans and res extensa derive from 
something that is far more like mind than matter.    
    This, of course, is ‘idealism.’ Heidegger is aware of the idealist implications of his work. He 
writes: “If what the term ‘idealism’ says amounts to the understanding that Being can never be 
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explained by entities but is already that which is ‘transcendental’ for every entity, then idealism 
affords the only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic.”46 His objection to the label 
idealist involves his feeling that it implies a choice for mind-substance over matter-substance, 
when, as he maintains, the whole problematic of mind vs. matter as distinct substances has been 
ill-conceived.  
    The ‘modern-empiricist’ solution to this problem tends toward materialism. What materialism 
basically does is to take the factual account of the world as ontologically fundamental. How 
human beings with ‘minds’ fit into this factual account is something materialism hasn’t yet 
worked out. But regardless of our assessment of materialism’s capacity to solve this problem, it 
is important for us to see the axiological implications of materialism. The factual, as we have 
seen, is constructed by reducing the meaningful to its least common denominator. This has 
practical value, for it allows us to decontextualize features of our experience of the world so as 
to make them useable in other contexts. But as a fundamental ontology it, in effect, renders the 
world meaningless.   
    What do we mean by ‘meaningless’? If meaning expresses the way in which something 
matters to us then the statement that the world is meaningless might be thought to be the 
assertion that the world does not matter to us. But this, of course, is not true. The world does 
matter to us. We matter to us and we are indissolubly implicated in the world which, therefore, 
also matters to us. To say, then, that the world is meaningless is really to say that the world 
resists our mattering to us, it defeats our mattering to us. And, certainly, it often does. But does it 
do so essentially? These are the issues that are at stake.  
    Our concerns here are not metaphysical, but axiological. We are wrestling with the question of 
what hermeneutic of existence will be possible for us.  Heidegger never provides us a way of 
Richard Oxenberg; Being-Towards-Life/Being-Towards-Death 
 
54  
modeling the world that would allow for the transcendence of the table and the saltshaker 
without a reversion to Cartesian dualism. If we are to make fast Heidegger’s insights concerning 
Being-in-the-world, if we are to make them available to us in our actual living, we must try to 
find one. Such a model will also, not incidentally, help us resolve ethical issues concerning 
Dasein’s relation to others.  
    I am by no means going to give – nor am I capable of giving – a fundamental metaphysic of 
Being. The best we can do is gesture to that which is, admittedly, beyond us. We are looking for 
a workable model that will accommodate the possibility of meaning in its fullness; we are not 
looking for apodictic certainty. The standard of certainty is inappropriate to the kinds of truths 
we are now seeking: truths of meaning.
47
 Still, this is not to say that some accounts are not better 
than others.
48
  
    You and I sit across the table from one another. I have a perspective on the table and so do 
you. The table itself, we must concede, is transcendent of our perspectives on it. And yet they are 
perspectives on just this table. They are not perspectives on some other table. Thus, though the 
table is transcendent of our perspectives it is also immanent to our perspectives. The table is 
immanent to our perspectives but not reducible to these perspectives. The table ‘in itself’ exceeds 
our perspectives. Where is this excess?  
    The 18
th
 century thinker George Berkeley, considering this problem, answered, ‘the mind of 
God.’ We make no pretense to being able to work out the metaphysics of this, any more than the 
materialist can work out the mechanics of how matter turns into mind. But our concern is with 
the implication this has for the question of meaning. For the materialist the table is essentially 
meaningless. It is matter upon which I project a meaning. The materialist is not troubled by the 
thought that this interpretation of the table is already a projection. But we now say that the table 
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is ‘in the mind of God.’ It is, in other words, an item in God’s ‘Being-in-the-world.’ It is a 
creation of God’s. This suggests that it already has a meaning, transcendent of me and my 
projections.  
    What is this meaning? Certainly I cannot simply identify my meaning for the table with God’s. 
Much of the reaction against monotheism in the modern world is a response to the cultural 
hegemony involved in identifying one’s own meanings with God’s. I am aware, then, that your 
meaning for the table may differ from mine. Beyond this, I myself can put the table to a variety 
of uses. What the table means for me today it may not mean for me tomorrow. Today it may be a 
dinner table, tomorrow a desk. Perhaps after that we will chop it up for firewood. We can do so 
because the table, the matter of the table, has a certain plasticity to it. It is not confined to just 
one meaning. It can accommodate multiple meanings. But in this very openness to divergent 
meanings may we not, indeed, see a meaning? Is not one of the meanings of matter just this 
plasticity?  Matter has meaning, among other things, as the capacity to embody meanings that we 
invent. In this ‘mind of God,’ then, there is the posibility of human inventiveness. There is the 
possibility of human differentness. The table may mean one thing to me and another to you. And 
just because of this, just because of this openness to difference, there is the possibility of human 
freedom. Matter’s plasticity is not its meaninglessness, rather its meaning is its plasticity.  
    When we look at the table in this light, then, we see a plurality of meanings. There is the 
plasticity of the matter, whose meaning is just this plasticity, and there is the meaning of the 
table qua table; i.e., qua cultural artifact. This matter, in this case, has been made into something 
culturally meaningful, it has been joined to a human meaning; it is a table – a table around which 
we eat and drink, a table around which we commune, a table upon which we work. We cannot 
look up the meaning of this particular table in the dictionary. Here is the place where we carved 
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our initials as children. Here is the corner around which we sat through the night conversing.
49
 
Even when the matter of this table is gone the meaning of this table will endure for as long as we 
remember it. But, of course, one who has not had these experiences with the table will not be 
able to share in these, our, meanings for the table. Thus, the ‘table’ will have a variety of 
meanings in relation to the variety of people who encounter it.  
    And this is a point we must note and whose implications we must come to understand. The 
same item is susceptible to a variety of meanings, a variety of interpretations. The variability of 
meaning, in this regard, is a function of the relationality of meaning together with the singularity 
and creativity of human beings. Given the relational nature of meaning, and the divergency of 
human beings, meaning must, necessarily, manifest itself variously among different individuals, 
different cultures, and different historical epochs. This variability of meaning is not to be 
confused with randomness or meaninglessness. On the contrary, what we see in the pluralistic 
world is not meaninglessness, but, if anything, a daunting abundance of meaning. We are 
overwhelmed by the vast variety of meanings we encounter and daunted by the task of 
reconciling them.  
 
    I enter the Church. I stand under the vaulted archway and gaze at the tinted light streaming 
through the stained-glass window. A girl sits in the front pew, praying. I hear the echo of my 
shoes upon the stone floor. I enter the schul. Old men with gray beards dovenning, whispering. A 
man in a prayer shawl cries out a prayer in an ancient language.  I enter the carnival grounds. My 
ears are accosted by a cacophony of piped music, shrill laughter, boisterous voices. Visions of 
hot dogs and cotton candy and running children flash by me. It is all meaningful, although not all 
clear. The confusion is itself meaningful.
50
 The world is a flood of meanings.  
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    Where do these meanings come from? We would say, not that they emerge from human 
beings, but that they emerge through human beings (who, after all, do not emerge from 
themselves).  They emerge through the collective efforts of creative (and inspired) individuals 
whose creativity is never a sheer creatio ex nihilo but always an ex-pressing of that which they 
discover in themselves and in the depths of their world. And, of course, even the most creative 
(and inspired) human beings always exist far more as receivers of, and responders to, meanings 
already inherent in their cultures than as creators of new ones. Indeed, the problem we find with 
Cartesianism – and to which Heidegger’s entire philosophy may be seen as a response – is that it 
entails a certain impoverishment of meaning: the Cartesian Weltanschauung, taken as a 
fundamental ontology, no longer presents the human being with meanings that speak to, or call 
forth, the most profound human aspirations.        
    Thus, the Monotheist’s proclamation that ‘God is One’ should not be taken to mean that some 
one of these many meanings should dominate and quash the others, but that each of these 
meanings has its place in the life of God. God’s Oneness bespeaks an inclusivity; all is included 
in the Oneness of God. Also suggested, of course, is the possibility of an ultimate reconciliation 
of meanings at the highest level. This possibility of reconciliation drives the need for 
interpretation, which renders meanings meaningful, i.e., understandable, across persons and 
cultures. Such reconciliation does not imply a reduction to cultural uniformity, any more than 
God’s Oneness implies the organic uniformity of all natural life-forms. Rather, God’s Oneness is 
manifest in the creation as relation, comm-unity, in which difference thrives through relation and 
relation is not broken by difference. In Christianity, the name for such healthful relationality, in 
which difference and comm-unity reinforce one another, is agapic love.         
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    But the transcendence of God, as the universal foundation of meaning, also implies certain 
hermeneutical limits. We cannot make anything at all out of the matter of the table. The matter of 
the table is something I encounter, it is not something I create. It is not simply one with my 
Being such that I can dispose of it however I like.  It has its own character that I must respect. It 
has a certain spatio-temporal constitution that I cannot violate. These are the facts pertaining to 
it. But, also, given that its ontology is not determined at the lowest common denominator of 
meaning but, ultimately, at the highest, there are other limits to observe: aesthetic limits, ethical 
limits, and spiritual limits. At each of these levels there is a price to pay for violating these limits, 
and this price varies depending upon the nature and extent of the violation. Our failure to fully 
observe these higher-order limits in the modern world is bringing us to the edge of ecological 
catastrophe. 
    There is a price to pay because we live in a world whose contours are axiological. This 
axiology is not imposed upon us but inherent within us. If we did not care there could be no 
price. If it did not matter to us it would make no difference. But, of course, it does matter to us. 
We cannot shake off this mattering because we are, intrinsically, axiological beings. It is just 
because of this, and only because of this, that we seek to understand the meaning of Being, 
which itself can only mean: to work out the terms of our axiological ontology.  
 
III.  Meaning and Truth  
    We are working our way toward an interpretation of the Judeo-Christian mythos through an 
interpretation of Heidegger’s Being and Time. We call this mythos a mythos in order to indicate 
that it expresses, or seeks to express, high-level meanings rather than mere empirical facts. Of 
course, not all statements of fact are ‘true.’ If I say it is raining out and it is not, I am speaking a 
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falsity. Can we make the same claim with respect to the broader category of meaning? Are some 
statements of meaning more true than others?   
    Heidegger investigates the meaning of the word ‘truth’ through an etymological analysis of its 
Greek counterpart, aletheia. Lethe, in Greek, can mean ‘hidden’ or ‘forgotten,’ hence a-letheia  
suggests ‘unhiddenness’ or ‘unforgottenness.’ This bears, at least, a semantic resemblance to the 
Platonic notion of anamnesis, which might also be rendered ‘unforgottenness.’ The implication 
of both these terms is that the search for truth is an attempt to uncover something that has been 
concealed, to find again something previously lost. Finally we note that the religious term 
‘revelation’ has a similar etymological implication: to re-veal is to ‘remove the veil.’  
    One can only wish to remove a veil to the extent that one experiences something as veiled; i.e., 
recognizes that what one presently encounters is, in some measure, distorted or incomplete, in a 
word, concealed. Concealment as such is a privative concept. Concealment must first of all be 
experienced as privation, as lack, in order for one to see it as concealment and wish to overcome 
it. Hence, the primitive idea of truth, if we accept these etymological clues, always implies a 
search for truth, a seeking of truth. Such a search implies a longing and such longing suggests an 
essential be-longing to that which is somehow missing. 
    Heidegger begins his discussion of truth by noting its traditional definition as ‘adaequatio 
intellectus et rei’: the adequation of thought to thing. In Being and Time he considers this strictly 
in its modern sense, as referring to a correlation of human thought to material reality.
51
 In a later 
essay, On the Essence of Truth, he notes that this formula is itself the inversion of a more 
original one referring to the correspondence of a thing to its idea, not in the human intellect, but 
in the divine intellect: “Veritas as adaequatio rei ad intellectum does not imply the later 
transcendental conception of Kant . . . that ‘objects conform to our knowledge.’ Rather, it implies 
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the Christian theological belief that, with respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as 
created (ens creatum), is only insofar as it corresponds to the idea preconceived in the intellectus 
divinus,  i.e., in the mind of God, and thus measures up to the idea (is correct) and in this sense 
‘true.’”52 
    It is odd that Heidegger never connects this theological notion of truth with the one that he 
himself develops, but there seems to be a clear connection which we will attempt to draw out. 
‘Truth,’ for Heidegger, means, as we have seen, unconcealment. Unconcealment has meaning 
only vis-à-vis concealment; i.e., if Being did not present itself as to some extent ‘concealed’ 
there would be no need for ‘unconcealment’ and hence no explicit concept of truth. The concept 
of ‘truth,’ then, stands always in relation to the concept of ‘untruth.’ The ‘truth’ is that which has 
been brought out of the ‘untruth’; that which has been brought into unconcealment after having 
been concealed: “To say that an assertion ‘is true’ signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in 
itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, ‘lets’ the entity ‘be seen’ (apophansis) in its 
uncoveredness.”53 
    This must be understood in relation to Dasein as Being-in-the-world. To say that Dasein is 
Being-in-the-world, as we have said, is to say that Dasein relates to itself through its relation to 
the world. The quality of its relation to the world, then, is part and parcel of the quality of its 
relation to itself. If the meaning of beings in the world are in some sense concealed from Dasein, 
this is as much as to say that Dasein is concealed from itself.  In order for Dasein to disclose the 
true meaning of beings, then, it must first of all come to the truth of itself. Thus Heidegger 
writes: “The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a 
potentiality-for-Being, can be, is the truth of existence.”54  By ‘existence’ Heidegger refers to 
Dasein’s own Being-in-the-world. Thus truth is realized, i.e., Being is disclosed, when and as 
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Dasein comes into the truth of itself: “Truth, understood in the most primordial sense, belongs to 
the basic constitution of Dasein.”55 
    This, it will be noted, bears some resemblance to the Kierkegaardian notion of ‘subjective 
truth’ we reviewed in the last chapter. ‘Truth’ is a standard to which Dasein’s Being may or may 
not conform. If we were to translate this into theological terms, then, we might say that it is 
Dasein itself whose existence can conform to its idea in the intellectus divinus, or fail to. If it 
does, when it does, then beings are disclosed in their own truth; i.e., in their proper relationality 
to each other and to Dasein, otherwise all is awry, disordered, in falsity.  
    The concept of truth, then, suggests a polarity between two ways of Being for Dasein: truth 
and untruth. It refers to what we have been calling meaning, but with a qualification. It suggests 
that some expressions and/or disclosures of meaning are axiologically sound and some are not, 
some are revelatory of the relations in which Dasein’s caring genuinely stands, and some 
distortions and misrepresentations of these relations. Dasein can live in the context of genuinely 
disclosed meanings, or can live in self-distortion, in self-concealment. When it does the former it 
lives ‘in the truth,’ when it does the latter it ‘lives in untruth.’ ‘Proximally and for the most part,’ 
Heidegger tells us, Dasein lives in ‘untruth’: “Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of 
Being is such that it is in ‘untruth’.”56 
    Heidegger insists that his use of the term ‘untruth’  does not bespeak a value judgment. “This 
term . . . is here used ontologically. If we are to use it in existential analysis, we must avoid 
giving it any ontically negative ‘evaluation’.”57 But this leads to the question of what criteria 
may be brought to bear for discerning truth from untruth. Since truths concern meanings, and not 
mere empirical facts, we cannot apply a simple empirical criterion. If there is also no distinction 
to be drawn concerning value, if one interpretation of Being is not ultimately better than another, 
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i.e., more expressive of or conducive to the good, it is hard to say in what sense one might be 
said to be ‘true’ and the other ‘false.’  
    We can take an example from the sphere of physical health. In what sense is it ever true to say 
that a person is sick? Certainly we can describe the state of the body in empirical terms, but to 
then add the qualification that this state constitutes ‘sickness’ is to apply a normative standard 
whose justification is axiological. We suppose it to be better for the body to be in one state than 
another, and suppose the standard by which we judge this to be inherent to the nature of the body 
itself, not a mere prejudice we project upon it. There is a ‘healthful’ state of the body, and when 
the body conforms to this state it is what it ‘should’ be. Except for some such axiological 
criterion it is hard to see how there can be ‘truth’ or ‘untruth’ in the sphere of health, or, more 
generally, meaning.  
    Of course the Medieval Scholastics, who first articulated the definition of truth as ‘adaequatio 
rei ad intellectum,’ where the intellectum in question was that of God, had no problem in this 
regard. To live ‘truly’ was to live in conformity with the Divine will and mind; it was to 
actualize oneself as the ‘image of God.’ Such an understanding of truth may be called 
ontological, but only so long as we recognize that, for the Scholastics, ontology was always, 
implicitly, axio-ontology. God is goodness itself. God is, at once, supreme Being and supreme 
Good.
58
 That which conforms to its idea in the mind of God achieves, by that very conformity, 
its supreme good.  
    But Heidegger does not speak in terms of God. The distinction between Dasein ‘in the truth’ 
and Dasein ‘not in the truth’ is rendered as the distinction between ‘authenticity’ and 
‘inauthenticity.’ Authentic Dasein is one who ‘resolutely’ pursues its ownmost potentiality-for-
Being. Heidegger’s notion of ‘potentiality,’ as we have seen, draws on the Aristotelian 
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distinction between act and potency. The actuality is implicit in the potency.  The potency is not 
a bare openness to any and all possibility; it is an impetus to its own actualization. Thus, Dasein 
lives ‘in the truth’ when it resolves to live according to its own potentialities rather than in accord 
with random schemes that have been thrust upon it through its interaction with the world. In a 
sense, then, Dasein’s ‘ownmost potentiality-for-Being’ serves the role, for Heidegger, that God 
serves for the Scholastics. It provides a standard of existential truth to which Dasein may or may 
not conform, and upon which it may or may not resolve. In resolving upon it Dasein chooses 
itself, but does not thereby create itself (as per Sartre); on the contrary, Dasein must resolve upon 
what it already implicitly is.   
    But what is it? If we are to discern between Dasein’s ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’ we must know 
something of Dasein’s essential potentialities, since it is in relation to these that Dasein may or 
may not be ‘in the truth.’ What is authentic Dasein to resolve upon? At this point Heidegger’s 
work takes an odd turn: “What if resoluteness, in accordance with its own meaning, should bring 
itself into its authenticity only when it projects itself not upon any random possibilities which 
just lie closest, but upon that uttermost possibility which lies ahead of every factical potentiality-
for-Being of Dasein, and, as such,  enters more or less undisguisedly into every potentiality-for-
Being of which Dasein factically takes hold? What if it is only in the anticipation of [zum] death 
that resoluteness, as Dasein’s authentic truth, has reached the authentic certainty which belongs 
to it?”59  
    Dasein, Heidegger tells us, is ‘Being-towards-death.’ Death, somehow, expresses the ‘truth’ 
under which Dasein must live if it is to live authentically. Indeed, it is because Dasein is in flight 
from this truth that the genuine meaning of Dasein and its world has been concealed from it. 
Thus, it is Dasein’s flight from death, which is also its flight from itself, that produces the 
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polarity of truth and untruth. Dasein hides the meaning of itself from itself because it finds this 
meaning – its subjection to death – repellent. To live authentically Dasein must accept this 
subjection, its “Being-towards-death.” We will find that the Judeo-Christian interpretation of 
human existence both agrees, and disagrees, with Heidegger’s assessment. But if we are to 
understand how Heidegger has arrived at this conclusion we must first follow the argument of 
Being and Time as Heidegger himself presents it to this point. It is to this we turn in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter III:  Dasein 
 
    When Heidegger writes that Dasein is ‘Being-towards-death’ he does not mean simply that 
Dasein is destined to die. He means something more like: Dasein lives under the ‘spectre’ of 
death. ‘Spectre’ is my word and Heidegger might avoid one with so negative a connotation. 
Nevertheless, ‘Being-towards-death’ is a way of Being for Dasein, a mode of Being realized 
through a specific understanding of Being. It is a way of Being that essentially belongs to 
Dasein, as Dasein’s ‘uttermost possibility.’ Dasein can live in acknowledgment or 
disacknowledgment of it, but in neither case can Dasein escape it. To live in acknowledgement 
of it is what first allows Dasein to ‘live in truth.’ To live in disacknowledgement of it is to live in 
distortion, concealment, flight. This distinction, then, corresponds to the distinction between 
authenticity and inauthenticity, truth and untruth. Authentic Dasein lives as Being-towards-
death, and therefore in the truth of itself, inauthentic Dasein lives in some form of denial and 
flight from itself, hence in untruth.  
    Being-towards-death has a specific character, which Heidegger spends some time laying out in 
detail. We will also spend some time considering it. But in order to set the discussion in context 
it will be helpful to see how Heidegger has arrived at this notion through an overview of the 
argument of Being and Time to this point. That is the task of this chapter. The concepts we have 
already developed in the last two chapters will aid us in this.   
 
I.  The Question of the Meaning of Being 
    Being and Time begins as an investigation into the question of the meaning of Being, a 
question which, Heidegger tells us, “has today been forgotten.”60 The brief preface to Being and 
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Time begins with a quote from Plato’s Sophist: “’For manifestly you have long been aware of 
what you mean when you use the expression ‘being.’ We, however, who used to think we 
understood it, have now become perplexed.’”61 
    We might suppose, upon reading this, that we are about to enter into an investigation into 
grammar or semantics; we wish to clarify the meaning of this word ‘being.’ But it is not so much 
the meaning of the word that Heidegger wishes to direct our attention to, as the impetus that 
drives us to ask about it. Or, to put this perhaps a better way, it is only through understanding the 
impetus that drives us to ask this question that we can hope to approach an understanding of that 
to which the word refers. “Are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the 
expression ‘Being’? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the 
meaning of this question.”62 
    We must first of all understand the meaning of the question. “Every inquiry,” Heidegger 
writes, “is a seeking.”63 Every seeking is the seeking of someone who seeks. To properly 
understand the question we must first of all understand the seeking that asks about it, and, thus, 
the being who seeks. The being who asks this question, of course, is we ourselves, whom 
Heidegger calls ‘Dasein.’ We are the being who asks this question. And yet it is a question, 
Heidegger tells us, that “has today been forgotten.” The suggestion, of course – a suggestion 
which will later be made explicit – is that in having forgotten the question we are asking we 
have, in some manner, forgotten ourselves.  
    Thus Being and Time quickly turns from an investigation into the meaning of the word ‘being’ 
to an analysis of the being who investigates this meaning, Dasein. And yet, in this turn, 
Heidegger by no means abandons his initial interest in the question of the meaning of Being. On 
the contrary, Heidegger sees clearly, and from the very beginning, that this question is not one 
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that Dasein puts indifferently; in asking the question of Being Dasein is asking the question of 
itself, it is inquiring into the meaning of its own Being, it is struggling to learn what it is for itself 
to be, and it is doing so because, for Dasein, Being is an issue, a matter of concern: “Dasein is an 
entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the 
fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.”64   
    In some sense, then, a sense that is not yet altogether clear, Dasein’s Being is at stake. 
Dasein’s struggle to discover the meaning of Being is also its struggle to resolve the issue that it 
is to itself. But all of this, at this point, is ‘seen through a glass darkly.’ Dasein has ‘today’ 
forgotten this question, and Being and Time takes its stance from the standpoint of this 
forgottenness. In Heidegger’s later writings he will approach the question of Being from a new 
standpoint, presumably, from the standpoint of the recollection of the question. But Being and 
Time is only on the way to that transition. Dasein has ‘today’ forgotten the issue that it is to itself 
and it is from within this forgottenness that it must begin, again, to inquire – and it must begin 
because, however oblivious it is to itself, it continues to be motivated by just this issue.  
    We recall that it is just such obliviousness that Kierkegaard found so ‘comical’ about Hegelian 
philosophy. The ‘Herr Professor’ (as Kierkegaard calls Hegel) churns out paragraph upon 
paragraph about the ‘meaning of Being’ while never showing the least evidence of being 
personally engaged; as if the whole thing concerned someone else. In this respect, it is part of the 
strange genius of Being and Time that Heidegger manages to find a language that opens up the 
passionate interestedness of Dasein while remaining, all the time, descriptive and detached. Is 
Heidegger also displaying ‘Hegelian’ aloofness? It seems there is a difference. Heidegger 
manages to present us with a work that is, at once, written in the mode of ‘objective reflection’ 
while being, at the same time, an exposé of it. He presents what might otherwise be dismissed as 
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‘subjective musings’ in a mode that gives it the seriousness and status of a ‘scientific’ inquiry. 
He writes in a later work that the language of Being and Time “even falsifies itself, for it does not 
yet succeed in retaining the essential help of  phenomenological seeing while dispensing with the 
inappropriate concern with ‘science’ and ‘research.’ But in order to make the attempt at thinking 
recognizable and at the same time understandable for existing philosophy, it could at first be 
expressed only within the horizon of that existing philosophy and its use of current terms.”
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    And yet this very need to falsify language helps to make Heidegger’s point. The objective 
inquiries of science and research are never just ‘objective inquiries,’ because there is no domain 
of ‘objectivity’ that is untouched by Dasein’s self-concern. To the extent that they pose as such 
they reveal, through their very attempt to conceal, Dasein’s discomfort with itself. The question 
of Being, then, as a seeking, proves to have a deeply ambiguous quality. It is, in fact, a hiding 
and a seeking. This very questioning, which arises out of Dasein’s fundamental interest in itself, 
seeks to hide from itself the very interest that motivates it.     
 
II.  The  mineness of Dasein 
    Dasein is in each case mine.
66
 In naming the human being ‘Dasein,’ Heidegger means to 
indicate, among other things, that Dasein is to be considered, not as an anthropological specimen, 
a member of the genus ‘Homo Sapien,’ but as the ‘I’ who is named in every first person 
reference. It is I who am concerned with myself, and it is only as me that I am concerned. The 
one who is being investigated is also the one who is investigating, and this is not an odd 
coincidence that just happens to be true in this case, it is essential to the nature of all 
investigation. There is no investigation that is not instigated by some I for the sake of some I; the 
ideal of objective reflection, in which the I is disregarded, is a kind of falsification. Dasein is in 
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each case mine and there is no Dasein who is not some me; i.e., some self-concerned being 
whose Being is an issue to itself.  
    This implies that Dasein is a self-relation of self-concern. The very notion of self-relation 
suggests the circularity of going forth and coming back; a self-separation that resolves itself (or 
tries to) in a self-reunion. This process is what Heidegger calls ‘existence.’ In later writings 
Heidegger will make explicit what is implicit in his choice of this word by spelling it Ek-
sistence, and thereby emphasizing its etymology, which means ‘to stand out.’ Dasein is existent 
insofar as Dasein, as a concernful self-relation, stands out beyond itself into its possibilities. But 
insofar as these possibilities are indeed its possibilities, in standing out beyond itself it also 
stands out toward itself.  Thus, Dasein is itself as standing out beyond-itself-toward-itself.  It is 
this structure of concernful-standing-out-beyond-itself-toward-itself that Heidegger means by 
existence. Being and Time, thus, as an exploration of the Being of Dasein’s existence, is an 
existential-ontology.   
 
III.  Being-in-the-World    
    Dasein stands out beyond itself toward its possibilities through its world. As ek-sistent, Dasein 
does not simply happen to be involved in a world; it is of the very nature of ek-sistence that it 
must stand out beyond itself and, thus, have that wherein it stands out. This ‘wherein’ is Dasein’s 
world. As we said earlier, Dasein, as a self-relation, relates to itself through its relation to its 
world.  Heidegger’s term for this is ‘Being-in-the-world.’ The hyphens express the idea that 
Dasein is not, just incidentally, in touch with its world, but that relation to a world is essential to 
the Being of Dasein. Dasein cannot be without its world. Relation to a world is constitutive for 
Dasein’s Being.   
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    And, with this idea, we are able to explain Heidegger’s choice of the word ‘Dasein’ to name 
the human being. Etymologically, the German word Dasein means ‘being-there’ or ‘to-be-there,’ 
and is often used to express ‘existence’ in the ordinary sense of the term; i.e., in the sense of 
something’s just ‘being there’ (on the table, in the room, etc.). Heidegger exploits the etymology 
of this word in order to suggest, once again, a being who stands out from itself into some ‘there.’ 
Thus the term ‘Dasein’ may be thought of as an abbreviated version of the phrase ‘Being-in-the-
world.’ Both endeavor to say the same thing: that Dasein is a being whose very Being is a 
standing out from itself into some ‘there,’ some ‘world,’ which is, then, also to be understood as 
an essential aspect of this being’s Being.     
 
IV.  Significance and Meaning  
    The world that Dasein stands out into is not, primordially, a world of indifferent things, 
although Dasein, in its self-forgetfulness, may take it to be so. Just insofar as Dasein is a 
concernful self-relation Dasein’s world presents itself to it as a world of concern; a world, thus, 
that has meaning. ‘Proximally and for the most part’ (a phrase Heidegger employs throughout to 
refer to Dasein’s customary way of Being) the kinds of meanings Dasein is concerned with are 
practical. I am writing to a friend. I sit at a desk with a pad and pen, perhaps a cup of coffee. The 
pad, the pen, the desk are items that have meaning to me in relation to my project of writing. The 
pad is in-order-to write on, the pen in-order-to write. The pen requires the pad and the pad the 
pen. The pad, the pen, and the desk are not bare things merely ‘present-at-hand’ in their sensory 
manifestness, but are related to each other in what Heidegger calls a ‘significance-structure’ 
which derives its meaning from my projects; in this case, my project of writing.    
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   My project of writing, of course, is my project. It is expressive of my own concernful self-
relation – ultimately, of the issue that I am to myself. It is my project of writing that renders the 
pad and the pen and the desk, etc., meaningful. The significance-structure whereby things 
acquire their meaning is for-the-sake-of my project. Language itself is functionally related to 
such projects. Ultimately the meaning of words – including, of course, the meaning of the word 
‘Being,’ whose investigation began our inquiry – derive from, and express, my own Being as 
concernful self-relation.  
 
V.  Temporality 
    The ontological mode of Dasein’s relation to its world, and, hence, itself, is temporality. 
Dasein does not only stand out of itself into its world but also into its future; and these two 
‘standing outs’ are really one: Dasein stands out into its future through its standing out into its 
world. But Dasein’s standing out into its future, which Heidegger calls projection, is also 
Dasein’s relationship with itself. Dasein stands out into its future for-the-sake-of actualizing its 
potentialities. Thus the ‘future’ is not to be thought of as just a ‘later now’ which simply ‘comes 
along’ as ‘time passes.’  Rather, future, past, and present are organically connected as the modes 
of Dasein’s self-relation; each requiring the others and implicated in the others.  
    Insofar as Dasein is concerned with its future it is ‘ahead-of-itself,’ and indeed, this 
phenomenon of ‘ahead-of-itselfness’ is Dasein’s primordial access to anything like a ‘future’; 
i.e., Dasein only knows of anything like a ‘future’ through its standing out toward its future, i.e., 
its ‘ahead-of-itselfness.’ The same is true of past and present. The phenomenal present is really a 
‘making-present,’ in which Dasein actively engages with its world for the sake of its project. It is 
Dasein’s project, then, that ‘makes’ the present – i.e., gives the present its character. Finally, 
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Dasein is engaged in a world that it finds already there at the time of its engagement. This 
‘already-there-ness’ of the world Heidegger calls its ‘having-been.’ The way in which Dasein 
experiences the ‘having-been-ness’ of the world will depend upon the way in which it seeks to 
make-present, which, in turn, depends upon the character of its ‘ahead-of-itselfness,’ i.e., its 
projectedness upon its future. Once again, it is only due to its experience of the ‘having-been-
ness’ of the world that Dasein is able to form anything like a concept of past.  Thus, our 
customary concepts of past, present, and future are derivations from our more primordial 
immersion in the phenomena of  the ‘ahead-of-itself,’ the ‘making-present,’ and the ‘having-
been.’ These phenomena themselves gain their character from Dasein as existent, i.e., as a 
concernful self-relation standing out beyond itself toward the actualization of its potentialities. 
This entire structure Heidegger labels Care. 
 
VI.  Who is Dasein? 
    Our inquiry began as an endeavor to understand the meaning of the word Being. In order to 
understand the meaning of this word, Heidegger told us, we had first to understand the meaning 
of the question that asks about it, and, in turn, the nature of the Being who asks this question and 
to whom the answer is to be addressed: ourselves. We have made some progress. Dasein is a 
concernful self-relation who projects itself into its future possibilities through its dealings with 
its world. It is just this self-projection that renders the world meaningful, including the words it 
uses to express and represent this world, including, therefore, the word Being. 
    But thus far we have given only the bare ontological structure of Dasein. We have said 
nothing of what Dasein’s projects portend. Dasein’s projects are for the sake of itself, but who is 
the self to whom these projects refer? Dasein’s projects are for the sake of Dasein, who is in each 
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case mine, but who is the me expressed through these projects? Or, to put this another way, what 
is the nature of the concern that I am to myself that projects me into my future? Clearly, it is only 
in answering this that I will be able to understand the nature of the concern that asks the question 
of Being.    
    We might suppose we could gain insight into this by looking at the ways in which Dasein, 
who, after all, is itself, understands itself. But now Heidegger entertains a suspicion, a suspicion 
that has, as we’ve seen, been lurking from the beginning: “Dasein is in each case mine, and this 
is its constitution; but what if this should be the very reason why, proximally and for the most 
part, Dasein is not itself? What if the aforementioned approach, starting with the givenness of the 
‘I’ to Dasein itself, and with a rather patent self-interpretation of Dasein, should lead the 
existential analytic, as it were, into a pitfall?”67 In other words: what if Dasein’s most customary 
self-interpretations constitute, in fact, a misrepresentation of itself? What if Dasein’s most 
ordinary ways of Being are not, indeed, attestations of who Dasein is ‘in truth’? What if Dasein, 
to put it most simply, is living a lie? 
    These suspicions are not without their ground. The very fact that we have, thus far, failed to 
understand the meaning of the most fundamental questions we ask is already some indication 
that we live in a state of concealment from ourselves. The fact that we have, thus far, represented 
Dasein as ‘thinking substance’ in essential separation from ‘extended substance’ shows that our 
self-conceptualization is at a far remove from the actuality of our existence as concernful Being-
in-the-world. The fact that the idea of ‘meaning’ has been reduced to ‘verbal reference,’ with no 
recognition that such references ultimately spring from our projects, which themselves arise from 
our concerns and circle back upon them, suggests that we live in some disacknowledgment of the 
thrust of these projects and the nature of these concerns.  The fact that we speak of ‘past,’ 
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‘present,’ and ‘future’ with no recognition of the care that is integral to the phenomena that have 
given rise to these concepts, suggests a drive toward objectification that is itself a concealed 
drive toward self-concealment. “Perhaps,” then, Heidegger writes, “when Dasein addresses itself 
in the manner which is closest to it, it always says ‘I am this entity,’ and in the long run says this 
loudest when it is ‘not’ this entity.”68 
 
VII.  Das Man      
    Indeed, Heidegger concludes, ‘proximally and for the most part,’ the projects that Dasein 
involves itself in are not expressive of what Dasein is in truth. Rather than living out of its own 
potentialities, Dasein has, for the most part, had its identity assigned to it by the world, and lives 
in accordance with this assignment. This might at first seem a paradoxical conclusion, since we 
have already established that Dasein’s world gains its meaning, its identity, from Dasein’s 
potentialities. But this paradox is resolved by taking into consideration something previously 
neglected: that Dasein lives in a world of other people, other Daseins. Heidegger writes: “In our 
previous analyses, the range of what is encountered within-the-word was, in the first instance, 
narrowed down to equipment ready-to-hand or Nature present-at-hand, and thus to entities with a 
character other than that of Dasein. This restriction was necessary not only for the purpose of 
simplifying our explication but above all because the kind of Being which belongs to the Dasein 
of Others, as we encounter it within-the-world, differs from readiness-to-hand and presence-at-
hand.”69 
    Just as Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is essentially and primordially related to its world, so 
Dasein is essentially and primordially related to other Daseins. This relation Heidegger calls 
MitDasein (Dasein-with). MitDasein is not something in addition to Being-in-the-world but is a 
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component of it; Dasein exists in, as, an essential relation to others:  “Being with Others belongs 
to the Being of Dasein . . . ”70 
    This statement, of course, is not to be read as stating that others themselves belong to the 
Being of Dasein (who is in each case mine), but it does raise a series of questions that 
problematize the way in which Dasein may be thought to be ‘with’ its world and others. What 
exactly is the ontological status of the ‘with’? We explored some of these questions in the 
previous chapter, and will have much more to say about it as we proceed. For now, however, we 
will continue following Heidegger’s footsteps.  
    Insofar as Dasein is also Mitsein (i.e., being-with-others), it is possible for Dasein to get its 
projects, not from itself, but from just this world of others, and ‘proximally and for the most 
part,’ this is indeed what happens, and it characterizes Dasein’s everyday life. Rather than being 
drawn to its future from its own potentialities, its life is driven by the ‘alreadyness’ of what it 
encounters in its world. As we might say, Dasein lives reactively rather than proactively. But, 
then, who is doing the driving? Is there, then, some one person or group of people whose projects 
are driving this vast human machine?  
    Heidegger’s answer is no. The machine is, in effect, being driven by the unwillingness of 
anyone to drive. No one wishes to be responsible. Everyone absolves herself of responsibility by 
taking upon herself the self-identity foisted upon her by a standard that has itself grown out of no 
one’s setting a standard. This Heidegger calls das Man. The word Man in German is used 
somewhat as the English word ‘one,’ to indicate an anonymous, but also normative, ‘anyone,’ as 
in the phrase ‘One does not do that sort of thing.’ It is translated as “the they” in the Macquarrie-
Robinson translation of Being and Time. This anonymous ‘anyone’ becomes the standard against 
which all compare themselves, and from which all take their self-identity. For just this reason the 
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who of Dasein is, for the most part, “not itself.” Dasein’s identity is characterized by a flight 
from its identity. This Heidegger calls, the “dictatorship of das Man,” a paradoxical term since 
das Man is really no one.
 
No one is piloting the human ship.
 
And it is just for this reason that 
Dasein does not experience the meanings of its world as its own.  
    Although Heidegger has a great deal to say about the way in which the individual Dasein 
becomes lost in the world of das Man, he is less clear about how this world itself gets 
constituted. The world of das Man, after all, is not a chaos. It is full of projects and activities, 
values and norms. If it is indeed a function of Dasein’s flight from itself then this flight itself 
proves to have its own logic and form and to be remarkably capable of sustaining itself. This 
suggests that the world of das Man, to the extent that it is a distortion, is a distortion, not merely 
of authentic Dasein in its individuality, but of authentic Mitsein, i.e., social relations.  But what 
would constitute the axiological basis of such authentic Mitsein, given that each Dasein, in its 
individuality, is for-the-sake-of-itself ? These are questions we will need to consider more 
carefully.   
 
VIII.  Anxiety and Thrownness   
    Why is Dasein in flight from itself? Our search for the question of the meaning of Being has 
taken a curious turn. This question arises out of Dasein and we will understand it only by 
understanding Dasein. But Dasein is in hiding from itself. We cannot read the meaning of this 
question off from Dasein as Dasein presents itself ‘proximally and for the most part,’ for Dasein 
is ‘proximally and for the most part’ not true to itself. Heidegger writes: “Thus by exhibiting the 
positive phenomenon of the closest everyday Being-in-the-world, we have made it possible to 
get an insight into the reason why an ontological Interpretation of this state of Being has been 
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missing. This very state of Being, in its everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself 
and covers itself up.” 71 
    But why? In order to understand this we must bring another aspect of Dasein’s Being to light. 
Dasein is not only projected into its future, it is affected by its circumstances. Indeed, Dasein is 
always already in some mode of having been affected. This affective state Heidegger calls ‘state-
of-mind’ (Befindlichkeit).72 It is only because Dasein can be affected that it can be troubled by 
the difficulties of its world: “To be affected by the unserviceable, resistant, or threatening 
character [Bedrohlichkeit] of that which is ready-to-hand, becomes ontologically possible only in 
so far as Being-in as such has been determined existentially beforehand in such a manner that 
what it encounters within-the-world can ‘matter’ to it in this way. The fact that this sort of thing 
can ‘matter’ to it is grounded in one’s state-of-mind.”73  
    Dasein always already encounters the world from the perspective of some affective mode, 
some ‘state-of-mind,’ which is manifest as some specific ‘mood’ (Stimmung). Such ‘moods’ are 
not arbitrary feelings, but are disclosive of Dasein’s relatedness to its world: “Existentially, a 
state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter 
something that matters to us. Indeed, from the ontological point of view we must as a general 
principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare mood.’ Pure beholding [sans 
mood]…could never discover anything like that which is threatening.”74 
    The etymology of Heidegger’s term ‘Befindlichkeit’ expresses the idea that Dasein always 
(already) finds itself in some state-of-mind, some affective mode. Dasein does not, first of all, 
choose its state-of-mind. And this reveals a basic fact about Dasein as existent: Dasein is not, 
first of all, a product of itself. Dasein always finds itself already in a world; that is, in some 
particular world with its particular characteristics to which Dasein has, in some way or other, 
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already responded. When Dasein first comes aware of itself it finds itself as already having-
been. Nor does it know the whence of its having-been. This Heidegger calls Dasein’s 
thrownness:  “In thrownness is revealed that in each case Dasein, as my Dasein and this Dasein, 
is already in a definite world and alongside a definite range of definite entities within-the-
world.”75  
    Such thrownness is accompanied by anxiety. Anxiety, Heidegger tells us, is a basic state of 
Dasein’s Being, and it is from just such anxiety that Dasein endeavors to escape through its flight 
into das Man, which Heidegger also expresses as a ‘falling’ into the world (of das Man) out of 
authenticity. Again we see the strange ambiguity of Dasein. Dasein’s anxiety is an expression of 
the issue that it is to itself. That Dasein is an issue to itself is the very thing that makes Dasein 
uncomfortable with itself; the very issue Dasein is to itself leads it to avoid the issue it is to itself. 
And yet it is just this issue that must be addressed.  
    Dasein’s ‘falling’ into das Man disburdens Dasein of its having to be responsible for itself, 
presents Dasein with the illusion that all is well, and thereby soothes Dasein’s anxious self-
concern: “The supposition of the ‘they’ [das Man] that one is leading and sustaining a full and 
genuine ‘life,’ brings Dasein a tranquility . . . ”76   
   But it is, decidedly, a false tranquility, and, thus: “falling Being-in-the-world is not only 
tempting and tranquilizing; it is at the same time alienating.”77   
 
IX.  Authenticity and Wholeness 
    We are still in search of the meaning of the question of Being. This question arises out of 
Dasein and we must understand Dasein if we are to understand what the question itself means, 
but Dasein has proven an unreliable witness to itself. We must endeavor to gain some insight 
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into what Dasein is ‘in its truth,’ i.e., in its ‘authenticity.’ We have laid out the existential-
ontological structure of Dasein as ‘concernful self-relation projected toward the future realization 
of its potentialities through its dealings with the world.’ 78 This structure Heidegger labels 
‘Care.’79 Care, as we have seen, is ‘fallen’ into its world, and, thus, its self-projective character 
has become distorted. It no longer projects itself toward its authentic potentialities, but is driven 
hither and thither by its immersion in das Man. If we are to gain a clear view of what Dasein 
authentically is, then, we must consider the authentic potentialities into which it may be drawn.  
   But now Heidegger notes a paradox. In order to know concretely what Dasein is (i.e., the 
meaning of Dasein’s Being), we must know something of the ultimate potentialities towards 
which Dasein is drawn. True enough, any given project is for the sake of actualizing some 
potentiality, which renders that project meaningful, and that project, in turn, is for the sake of 
something further, and so on. But if we are ever to get Dasein’s meaning into our view as a 
whole we must discover the ultimate potentiality from which all its more preliminary 
potentialities acquire their meaning. What is the ultimate ‘for which’ of Dasein’s Being? If we 
could answer this question we would have Dasein in our view ‘as a whole,’ which seems 
essential to knowing who Dasein is (authentically).  
    But given the essential temporality of Dasein this matter turns out to be highly paradoxical: “It 
is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is constantly something still to be settled 
. . . Such a lack of totality signifies that there is something still outstanding in one’s potentiality-
for-Being. But as soon as Dasein ‘exists’ in such a way that absolutely nothing is still 
outstanding in it, then it has already for this very reason become ‘no-longer-Being-there’ [Nicht-
mer-da-sein].”80 Thus, “As long as Dasein is as an entity, it has never reached its ‘wholeness.’ 
But if it gains such ‘wholeness,’ this gain becomes the utter loss of Being-in-the-world.”81   
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    It would seem that Dasein, as futurally projective, can only reach ‘wholeness’ when it has 
ceased to be projective, for otherwise there is something ‘still outstanding.’ But given that 
projectivity is essential to existence as such, Dasein can only cease to be projective when it has 
ceased to exist; i.e., in death. But death is surely not Dasein’s ‘wholeness,’ it is rather the 
termination of Dasein. Is it then impossible to speak of Dasein as whole? But perhaps this very 
paradox, Heidegger suggests, is a function of the fact that we have not yet really grasped the way 
in which the ‘end’ of Dasein, death, figures in the existence of Dasein: “Have we, in our 
argument, taken ‘Being-not-yet’ and the ‘ahead’ in a sense that is genuinely existential?  Has our 
talk of the ‘end’ and ‘totality’ been phenomenally appropriate to Dasein? Has the expression 
‘death’ had a biological signification or one that is existential-ontological, or indeed any 
signification that has been adequately and surely delimited? Have we indeed exhausted all the 
possibilities for making Dasein accessible in its wholeness?”82 
    The answer, of course, is that we have not.  
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Chapter IV:  Being-Towards-Death 
 
I.  Telos 
    It may appear that Heidegger has subtly changed the nature of the discussion. We have been 
involved, up until now, in laying bare the existential-ontological structure of Dasein. Heidegger 
has emphasized throughout the importance of maintaining an ontic/ontological distinction in 
these analyses. An ontological inquiry is concerned with uncovering the fundamental structures 
upon which any ontic inquiry – i.e., any inquiry concerning the particularities of Dasein’s being 
–  will depend. Thus we are not really interested in the specific content of any of Dasein’s 
particular cares and concerns but in the basic structure of care/concern itself. To this end we have 
examined the ontology of Dasein and arrived at a designation of Dasein’s basic structure as (to 
express it briefly) ‘self-projective concern.’ Of course we can expound upon the traits of this 
basic structure almost indefinitely, and Heidegger has gone into great detail illuminating many of 
its interrelated features. Why are we not now done? Why, with the designation of Dasein as ‘self-
projective concern,’ is our project not now complete?  
    We remember, of course, that the aim of Being and Time is not to provide an ontological 
analytic of Dasein but to achieve insight into the question of the meaning of Being. It is a 
presupposition of the work that this question is not one that Dasein puts casually; it lies at the 
core of the entire Western philosophical tradition and, beyond that, expresses something essential 
to the nature of Dasein itself, insofar as Dasein’s Being is an issue to itself. So we must now ask: 
having identified Dasein as ‘self-projective concern’ have we answered our initial question? 
Have we resolved the perplexity that launched our inquiry? It does not appear that we have, or at 
least not fully. Why not?  
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    It can only be that the meaning of this question is not fully given in Dasein’s purely formal 
structure. It seems that we need to inquire into the character of Dasein’s concern in order to 
make further progress. Does this, then, violate the ontic/ontological distinction? Is investigation 
into the character of Dasein’s concern an ontic investigation? We need to consider this more 
carefully.  
    Perhaps we can gain some insight by putting the matter in Aristotelian terms. In the 
designation of Dasein as ‘self-projective concern’ we have, in effect, given an ontological 
account of Dasein in respect to formal causality. And yet, in this very form is revealed the fact 
that Dasein’s ontology is not fully specified through its form alone.  For Aristotle, the most 
important ontological determinant of a Being is not its formal but its final, or telic, cause.  
Indeed, for Aristotle, who was not a mechanistic thinker, the telic cause is ultimately the efficient 
cause as well, in that every entity is driven toward the fulfillment of its telos. As we have seen, 
Heidegger draws upon this insight, or seems to, in developing his concept of temporality as 
primarily futural.  
    In posing the question of Dasein’s wholeness Heidegger, it seems, has switched from a 
consideration of Dasein’s formal structure to a consideration of Dasein’s telic structure. But this 
switch is mandated by the question we are asking, and in a double sense: On the one hand, our 
formal reflection on Dasein has revealed it to be, in effect, a telic being; i.e., a being oriented 
toward goals or telê. Thus, to complete our investigation into the ontology of Dasein we must  
consider the question of Dasein’s telic thrust. But more immediately, questioning itself has a telic 
structure. To ask the question of Dasein’s questioning, which is what we do when we ask after 
the meaning of Dasein’s question about Being, is to inquire into the character of Dasein’s telos 
itself:  What is it that Dasein seeks such that this question arises?  
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    Heidegger never clearly distinguishes between the telic and the formal in his analysis of 
Dasein and this, I think, accounts for some of the obscurity of the work. As an example, in 
designating temporality as the meaning of Dasein
83
 Heidegger uses the word ‘meaning’ in a 
manner inconsistent with his own phenomenological findings. ‘Meaning,’ Heidegger tells us 
elsewhere, refers to the ‘upon which’ of a primary projection;84 i.e., it refers to that potentiality 
of Being upon which Dasein projects itself. Thus the ‘hammer’ is part of a significance-structure 
that gains its meaning from being ‘for-the-sake-of’ the project of building a house and, beyond 
that,  Dasein’s potentiality for ‘being-homed.’  But ‘temporality’ is not that upon which Dasein 
projects itself, it is that through which Dasein projects itself; it is the medium of projection itself. 
In saying that the hammer derives its meaning from Dasein’s projects Heidegger is using 
‘meaning’ in a telic sense. In saying that temporality is the meaning of Dasein he is using it in a 
formal sense. This confusion of the telic and the formal in Heidegger’s work bears a relation to 
Heidegger’s failure to tease out the axiological from the temporal. The meaning of Dasein’s 
Being, and, with it, the meaning of the questions it asks, is not given in its temporality but in that 
toward which its temporality tends,  its good. 
85
  
    What needs to be seen, then, is that the telic is just as ontologically basic as the formal, and, 
indeed, takes hermeneutical priority. It is just for this reason that the recognition of Dasein’s 
lostness in das Man is not of mere sociological interest, but is a factor in the ontological-
hermeneutical problematic; for it signifies (if we accept Heidegger’s analysis) that Dasein, 
‘proximally and for the most part,’ is not properly oriented toward its telos. It is the possibility of 
such an improper telic orientation that lies behind the distinction between ‘authenticity’ and 
‘inauthenticity,’ living ‘in the truth’ and living ‘in untruth.’ The telic is also the axiological, the 
final cause is the ‘good,’ and although Heidegger insists that in distinguishing between 
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authenticity and inauthenticity he does not mean to make a value judgment there is, nonetheless, 
an implicit axiology that comes with the telic territory, and which Heidegger’s analysis cannot, 
and really does not, avoid.  
    The discussion of Being-towards-death is a discussion that concerns Dasein’s ontological telos 
(or, as we will say, ‘telic context’). This, it should be pointed out, is to be distinguished from the 
many ontic ‘telê’ that Dasein involves itself in on a day to day basis (e.g., building a house). It is 
the ontological ground of these ontic telê. In this chapter we will consider Heidegger’s treatment 
of this topic closely. To help make the distinction between the ontic and the ontological clear in 
this regard, however, and to help shed light on another aspect of Heidegger’s analysis that is 
critical to our discussion, we will first look at Heidegger’s comparison of the ontic mood of fear 
with its ontological basis, anxiety.  
 
II.  Fear and Anxiety  
    The distinction between fear and anxiety, Heidegger will maintain, is not simply that between 
an ontic mood and its ontological ground but, more importantly, that between an inauthentic and 
authentic orientation to that ground: “Fear is anxiety, fallen into the ‘world,’ inauthentic, and, as 
such, hidden from itself.”86 We will consider this claim as we proceed, but for now we are 
interested in considering in what sense anxiety may be said to be the ontological ‘ground’ of 
fear.
87
 
    In every instance of fear, says Heidegger, there are three elements that may be distinguished: 
that “in the face of which” we fear (what frightens us), the “mood” of fear itself, and that “about 
which” we fear (what we fear for).88 What frightens us is one or another thing in the world that 
we take to be detrimental and, thus, threatening. What we fear for is always ourselves. 
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Ordinarily, we take the fear itself to issue from the thing that is fearsome. It is because this or 
that thing in the world is threatening that I am afraid, and if I could only rid my world of it and 
things like it I would cease to be afraid. The fear is taken to be a function of that which threatens.  
    But, as Heidegger points out, it is only because, in our basic constitution, we can first of all 
feel threatened, that we can then experience any particular thing as threatening: “Only an entity 
for which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid.”89  If we did not first of all care 
for ourselves, if we were not first of all concerned for our well-being, not only would we not 
fear, but it would not be possible to experience anything as threatening. That which is 
threatening is only threatening in relation to our ontological constitution as care. But for this, it 
would be meaningless to speak of the threatening at all.  
    This signifies that fear does not first of all come to us from that which is threatening, but that, 
on the contrary, that which is threatening is threatening only because we are first of all subject to 
fear. In this or that particular (ontic) instance of fear we are revealed, ontologically, as a kind of 
being who can fear; i.e., a being whose Being is an issue to itself, a being who is concerned for 
itself.  
    This basic self-concern, considered ontologically, is manifest in anxiety. The experience of 
authentic anxiety, according to Heidegger, is a relative rarity.
90
 Mostly, even what we call 
anxiety is experienced as a response to this or that life circumstance. But when anxiety is 
experienced authentically, it reveals the fundamentality of the issue we are to ourselves. That is, 
it reveals that we are the issue, not this or that life circumstance. Anxiety is the manifestation of 
our self-concern as such. Thus, whereas the experience of fear drives us away from that which 
we fear, the authentic experience of anxiety calls us back to ourselves. Fear, in effect, points to 
something ‘out there’ as the issue, whereas anxiety indicates that it is I myself, my very Being-
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in-the-world, that is the issue. It is not this or that life circumstance that makes me anxious, 
rather, Being-in-the-world is anxious as such, and, as such, makes this or that life circumstance 
relevant and/or meaningful.  
    And yet this raises a question: Granted that I am an issue to myself, and that anxiety, in its 
ontological character, reveals that it is I who am the issue, and not this or that life circumstance: 
do not these circumstances, and the way in which they excite my anxiety, reveal something of 
the character of the issue that I am to myself? Granted that I am a caring being, what, then, do I 
care about? What is the ultimate telos of my caring? 
 
III.  The Telos of Dasein  
    The endeavor to identify an ultimate telos, in terms of which Dasein’s self-projection might be 
made whole, is, as Heidegger notes, paradoxical. How, Heidegger asks, can a being whose very 
essence is self-projection ever have anything like an ultimate telos, given that the realization of 
such a telos would, presumably, then put an end to just those self-projections?: “If existence is 
definitive for Dasein’s Being  and its essence is constituted in part by potentiality-for-Being, 
then, as long as Dasein exists, it must in each case, as such potentiality, not yet be something.”91 
But this, Heidegger notes, seems to imply that Dasein’s very Being resists the possibility of 
achieving anything like ‘wholeness’: “Any entity whose Essence is made up of existence, is 
essentially opposed to the possibility of our getting it into our grasp as an entity which is a 
whole.”92 Given this, we have no assurance that “a primordial ontological Interpretation of 
Dasein will not founder on the kind of Being which belongs to the very entity we have taken as 
our theme.”93 Perhaps, after all, a full ontological account of Dasein just cannot be had.94  
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    And yet, as Heidegger considers this, it occurs to him that Dasein does indeed have the 
consciousness of coming to a kind of completion; namely, in death: “As long as Dasein is, there 
is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be. But to that which 
is thus outstanding, the ‘end’ itself belongs. The ‘end’ of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, 
which belongs to the potentiality-for-Being – that is to say, to existence – limits and determines 
in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein.”95 Certainly, the factor of death must be 
figured in to any account of Dasein’s possible ‘wholeness.’ But this requires that we come to 
understand just what death means, existentially, to Dasein: “If, however, Dasein’s Being-at-an-
end in death, and therewith its Being-a-whole, are to be included in the discussion of its possibly 
Being-a-whole, and if this is to be done in a way which is appropriate to the phenomena, then we 
must have obtained an ontologically adequate conception of death – that is to say an existential 
conception of it.”96 
    Thus, if we are to attain insight into the relation of ‘wholeness’ to the eventuality of death we 
must, as Heidegger says, endeavor to arrive at an adequate existential conception of death: “But 
as something of the character of Dasein, death is only in an existentiell Being towards death.”97 
Let us, then, turn to Heidegger’s treatment of this issue.     
 
IV.  Death 
    How do we know of death, asks Heidegger. Of course, none of us has yet died. Still, death is a 
factor in our lives and culture. We experience the dying of others, attend their funerals, grieve 
their loss, etc. Is this, then, the primary source of our knowledge of death? Do we know of death  
because we know of others having died? When we think of our own death, do we think of it 
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primarily by way of analogy with the deaths of others? Do we imagine experiencing death in 
whatever way we observe them to have experienced death?  
   But, of course, we cannot, for we do not in fact observe their experience of death. Though we 
can witness the termination of another’s biological life, we cannot witness another’s death as it is 
for that person. If, then, we cannot get an idea of death from another’s death, nor from our own 
experience of having died, whence comes our understanding of the meaning of death?: “The only 
remaining possibility for the analysis of death as dying, is either to form a purely existential 
conception of this phenomenon, or else to forgo altogether any ontological understanding of 
it.”98  
    When we consider our own death we consider it as the prospect of our coming to an end. But 
surely, says Heidegger, we do not mean by this end a ‘coming to completion,’ in the sense of 
finally having ‘together’ what had hitherto been lacking: “That Dasein should be together only 
when its ‘not-yet’ has been filled up is so far from the case that it is precisely then that Dasein is 
no longer.”99 Nor may we think of life’s culmination in death as like the ripening of a fruit: 
“With ripeness, the fruit fulfills itself. But is the death at which Dasein arrives, a fulfillment in 
this sense?”100 Certainly not, on the contrary, “for the most part, Dasein ends in unfulfillment, or 
else by having disintegrated and been used up.”101  
    So, again, in what sense is death an ‘end’ for Dasein? We might, of course, think that death is 
an end simply in the sense of a stopping. When Dasein dies the process of its life simply stops. 
This certainly seems to be true, but, nevertheless, we have never thus far experienced such 
stopping. Such stopping, then, can have meaning for us only as the prospect of stopping: “Just as 
Dasein is already its ‘not-yet,’ and is its ‘not-yet’ constantly as long as it is, it is already its end 
too. The ‘ending’ which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s 
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Being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein], but a Being-towards-the-end [Sein zum Ende] of this entity. 
Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is.”102 
    In other words, this prospect of stopping, this ‘being-towards-death,’ is something we already 
are, i.e., it is something that characterizes us now and throughout life. Death has existential 
meaning just as this pervasive prospect. We live in the awareness (often the denial) of having to 
die. But even in our denial we manifest our awareness, for the denial is really a mode of the 
awareness itself. Death, the prospect of death, is not merely something we encounter at the end 
of our lives, it is something that characterizes our lives as such.  
    Existentially, then, death is construed as Being-towards-death, and such Being-towards-death 
is recognized as, in some manner, characterizing life; i.e., as rendering life meaningful in a 
distinctive way. Our next question, then, is: in what way? What is the character of Being-
towards-death?    
 
V.  The Character of Being-Towards-Death 
    Heidegger divides the character of Being-towards-death into five primary elements: Death is 
Dasein’s ‘ownmost,’ it is ‘non-relational,’ it is ‘not to be outstripped,’ it is ‘certain,’ and it is 
‘indefinite.’  Let’s consider each of these in turn.  
 
1. Death as Dasein’s ‘Ownmost’ 
    Dasein, as existent, is a being who is essentially projected toward its possibilities. Insofar as 
Dasein is ‘towards-death,’ then, death too may be regarded as a possibility toward which Dasein 
is projected, although certainly a distinctive one. What, then, is death the possibility of? It is, 
says Heidegger, “the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there.”103 This possibility does not 
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confront Dasein from elsewhere, like the possibility of winning the lottery, or the possibility of 
encountering a storm, rather it is an essential feature of Dasein’s very Being. But even as an 
essential feature of Dasein’s Being it is utterly distinctive. Death is the possibility of im-
possibility, i.e., of no further possibility. The prospect of death, thus, pertains to me in a way that 
no other prospect does. Grammatically, I can construct the sentence ‘I will die’  along the same 
lines as ‘I will go to the market,’ but this grammatical similarity conceals a profound 
dissimilarity, for whereas it is I who will experience the market when I go, I will not experience 
‘my’ death. Death is the end of experience. Thus, to state it more precisely, it is not I who dies, it 
is the I that dies.  
    Death threatens the very mineness of my Being.  It is not something that happens to me, but is 
the end of the ‘me’ that I am.  Thus, death touches me in a way that nothing else does or can.  
Nothing in my Being-in-the-world but I myself touches me as intimately as my death. But this 
sentence itself fails to capture just what is meant. Indeed, the very subject-predicate structure of 
language makes it all but impossible to adequately express the intimacy of death. Death is not 
something I do, nor something done to me. It is the elimination of the I that I am.   
    Thus, the prospect of death, Being-towards-death, when confronted forthrightly, highlights the 
I that I am in a way that nothing else can.  In highlighting the I it highlights the issue that I am to 
myself. My death, thus, is distinctively mine, distinctively my own. For this very reason I cannot 
flee from the prospect of my death without fleeing from I myself.  This is what Heidegger means 
when he says that, as das Man, Dasein is not itself. He does not mean that Dasein flees from 
some characteristic of itself, but from the very I that it is. It flees from the I that it is by evading 
its very I-ness.   
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    Being-towards-death, then, is one’s ownmost in an altogether distinctive way, indeed, in the 
way that I myself am my own.   
  
2. Death is ‘non-relational’   
    It is for this reason that death is also ‘non-relational.’ Of course Heidegger has made clear that 
Dasein’s Being, as Being-in-the-world, is essentially related to the things and people encountered 
in its world. The ‘non-relationality’ of which Heidegger here speaks is, again, a distinctive one.   
    What death reveals to Dasein is that nothing in its world does, or can, provide for it an 
ultimate support. Thus, through Being-towards-death Dasein sees that its Being cannot, and, 
hence, does not, finally depend upon the world of things and others. In this respect, ‘non-
dependent’ might better capture what Heidegger intends here than non-relational. Dasein’s Being 
is not a dependency upon its world or upon others, hence it need not be in thrall to the world of 
things and others: “It [Being-towards-death] makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things 
with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being is the issue.”104         
 
3. Death is ‘not to be outstripped’  
    Death is Dasein’s ‘uttermost’ possibility; i.e., no other possibility can overcome it or 
determine its meaning. It is not on the way to anything and thus does not have its meaning in 
terms of something else. Resolved upon authentically, it allows Dasein to foresee itself as a 
whole, and order its priorities accordingly: “Since anticipation of the possibility that is not to be 
outstripped discloses also all the possibilities which lie ahead of [i.e., before] that possibility, this 
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anticipation includes the possibility of taking the whole of Dasein in advance in an existentiell 
manner; that is to say, it includes the possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-for-Being.”105     
 
4. Death is ‘Certain’ 
    The certainty that pertains to death is not inductive and statistical, although everyday Dasein 
tends to represent it as such and thereby objectify death as, essentially, something that happens to 
others. But the certainty of death is revealed in our ineluctable anxiety with respect to it: “In 
evading its death, even everyday Being-towards-the-end is indeed certain of its death in another 
way than it might itself like to have true on purely theoretical considerations. This ‘other way’ is 
what everydayness for the most part veils from itself.”106 The certainty of death presents Dasein 
with the choice of either ‘holding it for true’ or living in evasion of it.    
 
5. Death is ‘Indefinite’ 
    Finally, death’s certainty is indefinite. Dasein does not know when it will come, and this ‘not 
knowing’ keeps Being-towards-death alive as a constant factor in Dasein’s existence.  
 
VI.  Death and das Man 
    We return again to the question we asked above: How does Dasein know of its death? Whence 
does the understanding of death that Heidegger has sketched above arise? Our knowledge of 
death, Heidegger insists, is neither empirical nor theoretical: “Dasein does not, proximally and 
for the most part, have any explicit or even theoretical knowledge of the fact that it has been 
delivered over to its death, and that death thus belongs to Being-in-the-world. Thrownness into 
death reveals itself to Dasein in a more primordial and impressive manner in that state-of-mind 
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which we have called ‘anxiety’.”107  “Being-towards-death” writes Heidegger, “is essentially 
anxiety.”108 
    We can become clearer about this by considering what it is that one who fears death may be 
said to fear. If death is essentially ‘no longer being there,’ then, presumably, the dead are no 
longer there to suffer from it. There is, then, quite literally, nothing to fear. And yet this 
realization does not resolve the fear of death. The fear of death is a feature, not of death as such, 
but of death as impending. Death’s meaning is exhausted, so to speak, in the  prospect of death. 
The existential concept of death is, ultimately, nothing but this prospect itself. Whereas death as 
an event may lie in the future, the meaning of death, i.e., the prospect of death, is ever-present 
throughout life.  It is, to express it in the terms we explored in chapter two, a distinctive feature 
of Dasein as futural.   
    The character of death as impending is revealed, says Heidegger, in anxiety:  “In anxiety,” 
Heidegger writes, “one feels ‘uncanny’.”109 The word Macquarrie and Robinson translate as 
‘uncanny’ is the German word ‘unheimlich’ which literally means ‘unhomelike.’ This literal 
meaning is important to Heidegger’s sense. Being-in-the-world, as such, feels not at home with 
itself.  Such not-at-homeness is revealed to it in, as, anxiety. Such anxiety does not arise from 
this or that life circumstance. It is an essential feature of Dasein: “That about which anxiety is 
anxious reveals itself as that in the face of which it is anxious – Being-in-the-world.”110  Such 
anxiety has all the characteristics of Being-towards-death we have enumerated: It is one’s 
‘ownmost’ – arising essentially from oneself and not conditioned by something else; it is ‘non-
relational’ – it is not finally relative to this or that life-circumstance and, thus, reveals Dasein’s 
ultimate, ontological, independence of its world; it is ‘not to be outstripped’ – i.e., not to be 
finally escaped through some modification of circumstances; it is ‘certain’ in an even more 
Richard Oxenberg; Being-Towards-Life/Being-Towards-Death 
 
94  
primordial sense than Descartes’ cogito, for it reveals the truth of Dasein in a more authentic way 
than does the cogito
111; and it is ‘indefinite,’ in the sense that it is not specific to one thing or 
another but is a pervasive presence.   
    In anxiety, then, Dasein experiences a sense of being not-at-home in itself: Unheimlichkeit. 
This sense of not-at-homeness induces Dasein to flee from itself into its world, a flight which 
Heidegger calls ‘falling into the world’: “By this time we can see phenomenally what falling, as 
fleeing, flees in the face of. It does not flee in the face of entities within-the-world; these are 
precisely what it flees towards . . . When in falling we flee into the ‘at-home’ of publicness, we 
flee in the face of the ‘not-at-home’; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in 
Dasein.”112 We now see the source of Dasein’s flight from the truth of itself which Heidegger 
has called das Man. Dasein seeks to escape the uncanniness of Being-towards-death experienced 
in anxiety, which it can only do through escaping itself, through self-forgetfulness, since this 
uncanniness is a feature of Dasein’s own Being as such. Thus, although, for Heidegger, Dasein’s 
ordinary mode of Being is as das Man, this is not Dasein’s primordial mode of Being. Das Man 
is a covering up of authentic Dasein; a covering up that has, for ‘everyday’ Dasein, always 
already taken place: “That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquilized and familiar [i.e., das 
Man] is a mode of Dasein’s uncanniness, not the reverse. From an existential-ontological point 
of view, the ‘not-at-home’ must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon.”113    
    This flight into das Man, while robbing Dasein of its authenticity and its capacity to pursue its 
authentic potentialities, has a tranquilizing effect upon Dasein. It soothes the anxiety inherent in 
Being-towards-death by, in effect, denying the characteristics of Being-towards-death. First, it 
denies that Dasein’s life is essentially its own. As das Man, Dasein takes itself to be merely ‘one 
of the crowd,’ adopts the opinions of the crowd, and pursues goals dictated to it by the values of 
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the crowd. Next, das Man denies the non-relationality, or, as we have expressed it, non-
dependency, revealed in Being-towards-death. Das Man persuades itself that the world of things 
and others to which it is related can indeed provide it with ultimate, ontological, support, and 
that, therefore, success in this world is all important. To further this denial, das Man denies the 
inevitability of death – its non-outstripability – by, in effect, allowing Dasein to identify itself 
with the crowd that endures. Death is always something that has happened to someone else, 
something that Dasein has survived. Also, the certainty of death, although attested to, is only 
attested to on the grounds that it ‘happens’ to ‘everyone,’ and, thus, is of no specific concern to 
oneself. The certainty of death is not something that one allows to touch oneself, it is reduced to 
a matter of statistics: “The falling everydayness of Dasein is acquainted with death’s certainty, 
and yet evades Being-certain.”114  Finally das Man denies the pervasive impendingness of death, 
its indefiniteness. Death is put off as something that will happen at the ‘end’ of life, which is 
always not yet, and, therefore, of no immediate concern: “One says, ‘Death certainly comes, but 
not right away.’ With this ‘but . . . ,’ the ‘they’ denies that death is certain…Death is deferred to 
‘sometime later.’”115  
    In all these ways Dasein seeks to escape the anxiety of Being-towards-death and thereby 
achieve a certain tranquility. Das Man, writes Heidegger, “provides a constant tranquilization 
about death.”116 But such tranquility is gained only at a price, the price of inauthenticity. Thus, 
such tranquility is also, at the same time, a self-alienation. The fall into das Man is a fall from 
oneself: “Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for 
Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world.’”117 Dasein is ‘tempted’ to this fall from self by the 
tranquilization it offers. But such a fall from self is also an alienation from self: “Falling Being-
in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilizing; it is at the same time alienating.”118 Such 
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alienation “closes off from Dasein its authenticity and possibility, even if only the possibility of 
genuinely foundering.”119       
    The tranquilization provided by das Man, however, is never complete, and cannot be complete 
just because it is essentially false. Thus Dasein’s “uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is 
a threat to its everyday lostness in the ‘they’.”120 Anxiety is forever ‘breaking out’ upon Dasein 
in its lostness, and Dasein is forever employing strategies to manage this break out, but can never 
succeed once and for all, because, as said, anxiety is essential to the Being of Dasein as such. 
Thus Dasein’s fleeing from itself is also a struggle to flee from itself. Dasein is ‘haunted’ by the 
call of its own authenticity; which Heidegger dubs ‘the call of conscience.’ We will discuss this 
call in the next chapter.  
 
VII.  Death and Wholeness 
    We must now consider in what sense Heidegger’s treatment of Being-towards-death resolves 
the paradox of Dasein’s telos, which must be resolved if we are ever to grasp Dasein as an 
ontological whole. This, remember, is necessary in order to finally understand the question of the 
meaning of Being, which is, as well, the question of the issue that Dasein is to itself.   
    The paradox may be stated, again, as follows: Dasein, as existent, is essentially self-projective. 
Dasein is always projected upon its own potentialities. It is from the ‘upon which’ of Dasein’s  
projections that Dasein’s world, and its life, acquire meaning. To understand Dasein as a whole, 
then, it would seem we must understand the ultimate ‘upon which’ of its projection, for this is 
what would provide final meaning to the entirety of Dasein’s life. But it would seem that Dasein, 
as essentially self-projective, cannot have an ultimate upon-which, for were it ever to reach such 
an ultimate state this very reaching would be Dasein’s undoing as the self-projective being it is. 
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Does this signify, then, that Dasein’s life cannot have coherent, ultimate, meaning, that Dasein, 
for as long as it endures, is essentially fragmentary? 
    On the contrary, says Heidegger, Being-towards-death allows Dasein to come to itself as a 
whole, through adopting what Heidegger calls an ‘anticipatory’ attitude towards death:  “The 
existential projection in which anticipation has been delimited, has made visible the ontological 
possibility of an existentiell Being-towards-death which is authentic. Therewith, however, the 
possibility of Dasein’s having an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole emerges . . . ” 121 
Death, of course, is, as such, something that can never be actualized. The moment one is dead 
one is, precisely, not actualized. It cannot, therefore, be construed as a telos in the ordinary 
sense. It is, in this respect, pure possibility: “In accordance with its essence, this possibility offers 
no support for becoming intent on something, ‘picturing’ to oneself the actuality which is 
possible, and so forgetting its possibility.”122 But this pure possibility nevertheless has meaning, 
in just the ways we have cited. It lights up Dasein’s own self-concern as its own, and thereby has 
the power to draw Dasein out of its lostness in das Man. It constitutes, then, not a telos, but what 
we will call a telic context
123
 in terms of which Dasein’s specific projects may be axio-
ontologically oriented and understood.   
    To get clear on what is meant by ‘telic context’ let us take an analogy. The mariner navigates 
his ship by the north star. He does not thereby navigate his ship to the north star. Rather, he 
navigates his ship from port to port. But he is able to orient himself spatially by reference to the 
north star. Through this he is able to know where he is at any given moment, and how to steer his 
ship so as to get him to where he wants to go. The north star is a fixed point which allows him to 
orient himself spatially vis-à-vis his sea voyages. Likewise, Being-towards-death, as Heidegger 
envisions it, provides an ultimate, axio-ontological, orienting context that allows one to order 
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one’s priorities so as to get one to ‘where one wants to go’; i.e., to the fulfillment of one’s 
factical potentialities.     
    In this respect, Being-towards-death and das Man may be viewed as two opposing telic 
contexts. Each provides Dasein with a certain orientation to life, each makes certain demands and 
provides Dasein with a certain outlook through which Dasein lives out its specific projects. But, 
of course, for Heidegger, these two telic contexts are not on a par, nor are they independent of 
one another. The context of das Man is essentially a reaction to, and a flight from, the context of 
Being-towards-death which is, therefore, Dasein’s true telic context. But, because of the anxiety 
implicit in Dasein’s true telic context Dasein lives, proximally and for the most part, in flight 
from itself. The telic context of das Man is essentially a running away from the telic context of  
Being-towards-death.   
    To overcome this running away one must reverse it. One must ‘run towards’ oneself as a 
‘running towards’ one’s essential Being-towards-death. Such ‘running towards’ Heidegger calls 
‘anticipation.’ The word ‘anticipation’ is the Macquarrie-Robinson translation of Vorlaufen, 
which quite literally means ‘running towards.’ Such ‘running towards’ death, of course, does not 
mean wishing to die or working at dying. On the contrary, according to Heidegger, it is through 
just such ‘anticipation’ of death that one is finally freed to fully live as oneself. Anticipation, 
here, means affirming Being-towards-death as one’s ultimate telic context; a context that has just 
the meanings we’ve seen. This, finally, allows Dasein to wrench itself away from das Man and 
live as itself. It does not prescribe the specifics of how Dasein is to live, but frees Dasein itself to 
prescribe these specifics from out of its own potentialities, rather than have them prescribed for it 
by das Man. The term Heidegger employs for such self-prescriptivity is resoluteness. Authentic 
Dasein, then, lives as anticipatory resoluteness; i.e., as resolved upon the specific potentialities it 
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has prescribed for itself from out of itself, under the ultimate telic context of Being-towards-
death.    
    There are many questions that arise from this account, questions that Heidegger himself never 
addresses, but which will become important for us in considering the relation of Heidegger’s 
concept of Being-towards-death to the Judeo-Christian account of human Being. If Being-
towards-death is indeed Dasein’s true ‘telic context’ why should it present Dasein with the sense 
of being ‘not-at-home’? One would expect, on the face of it, that Dasein’s truth would also feel 
to Dasein like its home. Heidegger never gives the kind of thoughtful analysis to the 
Befindlichkeit of Being-at-home that he gives to ‘not-at-homeness.’ And yet, surely, ‘not-at-
homeness’ is only called such because it names what feels like the privation of being at home. 
The state-of-mind of ‘not-at-homeness,’ then, presupposes a more primordial state of Being-at-
home. What is the significance of this?  
   And why should the mood that most essentially characterizes Dasein’s authenticity, anxiety, 
just happen to be associated with a mood whose essential meaning is ‘run away!’, i.e., fear. 
Heidegger himself has made us aware of the disclosive nature of moods, how moods are not 
arbitrary feelings but are disclosive of meaning. What meaning does anxiety disclose? Is it not 
danger? How is it that so essentially repellent a mood as anxiety should be the mood that one 
must ‘run towards’ in order to truly realize oneself? Does this not make Dasein the most self-
contradictory of beings? A being who is essentially repelled by itself?  
    Next, why should the flight into das Man be tranquilizing? One might suppose that the 
clustering together of a number of essentially anxious beings would result in an exacerbation of 
their anxiety, as each sees her own anxiousness reflected in the others. And yet, on the contrary, 
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it turns out that it is just such clustering that soothes Dasein’s anxiety, even if incompletely. 
What does this signify?  
    Finally, if Dasein is essentially self-projective, and in such a manner that the ‘upon-which’ of 
its projections is always already implicated in its present self-understanding, would not even the 
prospect of death, i.e., the prospect of no further projections, be an affront to the essential 
tendency of its very Being? Hasn’t Heidegger, despite his early cautions, simply conflated the 
idea of termination with the idea of wholeness? Wouldn’t the wholeness of a self-projective 
being have to involve the fulfillment of its self-projective tendencies rather than their termination, 
however conceptually vague our idea of such fulfillment might be? Indeed, is not the religious 
notion of eternal life, as the overcoming of death,  an attempt to convey just such a possibility of 
fulfillment and wholeness?      
    Might it be, then, that there is a third telic context that Heidegger has not considered?  A telic 
context that is neither Being-towards-death nor das Man, but through which the meaning of both 
may be finally understood? Indeed, we find just such a telic context articulated in the Judeo-
Christian mythos, and we name it Being-towards-life.   
    But before we turn to its consideration we must follow Heidegger through his own endeavors 
to confirm his analyses thus far. Heidegger asks whether there is any indication that Dasein itself 
feels that it lives, often, in untruth. Is Heidegger’s claim that everyday Dasein lives in falsity 
merely an expression of Heidegger’s own peculiar prejudices, or can one find something in 
human culture more generally that suggests Dasein’s awareness of such falsity? Does Dasein in 
general testify to a sense of being ‘untrue’ to itself? Heidegger believes so, and that we find this 
testimony in the phenomena associated with what has, traditionally, been called ‘conscience.’   
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 Chapter V:  The Call of Conscience 
 
I.  The Criterion of Truth 
    Is there, indeed, an existential truth from which Dasein is generally alienated? In the second 
chapter we considered Heidegger’s notion of truth as aletheia, i.e., unconcealment. But 
unconcealment is itself, of course, a metaphor. The metaphorical image is of something once 
hidden that is now unhidden, something in darkness that has been brought to light. And 
Heidegger has now delineated two ways of Being that correspond, in his view, to hiddenness and 
unhiddennness, truth and untruth; i.e., das Man and Being-towards-death.  
   But even if we grant Heidegger’s claim that these two terms name two distinct ‘telic contexts’ 
under which Dasein may live, on what grounds does Heidegger maintain that the one constitutes 
‘truth’ and the other ‘untruth’? There is a normativity implicit in this claim that requires 
clarification. This is by no means a minor problem nor a problem concerning only Heidegger’s 
work. The Judeo-Christian tradition has long advanced a concept of truth with striking 
similarities to Heidegger’s. It has claimed to speak in the name of a truth, not of empirical 
propositions, but of existence itself. The counterclaim that there is no such truth is characteristic 
of much modern and post-modern secular thought. Indeed, it is possible to see the 
epistemological minimalism characteristic of modern thought, beginning with Descartes, as a 
reaction against the absolutistic, existential, truth-claims of the Judeo-Christian tradition.   
    In his preference for Being-towards-death over das Man has Heidegger done anything more 
than reveal his own personal prejudices? Is there that in Dasein itself which ‘calls’ it to honor 
something on the order of ‘existential truth’? These are questions that Heidegger himself now 
entertains: “We must investigate whether to any extent and in any way Dasein gives testimony, 
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from its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, as to a possible authenticity of its existence, so that it 
not only makes known that in an existentiell manner such authenticity is possible, but demands 
this of itself.”124  
    If there is any such thing as existential truth, then its truth character can only be testified to by 
existence itself; which is to say, by Dasein. Dasein itself must show some evidence of sometimes 
feeling ‘in truth’ and sometimes ‘in falsity’ with respect to itself. Dasein itself must show signs 
of being sensitive to some standard of existential normativity by which its life ‘should’ be 
governed. Heidegger claims that we do indeed see such evidence, and we see it in the 
phenomenon that has been conventionally called ‘conscience.’ 
 
II.  The Question of Method 
    Heidegger now begins his investigation into the ontology of conscience. His methodology 
here, as throughout, is that of hermeneutical phenomenology. That is to say, Heidegger will 
observe the phenomenon (presumably as he finds it in himself) and then interpret the 
significance of this phenomenon in relation to others he has previously observed and interpreted. 
The question of method is of particular moment at this point because Heidegger is now 
examining that very phenomenon that is to serve, to some degree, as confirmation of his previous 
findings and, by implication, of his methodology itself.  
    But are we not now in the tightest methodological loop? The same Martin Heidegger who has 
employed his method of hermeneutical phenomenology to arrive at the distinction between das 
Man and Being-towards-death will now employ this very same method to investigate the 
phenomenon that, he claims, will vindicate his findings. This problem becomes all the more 
pressing when we see, as we shall, that Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience departs, 
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sometimes radically, from the conventional one. Have we anything more here than one prejudice 
confirming another? Can we even avoid the suspicion that Heidegger’s analysis of conscience is 
guided by the conclusions he wishes to reach?       
    This has come to be known as the problem of the hermeneutical circle, and it is a problem that 
Heidegger himself addresses: “Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding must 
already have understood what is to be interpreted.”125 Dasein does not and cannot begin its 
investigation of itself from a neutral place. It must begin with the understanding that it already 
has. Nor can Dasein retreat to some position outside of itself from which to observe itself 
‘objectively’; not only because there is no such ‘outside’ but, even more to the point, because 
interpretation itself, the phenomenological-hermeneutical process of interpretation, requires the 
active enlistment of those very features of Dasein that are to be interpreted. ‘Presupposition,’ of 
one sort or another, is essential to the project of interpretation itself.  Thus, there is no escape 
from the circle: “What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right 
way . . . In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To 
be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have 
understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and 
fore-conception [our presuppositions] to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, 
but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures by the things 
themselves.”126  
     But how are we to do this? Does not the endeavor to ‘purify’ our presuppositions itself entail 
the enlistment of these presuppositions? Are we not, indeed, motivated by these very 
presuppositions when we initiate our hermeneutical investigation? Heidegger himself raises these 
questions:  
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Where does this Interpretation get its clue, if not from an idea of existence in general which 
has been ‘presupposed’?  How have the steps in the analysis of inauthentic everydayness 
been regulated, if not by the concept of existence which we have posited? And if we say that 
Dasein ‘falls,’ and that therefore the authenticity of its potentiality-for-Being must be wrested 
from Dasein in spite of this tendency of its Being, from what point of view is this spoken? Is 
not everything already illuminated by the light of the ‘presupposed’ idea of existence, even if 
rather dimly? Where does this idea get its justification?
127
 
 
And he answers as follows:  
When it is objected that the existential Interpretation is ‘circular,’ it is said that we have 
‘presupposed’ the idea of existence and Being in general, and that Dasein gets Interpreted 
‘accordingly,’ so that the idea of Being may be obtained from it. But what does 
‘presupposition’ signify? In positing the idea of existence, do we also posit some proposition 
from which we deduce further propositions about the Being of Dasein, in accordance with 
formal rules of consistency? Or does this pre-supposing have the character of an 
understanding projection, in such a manner indeed that the Interpretation by which such an 
understanding gets developed, will let that which is to be interpreted put itself into words for 
the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord whether, as the entity which it is, it 
has that state of Being for which it has been disclosed in the projection with regard to its 
formal aspects? Is there any other way at all by which an entity can put itself into words with 
regard to its Being?…What common sense wishes to eliminate in avoiding the ‘circle,’ on 
the supposition that it is measuring up to the loftiest rigor of scientific investigation, is 
nothing less than the basic structure of care.
128
     
 
    The alternative to the circle is a retreat to the epistemological minimalism of, say, logical 
positivism, in which only what appears in the public space of the empirical is ‘officially’ allowed 
meaning. But this in effect makes philosophy impossible, if what we mean by philosophy is the 
disciplined endeavor to obey the Socratic dictum: ‘Know thyself’: “Because understanding, in 
accordance with its existential meaning, is Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being historiological 
[or, for that matter, philosophical] knowledge transcends in principle the idea of rigor held in the 
most exact sciences.”129  
   Does this mean we are trapped in a hopeless redundancy? Can a philosopher do nothing more 
than reiterate what he or she already believes? The practice of philosophy itself proves 
otherwise. Indeed, the ‘circle’ is an overly simplistic metaphor for the true hermeneutical 
process, which involves investigation, examination, dissection, and novel re-integration of what 
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has been newly investigated and examined. What guides this process? What criteria can be 
brought to bear to determine whether these novel interpretations are in any sense sound? What 
guides it is also what motivates it, and what may simply be called ‘fit.’ The interpretation must 
‘fit’ the phenomena as they appear to us (as we live them), and must fit it along all the axio-
ontological dimensions by which our existence is bound. To suggest that our assessment of  ‘fit’ 
will be dictated by our presuppositions, and is therefore an unsound criterion, is a naïve critique 
– for it is just because we sense that our presuppositions do not ‘fit’ that we have ventured upon 
the hermeneutical path to begin with.  
    In the case of Being and Time it is the whole modern self-interpretation that Heidegger has 
called into question, that Heidegger has claimed does not ‘fit.’ In a sense, the ‘forgotten 
question’ (of the meaning of Being) serves merely as a token for this general sense of lack of fit. 
Heidegger’s entire critique of das Man is doubtless an attempt to articulate and clarify his pre-
philosophical intimation that the common person’s self-interpretation is at odds with a more 
authentic relation to self. Out of this, Being and Time endeavors to provide, at a very 
fundamental level, a reinterpretation of what it is to be a human being. What criteria can we 
bring to bear in assessing whether or not its reinterpretation is apt? Just this sense of ‘aptness’ or 
‘inaptness’ itself, which we must struggle to articulate as best we can.    
    This is, for sure, a sloppy and inexact method.  But not only is it the only method available to 
us, it is the only one remotely possible, given the kind of beings we are. The ideal of apodictic 
certainly, which launched the Cartesian project and has characterized so much of modern 
thought, needs itself to be interrogated with respect to its presuppositions, and, even more, its 
existential implications. What is it we are trying to achieve through such certainty? And what 
must we give up to achieve it?   
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    So – contra Wittgenstein – we assert that those things that cannot be said (with perfect 
precision) must, nevertheless, be said as best they can, for they are among the most important 
things to say. This principle, derived here from Heidegger’s work, can serve as both a 
justification for, and a caution with respect to, any formal articulation of religious faith. Faith 
entails a commitment to an interpretation of Being (a telic context) that can never achieve 
apodictic certainty. Faith is not thereby invalidated, given that human beings must, nevertheless, 
live within the context of some such uncertain interpretation.  But this very fact, which serves as 
faith’s justification, also implies its fallibility. Such fallibility does not require that faith be 
abandoned; it does require that we humbly acknowledge the inevitable imperfection of any 
possible human expression of faith.   
    We can say the same of Heidegger’s treatment of conscience. Certainly, and necessarily, 
Heidegger’s treatment is bound up with his entire analytic of Dasein, and if it is in any way 
confirmatory of that analytic it is so only to the extent that we are persuaded by it. On the other 
hand, even if we are not wholly persuaded it is not therefore worthless. The interpretation of 
human existence is and must be a ‘work in progress’; contributions to this work are not lost, even 
when surpassed by more satisfactory ones. 
 
III.  Schuldigsein 
    Heidegger begins by acknowledging that the very reality of conscience has often been called 
into question: “That the very ‘fact’ of conscience has been disputed, that its function as a higher 
court for Dasein’s existence has been variously assessed – all this might only mislead us into 
dismissing this phenomenon if the very ‘doubtfulness’ of this Fact – or the way in which it has 
been interpreted – did not prove that here a primordial phenomenon of Dasein lies before us.”130 
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Heidegger does not elaborate on this point but what he presumably means is that the very 
questioning of the phenomenon of conscience indicates that there is something to question, even 
if its customary interpretation is considered dubious. Even for dismissive interpretations, in 
which what is customarily called conscience is explained away in terms of psychological or 
sociological factors, some phenomenon must stand as the target of these dismissals. Something is 
being denied a particular meaning. The task of the existential analytic, then, is to identify this 
something, and state is true meaning.    
    What conscience is conventionally said to do is to make one aware of one’s ‘guilt.’ Insofar as 
one has been afflicted by a ‘pang’ of conscience one has come to recognize one’s guiltiness with 
respect to something. Heidegger now asks: what are the ontological conditions for the possibility 
of being guilty? What must be true of a being for it to be susceptible to an experience of 
guiltiness? Heidegger notes that ‘guiltiness’ always suggests an indebtedness of some kind: 
“Everyday common sense first takes ‘Being-Guilty [Schuldigsein] in the sense of ‘owing,’ of 
‘having something due on account.’ One is to give back to the Other something to which the 
latter has a claim.”131 This connotation of indebtedness, it must the noted, is far more pronounced 
in the German word Schuldigsein, which can mean simply ‘indebted’ in the sense of owing 
money, than in the English word guilt, which does not have the same etymological base. 
Nevertheless, even in English we speak of a criminal having to ‘pay his debt’ to society or of 
justice ‘exacting its due.’  In the idea of guiltiness, then, as well as in the idea of general 
indebtedness, is the idea of coming to be responsible for something that is lacking. To the extent 
that one has incurred a debt one is responsible for paying it back. To the extent that one has 
wronged another one is responsible for making reparations. “These ordinary significations of 
‘Being-Guilty’ [Schuldigsein] as ‘having debts to someone’ and ‘having responsibility for 
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something’ can go together and define a kind of behavior which we call ‘making oneself 
responsible’.”132 
    One becomes responsible to another, in this sense, to the extent that one has deprived that 
other of something belonging to them. If one has borrowed money from the other then one is the 
source of the other’s ‘lack’ of this money, and one is responsible for making it up. If one has 
wronged another and hampered her life in some way, then one is the source of this negativity 
and, again, responsible for making it up. Through such considerations Heidegger arrives at a 
formal conception of Schuldigsein as “Being-the-basis for a lack of something in the Dasein of 
an Other, and in such a manner that this very Being-the-basis determines itself as ‘lacking in 
some way’ in terms of that for which it is the basis.”133 In other words, one comes to be schuldig 
(in debt) in relation to another to the extent that one has deprived that other of something 
belonging to the other, and to the extent that one does not oneself have the resources for making 
it up. Of course, if one possessed the resources to cover what one owes then one might do so and 
would no longer be in debt. One is essentially in a state of debt (schuldig) just insofar as one is 
both responsible for the other’s loss and unable to make it up.  
    Thus indebtedness, Schuldigsein, has something to do with lack, or, more precisely, with the 
potentiality of a human being to be in a state of lack. Heidegger dubs this state ‘nullity.’ One 
becomes indebted to another just to the extent that one has made oneself the basis of a ‘nullity’ in 
another: “Hence we define the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty!’ as ‘Being-the-basis-for-
a-Being which has been defined by a ‘not’ – that is to say, as ‘Being-the-basis of a nullity’.”134    
    Yet it is not enough that one be the basis of a nullity in another. In order for the phenomenon 
of guilt to exist one must be capable of recognizing oneself to be such a basis. Thus, Being-
indebted (Schuldig-Sein) is not, first of all, a matter of legal or social convention. There is that in 
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Dasein which is able to own up to such Being-indebted, to acknowledge that the other has a 
legitimate claim on one, a claim grounded in an ontological legitimacy that precedes and is the 
basis for any possible social or legal legitimacy. Indeed, the proof of this is that Dasein can feel 
itself to be wrongly accused and convicted of debt, forced to pay what it does not really owe. 
This is a case in which the exception proves the rule: for if Dasein can feel wrongly convicted of 
debt, it can, by implication, feel rightly convicted as well.   
   What is the ontological condition for the possibility of such Being-indebted, such recognizing 
oneself as indebted? Heidegger traces this possibility to what he calls the nothingness or nullity 
inherent in Dasein’s very Being. Dasein’s nullity may be seen in three ways, corresponding to 
the three temporal ecstases of Dasein’s temporal constitution: there is the nullity implicit in 
Dasein’s thrownness (past), the nullity implicit in Dasein’s freedom (present), and the nullity 
implicit in Dasein’s Being-towards-death (future). “Care . . . ” writes Heidegger, “is permeated 
with nullity through and through.”135  
    Dasein’s ‘thrownness’ entails nullity insofar as it reveals that Dasein is not the basis of its own 
Being: “As being, Dasein is something that has been thrown; it has been brought into its ‘there,’ 
but not of its own accord . . . As existent, it never comes back behind its thrownness in such a 
way that it might first release this ‘that-it-is-and-has-to-be’ from its Being-its-Self and lead it into 
its ‘there’.”136 Dasein has to be itself but has not, first of all, chosen to be itself. It first of all 
‘finds itself’ already ‘there.’ Its ultimate whence is veiled from it. Thus Dasein’s Being rests 
upon, as Heidegger expresses it, ‘a null basis.’   
    Beyond this, Dasein is null in respect to its freedom. Nullity, indeed, is the very condition for 
the possibility of freedom. To choose to actualize one potentiality is to exclude other 
potentialities from actualization. This is the sense of freedom’s ‘nullity’ that Heidegger himself 
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notes. But perhaps even more to the point is that freedom, as such, entails a lack of definite 
determination to any one possibility. Dasein stands before its possibilities in a place of choice, at 
a crossroad of options, and just as long as it stands at this crossroad of options it is not 
determined to any one of them. There is, thus, a certain ‘nothingness’ implicit in freedom itself. 
As free, Dasein is determined, so to speak, by a lack of any definite determination.
137
    
    Finally, Dasein is ‘null’ insofar as it is Being-towards-death; i.e., Being-towards the possibility 
of no-further-possibility. This also, like freedom, constitutes a lack of determination; in this case, 
a lack of ultimate determination. Not only is Dasein, as thrown, null in its basis, but, as Being-
towards-death, it is null in its final term. And, of course, as free it is null in its present stance. 
These three nullities are related to one another and, taken together, constitute a fundamental lack 
of determinateness at the core of Dasein’s Being. Even the apparent determinateness of Dasein’s 
facticity is not a true determinateness for, as thrown, Dasein “has been released from its 
[factical] basis . . . ”138     
    But what has Dasein’s lack of determinateness to do with the phenomenon of Being-indebted? 
Heidegger’s suggestion seems to be that this nullity constitutes Dasein’s primordial indebtedness 
to itself. This indebtedness, of course, is not something Dasein has incurred through some action 
it has taken. Rather, it is an implication of Dasein’s very Being as ek-sistent. This primordial 
indebtedness to self, responsibility to self, is what Heidegger calls Schuldigsein, translated in the 
Macquarie-Robinson text as Being-Guilty. This translation, I believe, is extremely misleading, 
for the English word ‘guilt’ does not have ‘debt’ as an alternate meaning, as does the German 
Schuld; whereas it is just this sense of ‘debt’ that I believe is uppermost in Heidegger’s mind.139 
Dasein is primordially responsible to itself, responsible for making something determinate of its 
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indeterminateness (not once and for all, as per Sartre, but in each and every situation). In its 
flight into das Man it attempts to evade this responsibility. 
    It is only because Dasein first of all exists as primordial indebtedness/responsibility (to itself) 
that it can incur ontical ‘debts’ in relation to others. It is the ontological structure of Schuldigsein 
that makes Dasein a creature whose life can be reckoned in terms of ontical  ‘debts,’ 
‘responsibilities’ and ‘guilt’: “Being-guilty does not first result from indebtedness, but . . . on the 
contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only ‘on the basis’ of a primordial Being-guilty.”140 
Thus what Heidegger is pointing to with his notion of Schuldigsein is the ontological ground, the 
condition for the possibility, of obligation itself. This ground of obligation, then, constitutes a 
normativity implicit in Dasein’s very Being.     
  
IV.  The Call of Conscience 
    We are made aware of this primordial responsibility to ourselves, according to Heidegger, via 
the ‘call of conscience’: “Conscience summons Dasein’s Self from its lostness in the ‘they’.”141 
As das Man, Dasein is in flight from its responsibility to itself. It is the function of conscience to 
call Dasein back to itself, back to an acknowledgment of its primordial self-responsibility (i.e., 
Schuldigsein). In this call there are three elements: the one who calls, the one who is called, and 
the content of the call itself. We will consider each of these in turn.  
    “If the caller is asked about its name, status, origin or repute, it not only refuses to answer, but 
does not even leave the slightest possibility of one’s making it into something with which one 
can be familiar when one’s understanding of Dasein has a ‘worldly’ orientation.”142 The caller’s 
sole concern, according to Heidegger, is in having us respond to the call itself, it is not interested 
in having us speculate as to its origin and character and, thereby, divert ourselves once again 
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from what we are being called to. Its “peculiar indefiniteness” about itself, makes “known to us 
that the caller is solely absorbed in summoning us to something, that it is heard only as such, and 
furthermore that it will not let itself be coaxed.”143 
    Nevertheless, the existential analytic, as such, has an interest in understanding the ontology of 
the call and therefore the identity of the caller. But the answer to the question of who calls, is, in 
a sense, implicit in the nature of the call itself; for what else can call one to a responsibility to 
oneself  but this very responsibility? If one were not first of all (primordially, ontologically) 
responsible to self no call from elsewhere could make one responsible. It is one’s own Being as 
responsible that calls one into acknowledgment of one’s responsibility: “In conscience Dasein 
calls to itself.”144   Of course, the call does not come from oneself as one currently understands 
oneself. The call, in effect, is one’s own authenticity breaking out upon one’s inauthenticity in 
order to call it to account. Thus: “The call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over 
me.”145 
   The call, then, is phenomenally experienced as transcendent and ‘uncanny,’ insofar as it 
emerges from a more primordial place in oneself than one is customarily cognizant of.  It is this 
that has led to its being interpreted as a call from God, according to Heidegger: “These 
phenomenal findings are not to be explained away. After all, they have been taken as a starting-
point for explaining the voice of conscience as an alien power by which Dasein is dominated. If 
the interpretation continues in this direction, one supplies a possessor for the power thus posited, 
or one takes the power itself as a person who makes himself known – namely God.”146 But this 
interpretation, says Heidegger, is a function of our proclivity to assign phenomena to something 
present-at-hand, a proclivity we must resist: “We must instead hold fast not only to the 
phenomenal findings that I receive the call as coming both from me and from beyond me, but 
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also the implication that this phenomenon is here delineated ontologically as a phenomenon of 
Dasein.”147   
    It is Dasein, then, who calls to itself, Dasein “in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-
the-world as the ‘not-at-home’ – the bare ‘that-it-is’ in the ‘nothing’ of the world. The caller is 
unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice.”148 Nevertheless it is I 
myself, my own truth, calling me into self-acknowledgment. 
    Who then is addressed by the call? It is, of course, Dasein as das Man; Dasein as flight from 
itself, as ‘fallen’ into the world: “Losing itself in the publicness and the idle talk of the ‘they,’ it 
fails to hear its own Self in listening to the they-self.”149 The call of conscience, then, is Dasein 
calling itself back to itself, back to its ‘truth’ from its lostness in ‘falsity.’  
    And what does the call say? Heidegger’s answer: “Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts 
nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it try to 
set going a soliloquy in the Self to which it has appealed. Nothing gets called to this Self, but it 
has been summoned to itself.”150 The call says nothing that can be put into words, but it gives one 
to understand: ‘In debt!’, i.e., ‘Responsible!’  Not responsible in the sense of accountable for 
what one has done, but rather responsible for taking responsibility for who one is.   
    We will entirely fail to understand this if we hear it merely as an expression of  Heidegger’s 
conviction that people should live responsibly. Rather, Heidegger is here claiming that there is 
that in each of us that demands such of ourselves, and this is revealed in the phenomenon of 
conscience. That is, it is revealed in the very fact that there can be such a phenomenon as 
conscience. This phenomenon is only possible to the extent that Dasein is already aware of the 
possibility of something on the order of responsibility. Where can Dasein have learned of this 
possibility? Surely not by observing things in the world. The very idea of responsibility is only 
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possible on the basis of an ontological disposition to responsibility that Dasein finds in itself. 
And it is only on the basis of this that there can be any such thing as moral responsibility or 
financial responsibility, etc.  
 
V.  Resoluteness 
    The decision to live one’s life as responsible (as Schuldigsein) is called by Heidegger 
‘resoluteness.’ Heidegger defines resoluteness as the “reticent self-projection upon one’s 
ownmost Being-guilty.”151 Again, ‘Being-guilty’ must be understood here as ‘Being-responsible 
(to oneself).’ When Dasein is resolute, and only when Dasein is resolute, the world is disclosed 
in its truth, which is also, of course, the truth of Dasein. Resoluteness, then, is Dasein’s 
authenticity.  
    The German word translated resoluteness, Entschlossenheit, contains an etymological duality 
that is lost in translation but important to Heidegger’s sense. Schlossenheit  taken by itself might 
be translated closedness, in the sense of something having the quality of being ‘locked up.’ The 
prefix Ent-  can function as either an intensive or a privative. Thus Entschlossenheit can mean to 
‘lock in’ on something, just as the English word ‘resoluteness,’ and this is its common meaning 
in German. But if the privative sense of its prefix is emphasized (as Heidegger sometimes does 
in writing it Ent-schlossenheit)  it can connote ‘unlocking’ something, ‘being open’ to 
something.  Heidegger’s implication seems to be that the authentic person is, first of all, open to 
her primordial self-responsibility (Schuldigsein), and this openness allows her to then ‘lock in’ 
on specific tasks in an authentic manner. Thus it is impossible to give a general statement as to 
what an ‘authentic’ person resolves upon, for this must be revealed to her by her ‘openness’ 
itself, in each and every situation: “Only the resolution itself can give the answer. One would 
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completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should want to suppose that 
this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, and 
seizing hold of them. The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of 
what is factically possible at the time.”152 
    Resoluteness, then, is a general life orientation in which one owns up to one’s self-
responsibility and lives accordingly. It is, so to speak, ‘responding responsibly to one’s self-
responsibility.’ Heidegger’s assumption seems to be that in ‘wanting to have a conscience,’ i.e., 
in wanting to ‘respond responsibly to one’s self-responsibility’ that which one is concretely 
responsible for in any given factical situation will be made plain.  
 
VI.  Anticipatory Resoluteness 
    We began the discussion of conscience in search of a phenomenon through which Dasein 
attests to a sense of sometimes being ‘in the truth’ and sometimes ‘in the untruth’ in respect to 
itself. Heidegger’s claim is that the call to responsibility, to Schuldigsein, which is customarily 
called ‘conscience,’ is just such an attestation. Of course, commonly understood, conscience is 
that which convicts one of moral transgression. But Heidegger’s point – quite typical of 
Heidegger – is that such self-conviction as is found in the ordinary experience of conscience is 
only possible on the ground of a prior ontological disposition to responsibility as such. Only a 
being who is primordially disposed to something like responsibility can be convicted of 
irresponsibility in some particular case. Thus the common phenomenon of conscience, even as 
commonly understood, testifies to Dasein’s sense of a normative standard to which it owes 
allegiance.    
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    The question remains, however, whether this call to responsibility is, indeed, one that calls us 
out of das Man and into Being-towards-death. Even if we are persuaded by Heidegger’s 
treatment of an ontological disposition to responsibility at the core of Dasein, this, in itself, does 
not entail that Being-towards-death, as Heidegger has explicated it, is the proper expression of 
this disposition. We have two issues here that need to be kept distinct. Heidegger may well argue 
that the call to responsibility is, as such, a call out of das Man, insofar as das Man is defined as 
an existentiell mode that evades responsibility. There is, then, a clear connection between the call 
of conscience (as the call to responsibility) and the call out of das Man. But it is less clear that 
the call out of das Man is also a call into Being-towards-death.     
    What is Heidegger’s argument for this? We remember that Being-towards-death was first 
proposed as a way of envisioning Dasein’s wholeness. Heidegger has enumerated the features of 
Being-towards-death as Dasein’s ‘ownmost, uttermost, non-relational, certain and, as such, 
indefinite’ potentiality. The link between resoluteness and Being-towards-death pertains most 
prominently to the first three of these features. What Being-towards-death reveals to Dasein, 
according to Heidegger, is that it is responsible to itself all the way to the end.  In other words, 
the call of conscience calls Dasein to self-responsibility in the current factical situation; 
‘resoluteness’ is Dasein’s appropriate response to this call. But Heidegger’s analysis of  
temporality, in which we see that the three temporal ecstases are mutually implicated in one 
another, implies that any given factical situation is only understandable in terms of that toward 
which it tends. To act responsibly in the moment I must, at the same time, act responsibly toward 
the future that gives it meaning. In effect, then, responsibility in the moment entails 
responsibility to the future. But if there is no terminus to this future responsibility, if each 
future's meaning depends upon some further future's meaning ad infinitum, then I can never gain 
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closure or wholeness. In being responsible to an indefinite future I myself am made indefinite. 
Under such circumstances I can never come into full ownership of myself, and thus resoluteness 
(responsibility-to-self) is made impossible.  
    Thus, for Dasein’s call to self-responsibility (resoluteness) to be ‘certain of itself’ it must be 
able to project itself to the point of no-further-possibilities (or potentialities), i.e., to the point of 
death, for only then can it know that its projections will not be overruled (outstripped) by 
something beyond. It is just this that Being-towards-death, as Dasein’s supreme ‘telic context,’ 
provides. Resoluteness, then, is only ‘sure of itself’ in the context of Being-towards-death, which 
is to say, as anticipatory resoluteness. Just because Dasein’s ultimate term is null this ultimate 
term constantly directs Dasein back to itself in the moment, to its resolute action for itself, and 
frees it for this resolute action.  Thus, Being-towards-death makes clear to Dasein that its call to 
responsibility is a call to self-responsibility. In circling Dasein back upon itself, it reveals to 
Dasein that the meaning of its life is its own. 
     When Dasein lives as its own, as responsible to its own truth, it lives authentically. 
Anticipatory resoluteness is Heidegger’s term for the existential disposition of the fully authentic 
human being. The remainder of Being and Time is, by and large, Heidegger’s attempt to 
explicate Dasein’s fall from authenticity in terms of his existential conception of temporality. As 
for the manner of life of the truly authentic person – about this Heidegger is notoriously vague, at 
least in Being and Time. Nevertheless, if we are to try to grasp Heidegger’s argument in its 
entirety we must now consider his treatment of this question.    
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VII.  Historicality 
In the existential analysis we cannot, in principle, discuss what [authentic] Dasein factically 
resolves in any particular case. Our investigation excludes even the existential projection of 
the factical possibilities of existence. Nevertheless, we must ask whence, in general, Dasein 
can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself. One’s anticipatory 
projection of oneself on that possibility of existence which is not to be outstripped – on death 
– guarantees only the totality and authenticity of one’s resoluteness. But those possibilities of 
existence which have been factically disclosed are not to be gathered from death.
153
 
 
    Heidegger has, it might be pointed out, painted himself into something of a corner. He has so 
emphasized Dasein’s nullity that it has become difficult to say just where, in principle, Dasein is 
to draw its particular projects from. If Dasein’s ultimate term were something rather than 
nothing, it might draw its projects from the endeavor to realize this something. But as Being-
towards-death, as Heidegger himself concedes in the above quote, Dasein is, ultimately, not 
directed to anything but itself; that is, Dasein’s ultimate term does nothing but constantly direct it 
back to itself in the moment. Can Dasein get its projects, then, from its ‘thrownness’? But Dasein 
has been released from its thrownness such that it is not determined by it; indeed, this 
releasement is just what is signified in the expression ‘thrownness.’ Nor can Dasein get its 
projects from its freedom, for such freedom is, precisely, the freedom from determination to any 
particular project. Then where? Authentic Dasein, as a call to responsibility, seems to be all 
dressed up with nowhere to go. What is this difficult call to responsibility for?   
    Heidegger suggests that Dasein’s authentic possibilities are to be found in Dasein’s heritage. 
He writes: “The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical 
possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that 
resoluteness, as thrown, takes over.”154 In coming back to oneself, out of das Man, one comes 
aware of the situation one is thrown into as that which has been handed down to one and which 
one, in some manner, must now (responsibly) ‘take over.’ By ‘taking over’ the possibilities 
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passed down to one in one’s heritage one is linked to one’s past. In then projecting these 
possibilities upon one’s for-the-sake-of which, one links one’s past to one’s future. Such linkage 
Heidegger calls ‘historicality,’ and the process of such linkage ‘historizing’: “Once one has 
grasped the finitude of one’s existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of 
possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one – those of comfortableness, shirking, and 
taking things lightly – and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals]. This is how 
we designate Dasein’s primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which 
Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet 
has chosen.”155  
    Thus, the factical possibilities upon which authentic Dasein may resolve are presented to it by 
its heritage, which Dasein has first been thrown into but now must responsibly choose: “The 
resoluteness which comes back to itself  and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a 
possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly – that is 
to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there.”156     
    But it is hard to avoid the suspicion that we are involved in something of a shell game. If the 
Dasein of today is not endowed with that wherein it can generate meaningful possibilities for 
itself, how is it to find these possibilities in the Dasein of yesterday? Was the Dasein of yesterday 
better endowed with meaning-generating capacity than the Dasein of today? Then where did it 
get it from? Heidegger, it seems, has misconstrued his own question. He himself is now 
confusing the ontic with the ontological. We are seeking the ontological ground of meaning. 
Only so far as we can find it will we gain insight into our original question: the question of the 
meaning of Being. We have sought this ground through an analysis of Dasein – that being for 
whom Being has meaning – hoping to catch sight of this ground in the course of this analysis. 
Richard Oxenberg; Being-Towards-Life/Being-Towards-Death 
 
120  
But it has turned out that Dasein, as thrown Being-towards-death, is pervaded with nullity 
through and through. The angst associated with such nullity has driven Dasein into a determined 
self-forgetfulness which has hidden the true ground of meaning from its (our) purview. The call 
of conscience calls Dasein back to its authenticity, and we have turned to an examination of 
Dasein’s authenticity in the hope, again, of discovering this elusive ground of meaning, hidden 
from inauthentic Dasein. 
    So where is it? Now Heidegger tells us it is in Dasein’s heritage. But where has this ‘heritage’ 
come from if not from Dasein itself, i.e., from the Dasein of yesterday? Was the Dasein of 
yesterday equipped with something that the Dasein of today is not? If so, what? It is only to the 
extent that we can identify this what that we will come within striking distance of answering our 
original question. And yet, not only does Heidegger not identify this what, he does not even ask 
about it.    
    And there is a further, related, problem. Heidegger’s analytic gives us no clue as to the basis 
upon which the Dasein of today is to choose between the various options passed down to it by 
the Dasein of yesterday. It is not enough to say that resolute Dasein must decide this for itself. 
Certainly this is so ontically, but what we are seeking here is some insight into the ontology of 
the choice. A choice bespeaks a preference. What is the ontology of preference? Heidegger’s 
analytic gives us no clue as to why, or even how, one mode of existence might be preferable to 
another. Certainly Heidegger alludes to the issue. The repellent nature of angst gives inauthentic 
Dasein a preference for the existential disposition of das Man. But what is the relationship 
between the mood and the preference? What is it about moods and states-of-mind that make 
some preferable to others, and what are the implications of this? These are questions Heidegger 
never explores.  
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    And yet, these questions lie at the very core of what concerns us here. Does not one build a 
house and, thereby, pursue the project of Being-homed, because one prefers Being-homed to 
Being-homeless? Isn’t this preference, then, an integral part of the project’s meaning, indeed, of 
its intensity of meaning? – for some meanings have greater intensity than others, because some 
projects are more important than others. But these distinctions between the important and the 
unimportant, the crucial and the incidental, are only intelligible within the context of an ontology 
of preference.  
    The name for such an ontology, as we have said, is axiology. As we have pointed out, 
Heidegger does not so much ignore axiology as subsume it within his analysis of temporality. It 
is there but one must dig it out. This is something, however, that Heidegger not only fails to do, 
but fails to see, and this failure leaves questions unasked that are critical to our investigation. 
Granted that Dasein, as ‘thrown,’ must live in the context of a pool of possibilities derived from 
its heritage; still, heritage as such can neither constitute the ontological basis of these 
possibilities nor the ontological basis of Dasein’s proclivity to pursue some possibilities as 
opposed to others. What can? Any full analytic of Dasein must address this question.   
 
VIII.  The Question of God  
    It is interesting to note that the Judeo-Christian tradition agrees with Heidegger about the 
essential nullity of the human being left to itself: “From dust were you made,” says God to Adam 
and Eve, “and unto dust shall you return.” Dust, as such, is meaningless and void. It receives 
meaning only when animated by the spirit of God. According to this tradition, then, the font of 
meaning is not to be found in the human being per se, but in the relation between the human 
being and God. That phenomenological ontology should find no ground of meaning in its strictly 
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secular examination of Dasein is confirmatory of the Judeo-Christian point of view. But this 
raises a question as to the relationship of philosophy to religion. If philosophy is that pursuit that 
strives to understand ‘the question of the meaning of Being,’ and if meaning stems, primordially, 
not from the finite human being as such but from the human being in relation to God, then it 
would seem that philosophy is driven to theology in the natural course of its investigations.     
    Granted, this is only the case to the extent that we concede that the font of meaning is indeed 
trans-human. So long as philosophy denies this claim it remains free to pursue meaning wherever 
it may hope to find it, without venturing into the traditional terrain of theology. But it has long 
been a belief in theological circles that philosophy, if pursued diligently and sincerely enough, 
must eventually lead, at least, to the question of God. Philosophy, according to Thomas Aquinas, 
is a prolegomenon to theology. His ‘five proofs’ for the existence of God, as Tillich has pointed 
out, serve to indicate that any investigation of the natural world, pursued diligently enough, must 
eventually lead to the question of its ultimate ontological/metaphysical underpinnings; i.e., to the 
question of God.
157
 This suggests that philosophy, in asking the question of  fundamental 
ontology, cannot avoid entering upon the terrain of theology; for theology, after all, is just that 
discipline which reflects upon Being as such: Esse Ipsum.   
    Interestingly, in 1927, the year in which Being and Time was first published, Martin 
Heidegger gave a lecture in Tübingen in which he forcefully denied the above thesis.
158
 
Theology, according to Heidegger, is a positive, ontic, science, in the same category as, say, 
physics. It is not the science of Being as such, but of a certain type of being. On the other hand, 
“the science of [B]eing, the ontological science, [is] philosophy.”159   
    Christian theology, according to Heidegger, is ‘a positive science,’ and, hence, absolutely 
different in kind from philosophy. “A positive science is the founding disclosure of a being that 
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is given and in some way already disclosed.”160 What, then, is ‘already given’ for Christian 
theology?: “What is given for theology (its positum) is Christianness.”161 And what is 
‘Christianness’?: “We call faith Christian. The essence of faith can formally be sketched as a 
way of existence of human Dasein that, according to its own testimony – itself belonging to this 
way of existence – arises not from Dasein nor spontaneously through Dasein, but rather from that 
which is revealed in and with this way of existence, from what is believed.”162 “Theology,” thus, 
“is the science of that which is disclosed in faith, of that which is believed.”163 
    Thus, Christian theology is the science of one particular way of Being, that of Christian faith, 
whereas philosophy is the science of Being as such. Philosophy, as the science of Being as such, 
is able to provide theology with ontological ground concepts in terms of which it can formulate 
its ontic themes: “All theological concepts necessarily contain that understanding of [B]eing that 
is constitutive of human Dasein as such, insofar as it exists at all.”164 Heidegger considers, as an 
example, the relation between his own ontological concept of ‘guilt’ (Schuld) and the Christian 
concept of ‘sin’: “If sin, which is the counterphenomenon to faith . . . is to be interpreted in 
theological concepts, then the content of the concept itself, and not just any philosophical 
preference of the theologian, calls for a return to the concept of guilt.”165 We remember that by 
‘guilt’ (Schuld) Heidegger does not mean the state of having transgressed, but, rather, the 
ontological condition for the possibility of  transgression; i.e., the demand for responsibility that 
is ontologically native to Dasein as such. Only a being who is first of all ‘called to responsibility’ 
can transgress against that call in a specific way and, thereby, sin.   
    Thus, philosophy can provide theology with its ground concepts but, of course, philosophy is 
not restricted to this function. On the contrary, “it can be shown that philosophy, as the free 
questioning of purely self-reliant Dasein, does of its essence have the task of directing all other 
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nontheological, positive sciences with respect to ontological foundations.”166 The relation 
between theology and philosophy is only incidental to the latter. Theology is only one of many 
ontic sciences for which philosophy is to provide an ontological foundation.  
    But is the matter really as clear-cut as this? Let us return to Heidegger’s designation of 
theology as ‘the science of that which is disclosed in faith.’ Everything now depends upon what 
is understood by ‘that which is disclosed in faith.’ Heidegger writes: “For the ‘Christian’ faith, 
that being which is primarily revealed to faith, and only to it, and which, as revelation, first gives 
rise to faith, is Christ, the crucified God.”167 Christian theology, then, is the science of the 
revelation of ‘the crucified God.’ This is as far as Heidegger goes in attempting to explicate the 
content of Christian faith. But it seems that he misses something crucial. The ‘crucified God’ is 
not simply revealed to faith as ‘crucified God’ but as one who claims to be ‘the truth.’ And the 
truth claimed here is not just one truth among many, but the one truth of the one God, the 
‘creator of heaven and earth,’ i.e., of all that is.  Understanding ‘truth’ in just Heidegger’s sense 
of ‘unconcealment’ (of meaning), this is as much as to say that the ‘crucified God’ of 
Christianity claims to be, or to somehow disclose, the very meaning of Being for which 
philosophy looks.  
    This implies that the relation between philosophy and theology is far tighter than Heidegger 
suggests, so long as Heidegger’s definition of philosophy, as ‘that discipline which considers the 
question of the meaning of Being,’ is retained. Of course there is a distinction that can be drawn 
between the question of the meaning of Being and any attempted response to the question. One 
can explore the nature of the question and the implications of the question, develop the 
terminology in which the question can be meaningfully put, even explore the conditions for the 
possibility of the question, without ever entering into consideration of a possible way of 
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responding to the question. At times, this seems to be what Being and Time endeavors to do. And 
yet, in its very entry into the question, as we have seen, it has been forced to consider the way in 
which Dasein may authentically respond to this question. What else, after all, are Heidegger’s 
analyses of ‘anticipatory resoluteness,’ ‘das Man,’ and ‘Being-towards-death,’ but Heidegger’s 
attempt to consider Dasein’s authentic (and inauthentic) responses to the question of the meaning 
of Being; responses which entail a particular way of Being? Indeed, the fact that the question of 
Being is not asked indifferently, but as a means of addressing the issue that Dasein is to itself, 
implies that the pursuit of the question cannot be divorced from the pursuit of a satisfactory 
response to the question.  
    But are das Man and Being-towards-death the only responses to the question of the meaning of 
Being Dasein is familiar with? They are not. Religion, specifically the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
gives us an account of another response, another way of understanding Dasein as ‘authentic’ and 
‘whole.’ This way may be called ‘Being-towards-(eternal)-life.’ Presumably, this mode of 
projective life has also been revealed (‘disclosed’) to Dasein – in this case, to religious Dasein.  
Interestingly, though Heidegger has next to nothing to say about the religious experience of 
Being-towards-life, religion, as we shall see, has a great deal to say about what Heidegger calls 
‘Being-towards-death.’  
    Both Being-towards-death and Being-towards-life, then, are projective interpretations of the 
meaning of  human Being. Both involve an interpretive projection from the here-and-now of 
finite Dasein toward an ultimate ‘upon which’ that gives the here-and-now meaning in a 
particular way.  Both, then, are ways in which Being may be ‘disclosed’ for Dasein.  
    Neither of these interpretations can be verified in the finite here-and-now of Dasein. Indeed, 
given the projectivity of ek-sistence, it is questionable just what verification would mean in this 
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context. If it means actually dying (in the sense of ceasing to be) then Being-towards-death could 
never be verified by one who is still alive (nor, obviously, by one who isn’t). If it means actually 
living forever (i.e., never ceasing to be), then Being-towards-life could just as obviously never be 
finally verified.  But neither Heidegger nor religion understands these to mean mere cessation, on 
the one hand, or continuance, on the other. Rather, these modes of projective life have their 
significance in the way in which life is lived ‘under’ them in the here-and-now; i.e., they render 
the here-and-now meaningful in distinctive ways. Meaning, we said, pertains to the way in which 
things matter to us; i.e., to the way in which things pertain to the issue we are to ourselves. Who 
but we ourselves, then, we who are this issue, can judge whether or not the issue is being 
adequately addressed in these projective interpretations? 
 
    What role can philosophy play in this judgment? It can, at least, endeavor to lay out the 
phenomena as clearly as possible and provide some assessment of their meaning. Theo-logy, in 
this context, is that discipline that explores the meaning (logos) of theos, i.e., the meaning of the 
theistic response to the issue Dasein is to itself. As such it cannot be opposed to philosophy, as 
an ‘ontic’ to an ‘ontological’ science – rather the difference between philosophy and theology 
pertain, not to the object of their concerns (which in each case is truth), but to the sources they 
employ in pursuing that object. Philosophy seeks truth on the basis of what is manifest to Dasein 
in its self-world experience. Theology seeks the same truth, but does so through an examination 
of sources that claim to derive from a reality transcendent of Dasein in it’s ordinary self-world 
experience. Nevertheless, insofar as it is Dasein who must examine these sources, and Dasein 
who is to be the beneficiary of this examination, philosophical reflection is necessary to theology 
in order to provide Dasein a cognitive basis for understanding the meaning of these sources as 
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they bear upon the meaning of Dasein’s life. Thus, theology needs philosophy as that discipline 
through which its claims may be made intelligible and assessed. On the other side, though 
philosophy cannot be said to ‘need’ theology in the same way, it nevertheless has an interest in 
theology just insofar as theology claims to be privy to the very truth that philosophy seeks. 
Philosophy cannot be indifferent to theology; on the contrary, to the extent that it remains true to 
the questions it asks, it cannot but be challenged by theology’s claim to address those questions 
in an extraordinary way. The distinction between philosophy and theology, then, is not between 
an ontological and an ontic discipline, but between two modes of access to the ontological.
168
   
    In the remainder of this work we will employ Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein as the 
philosophical basis for an examination of the Judeo-Christian understanding of the meaning of 
Being.  Our approach remains philosophical throughout, in the sense that we approach the 
primary texts of the Jewish-Christian tradition (the Bible), not with a prior commitment to their 
truth, but with the aim of understanding what they have to say to us as seekers after truth. We 
stand in the place of the question, and approach the biblical message from this place. Though this 
approach is philosophical, it is not without biblical sanction: “Ask and it will be given to you; 
seek and you will find, knock and it will be opened to you. For everyone who asks receives, and 
he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it will be opened” (Mt 7:7-8).169  
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                                               Chapter VI: Methodological Interlude 
 
 
    The aim of our work, as we have said, is to examine the Judeo-Christian mythos in relation to 
Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein. In particular, we wish to employ Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Being-towards-death as an avenue into a fuller understanding of the Judeo-
Christian understanding of Being-towards-life. The inspiration for our work is twofold: First, we 
find in Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology a way of thinking about human existence that 
makes possible a new, and more fruitful, rational apprehension of religious faith. Secondly, we 
find in the Judeo-Christian interpretation of human Being one (although perhaps not the only) 
way of resolving issues left unresolved in Heidegger’s work itself. In the following chapters we 
will employ Heidegger’s new conceptuality to present a reading of the biblical understanding of 
human Being, one that will base itself in the existential analytic of Being and Time while 
suggesting ways in which this analytic might itself be modified and extended in a religious 
direction. In this chapter, however, I would like to step back and reflect upon the problems 
encountered in thinking about religion at all. Religion presents rational thought with some of its 
greatest challenges. Heidegger’s work can help us address some of these challenges. In this 
chapter we will consider how.  
 
I.  Metaphysics and Religion 
    In a conversation between Heidegger and a group of German theologians held in 1958, the 
theologian Hermann Noack remarked that “Heidegger’s thinking moves in a dimension which 
alone makes room for doing genuine theological ‘thinking’ once again – inasmuch as theology at 
a very early stage fell under the spell of ‘metaphysics,’ which is inappropriate for speaking about 
the truth of revelation.”170 In this and following sections we will consider what is meant by the 
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“spell of ‘metaphysics,’” in what way it is “inappropriate for speaking about the truth of 
revelation,” and how Heidegger’s thinking “makes room for doing genuine theological ‘thinking’ 
once again.”  
 
    The word ‘metaphysics’ originally derives from the Aristotelian work of that name, and was 
apparently employed by Aristotle’s compilers merely to designate the work placed after (meta) 
the Physics. It soon became the favored word in philosophy to refer to that study which considers 
the fundamental structure of reality, or Being, in toto. As such, it is more or less equivalent to the 
phrase ‘fundamental ontology’ (although not in the Heideggerian sense).  Insofar as religion 
speaks of God as the ‘creator of heaven and earth,’ and enjoins human beings to come to know 
God, religion and metaphysics would appear to have an interest in common. Both, apparently, 
seek to ‘know’ what is fundamental in Being.   
    And yet, in the very writing of such a sentence we immediately sense that there is something 
wrong with it. Indeed, we are using the word ‘know’ equivocally. The sort of knowledge that the 
religious person seeks is not the same as that sought by the metaphysician. The religious person 
seeks to know God in the sense in which one might speak of knowing a person. The 
metaphysician seeks to know the fundamentals of Being in the sense in which one might speak 
of knowing a scientific theory or compilation of facts. The metaphysician is seeking a rational 
account of the structure of Being. The religious person is seeking something on the order of a 
personal relationship.    
    Must we then conclude that the religious person and metaphysician have nothing in common? 
Is the supposition that they have merely the result of a double entendre, a failure to discriminate 
between two different senses of the word ‘know’? The matter is not as simple as that.  Though 
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the religious person may speak of wishing a personal relation with God, the ‘knowing’ of God is 
nevertheless sui generis; it is not, and cannot be, just like the knowing of a human person. God 
does not present himself/herself as an objective other whom one can get to know just as one 
would another person. Nor is God’s significance reducible to that of the significance of just 
another person. God, for the religious person, is not a mere personal acquaintance but is, as 
personal, the very fundament of Being itself. Thus, even for the one seeking a personal relation 
with God, God’s metaphysical aspect remains eminently relevant.  
    On the other side, though the metaphysician may seek something on the order of an objective 
account of Being, to the extent that he/she is not a technician, the pursuit of such an account is 
motivated by something more than a desire for instrumental mastery. Both are seeking some 
relation to what fundamentally is, and seeking this for its own peculiar value (whatever this may 
be). The metaphysician pursues it cognitively, the religious person personally. 
    I do not wish to suggest that all metaphysicians have a secret religious intent. Perhaps there is 
a purely intellectual desire which finds its satisfaction in metaphysical reflection, having little or 
nothing to do with religion. I pass no judgment on this. Our question, however – the question for 
philosophy of religion – is how to think about the religious relation to God. For much of Western 
history an alliance has existed between Judeo-Christian spirituality and Greek metaphysical 
conceptuality. The religious person could borrow the terms in which she thought about God from 
the metaphysical tradition, and find in this same tradition epistemic justification for her faith. 
This, perhaps, was not without its problems, as the objectivist style of metaphysical thinking, as 
Noack remarks, is less than ideal for the expression of spiritual concerns; nevertheless this 
alliance provided some rapprochement between ‘head’ and ‘heart’ (reason and faith) for the 
spiritually minded person. This alliance, however, has broken down in modern times. The 
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metaphysical concepts through which religion has hitherto understood itself have, by and large, 
lost their intellectual respectability. The scientific-positivistic concepts that have more or less 
replaced them are not compatible with the deepest concerns of religion. This situation has 
created, for religious thought, both a crisis and an opportunity.  The crisis is that religion has lost 
the concepts through which it once made itself intelligible. The opportunity is that we are now in 
a position to seek more adequate ones.     
 
II.  Personal vs. Metaphysical Conceptuality  
    The critique that Heidegger and others have launched against metaphysical thinking as such 
has historical roots in Kant’s rejection of what he calls ‘dialectical’ thinking.  Ostensibly, this 
critique has little to do with religion, but is grounded in a critique of cognition itself. It is 
metaphysical thinking itself that has proven itself epistemically unsound, according to Kant. In 
The Critique of Pure Reason Kant demonstrates that metaphysical reasoning, based, as he 
contends, on extrapolation from the pure (transcendental) concepts of the understanding, leads to 
self-contradictory results. For instance, the series of natural causes must have a first cause to 
initiate it but, given that every cause must itself be caused, cannot have. Thus there must be, and 
cannot be, a first cause. This contradiction is the result of following two divergent tendencies of 
human reason to their logical conclusion. The contradiction is resolved, according to Kant, by 
recognizing that neither tendency tells us anything about what reality is in itself. Metaphysical 
thinking, according to Kant, amounts to little more than the human intellect ‘spinning its own 
wheels.’ Our desire to know the deep metaphysical underpinnings of the universe, as it is ‘in-
itself,’ is futile.   
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    This conclusion bears a paradoxical relation to the religious orientation to God.  On the one 
hand, many a religious person might agree with Kant that the ‘deep things of God’ are hidden 
from human reason. On the other hand, many would, at the same time, deny that this means we 
cannot know God in any direct way; that, as per Kant, God must remain a mere ‘postulate of 
practical reason.’ For the religious person God is both knowable and unfathomable. There is no 
contradiction here because the word ‘know’ is being employed in the personal, not the 
objectivist, sense. I may not know all there is to know about my lover’s circulatory system. But 
this does not prevent me from knowing her.    
    When Noack contends that “Heidegger’s thinking moves in a dimension which alone makes 
room for doing genuine theological ‘thinking’ once again,” he is suggesting, I believe, that 
Heidegger has provided a way of thinking about God that permits us a cognitive exploration of 
this second sense of ‘knowing;’ the only sense, indeed, with which religion qua religion is really 
concerned. The philosopher of religion, insofar as he/she is a philosopher of religion, must be 
interested in just this second sense. Of course, though the religious person’s ‘knowing’ of God 
may be non-cognitive, this does not prevent religious philosophy from entering upon a cognitive 
exploration of just this non-cognitive knowing. Indeed, if we are to rationally explore the 
religious sense of knowing God this is just what we must do.  
    Heidegger, thus, has presented the philosopher of religion with a new, and perhaps more 
legitimate, way of reflecting upon the human relation to God than provided by traditional 
metaphysics. At the same time, and somewhat ironically, Heidegger – at least the Heidegger of 
Being and Time – does not himself enter into such a reflection, but provides an interpretation of 
human Being that emphasizes human finitude and mortality. This emphasis, of course, is based 
upon Heidegger’s own phenomenological reflections. My thesis is that there is a phenomenology 
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of faith that can itself be expressed in Heideggerian terms but that takes us beyond the set of 
existential conclusions we are left with at the end of Being and Time. In the following chapters I 
will attempt to explore this phenomenology of faith. At present, though, we wish to examine 
more deeply what it is about Heideggerian conceptuality that provides us the opportunity for this 
exploration.   
 
III.  Objectification vs. Relationality   
    We have, to some degree, already touched upon these issues in our discussion of the 
construction of the factual in chapter two. Objectified thinking endeavors to consider the world 
as it is ‘in itself’ without reference to an observing subject. Given that every observation of the 
world must, qua observation, be the observation of some observing subject, however, a purely 
objective account of Being necessarily entails a falsification, or at least a neglect, of the way 
Being is indeed manifest. As we noted in chapter two, this neglect of the relationality (or, in 
Husserlian language, ‘intentionality’) inherent in the act of knowing has practical value. It allows 
the compilation of ‘objective facts’ that have general validity and applicability. If I say that the 
hammer is ‘too heavy’ I provide you with no valuable information about how the hammer will be 
for you. If I say, however, that the hammer ‘weighs a pound’ you now have information with 
which you can determine whether or not the hammer will be useable by you. In the one case I 
speak of how the hammer is for me. In the other I speak of how the hammer is ‘in itself.’ But 
these two ways of speaking are not on an epistemic par. The second case is an abstraction from 
the first, which is epistemically prior. I do not immediately encounter the hammer as ‘weighing a 
pound,’ but as having a certain weight for me. The practice whereby I am able to speak of the 
hammer as ‘weighing a pound,’ i.e., the system of objectified thinking, is a human innovation 
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that has practical utility but fails to accurately reflect the way in which Being is primordially 
disclosed.  
    It should be fairly obvious that such objectification must, by its very nature, lead to a distorted 
understanding of those matters whose very essence lies in their relation to an observing subject.  
We say, for instance, ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’ but what seems more truly to be the 
case is that beauty is in the relation between the beholder and the beheld. Heidegger, building on 
Husserl,  has helped make it clear to us that such relationality is ontologically primary. This is a 
revolutionary discovery, especially when we consider that the word ‘objective’ has, in modern 
times, become virtually synonymous with ‘real.’ And yet it is the discovery of a truth that has 
been, quite literally, right before our eyes all along. We have not so much been prevented from 
seeing it as from thinking it, and we have been prevented from thinking it due to a style of 
thinking that has not allowed its full recognition.  
    The recognition that Being is primordially relational, that objectified thinking is itself a 
construction and abstraction from a more primordial ontological relationality, is, in and of itself, 
already confirmatory of an essential aspect of the religious point of view. The religious person 
claims to be able to know God, the fundament of Being, relationally. The religious person speaks 
of having a personal relation to that which is ontologically primary. But the term ‘relationality’ 
does not yet express all that is intended in personal relation. To speak of a personal relation is to 
speak of a relationship that involves the concerns native to human personhood. Heidegger has 
defined the human being as essentially concerned; i.e., as ‘Care.’ Dasein’s relation to its world, 
thus, is never a relation of indifference, but one in-formed by the fundamental concerns of 
personhood. What gets dismissed by objectivist thinking as ‘emotion’ is, for Heidegger, a 
primary mode whereby Being is disclosed to and for Dasein. In this respect, Heidegger’s 
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phenomenological work dovetails with the religious point of view exactly. Both Heideggerian 
phenomenology and religion understand Being to be primordially disclosed in (and as) relations 
of concern. This constitutes an enormously important breakthrough in the endeavor to think 
about religion. The promise of this breakthrough is that, through allowing us to think about 
religious matters and religious claims in a way more appropriate to religion itself, we are given 
the opportunity to correct many distortions that creep into religion due to the application of styles 
of thinking inappropriate to it. For example, the notion that one must affirm certain creedal 
formulae as true in an ‘objective’ sense in order to be saved is, I would contend, a distortion of 
the deep meaning of faith; a distortion that is at least partly due to an objectivist style of thinking. 
The faith that ‘saves’ is relational, it has to do with the quality of relation established between 
person and neighbor, person and world, and, ultimately, person and God. Objectivist thinking 
obscures this, and thus (as Noack says) distorts the meaning of revelation.   
    Nevertheless, there remains two significant differences between the Heideggerian orientation 
to Being and the religious. Firstly, Heidegger’s language, though no longer objectified, is still 
abstract. The primary religious text in the Western tradition, i.e., the Bible, on the other hand, is 
largely imagistic. Secondly, Heidegger’s interpretation of human Being as Being-towards-death, 
though expressing one dimension of the religious interpretation of human Being, takes no 
account of the possibility proclaimed at the heart of religious life, the possibility that the finite 
human being can live beyond its finitude, under the telic context of what I am calling ‘Being-
towards-life.’ Let us consider the significance of each of these differences in turn.  
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IV.  Abstract vs. Imagistic Conceptuality  
    Rudolf Bultmann, influenced by Heidegger, coined the term ‘demythologization’ to speak of 
the translation of the imagistic language of Scripture into conceptual, existential, language. 
Bultmann writes: “The real purpose of myth is not to present an objective picture of the world as 
it is, but to express man’s understanding of himself in the world in which he lives. Myth should 
be interpreted not cosmologically, but anthropologically, or better still, existentially . . . [T]he 
importance of the New Testament mythology lies not in its imagery but in the understanding of 
existence which it enshrines. The real question is whether this understanding of existence is true. 
Faith claims that it is, and faith ought not to be tied down to the imagery of New Testament 
mythology.”171   
    Bultmann’s point, in calling Scripture myth, is not to suggest that it is fanciful but quite the 
opposite. Through myth, Scripture endeavors to reveal truths to us of the utmost importance.  In 
order for us to understand these truths we must interpret the myth – demythologize it – so as to 
extract its global, yet personal, significance. But why, we may ask, does Scripture present itself 
imagistically at all? Why does it not simply give us the demythologized concepts from the first? 
We will not be able to answer this question, I believe, without entering into a consideration of 
what lies at the very heart of language and meaning. A full treatment of this subject is well 
beyond the scope of our project, still, some discussion of it is necessary if we are to make the 
aims of our project clear.  
    In his 1947 “Letter on Humanism” Heidegger famously writes, “Language is the house of 
Being.” What Heidegger appears to mean by this is that language presents us with the terms in 
and through which we live. The way in which we see the world is necessarily conditioned by the 
linguistic terms through which we see it. Another set of linguistic terms would yield another 
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perspective on the meaning of the world, and, hence, a different mode of life. Being, hence, i.e., 
our mode of Being, has its life conditioned by the linguistic frame it inhabits. What Heidegger’s 
work on language does not explore as fully as it might, however, is the reason for language’s 
vast influence. What is it about language that gives it this comprehensive power over life? If we 
wish to understand the relationship between abstract and mythological language, necessary to an 
understanding of religious thought, we must make some effort to explore this question. 
    As the Greek word logos implies, language has the power to correlate and organize our 
discrete phenomenal experiences, permitting us to integrate them into a rational, i.e., ordered, 
view of the world. Let’s take a simple example. Before me stands what I am accustomed to 
calling ‘a glass of water.’ The phrase ‘glass of water’ does not fully describe what I encounter in 
observing this glass of water. There are things about this glass of water that are not fully 
expressed in the phrase; for instance, its height. There is, further, that about the phrase that 
makes it applicable to more than this glass of water; the same phrase might designate another 
glass of water. There is, then, a discontinuity between the phrase and a particular empirical 
instantiation of that which it indicates, a discontinuity that allows me to correlate this particular 
experience with another that is relevantly similar; i.e., with another ‘glass of water.’ This is a 
peculiarity of language as such. There is no one-to-one correspondence between a word or 
phrase and a particular empirical datum. Even proper nouns, though naming what we call 
particulars, never name a particular empirical moment of experience. The name ‘The Empire 
State Building,’ for instance, does not name some particular empirical encounter with the Empire 
State Building, but a more extensive, more ‘abstract,’ idea.   
    Thus language is, by its very nature, ‘universalizing.’ That is, it represents the world in terms 
of ‘universals’ that have no direct phenomenal correspondence, but that gather together, under 
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common terms, phenomena bearing similarities we deem relevant. The practical need for doing 
so is fairly easy to see. If I know something of what ‘glass’ means, then I know something of 
how to relate to this glass even if I have never encountered it before, so long, that is, as I know it 
to be a glass. The same phenomenal item might have been introduced to me as a ‘vase,’ in which 
case I would approach it differently. The word tells me something of how I am to relate to the 
thing. The universalizing and ordering functions of language, then, allow me to organize my 
experiences and potential experiences in ways that have practical utility. Language tells me how 
I should relate to things. In this respect language itself has axiological implications, quite apart 
from any explicit adoption or endorsement of a set of values. I can now, also (and not 
incidentally), communicate my experience of the world to others.  I can pass it down through the 
generations. I can teach and be taught.  
    Insofar as language universalizes, it also objectifies. There is an objectifying tendency in 
language as such. This is because language, in its universalizing capacity, necessarily transcends 
the immediacy of encounter, which is to say, the immediacy of relation, and must do so in order 
to fulfill its ordering function. This encounter with the Empire State Building is not that 
encounter with it. To speak of the Empire State Building at all, then, is already to speak of 
something abstracted from the immediacy of encounter. The phrase ‘The Empire State Building’ 
does not refer to my encounter with the Empire State Building, but represents the Empire State 
Building as a thing having its own ontological standing apart from anyone’s encounter with it. 
This, of course, is utterly necessary. To the extent that I were unable to develop an understanding 
of the world abstracted from the immediacy of encounter, the things of the world, and the world 
itself, would have no coherence. If I had to give each instance of encounter a unique name it 
would be futile to name anything at all; the world would be a chaos of immediacy. 
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    Insofar as language orders our experience of the world, it is easy for us to confuse it with the 
meanings that it orders. It is crucial, however, for us to recognize that language, as such, is not 
equivalent to meaning.  Language organizes and is a bearer of meaning, but is not meaning 
itself.  This, by the way, is the mistake that the advocates of ‘strong AI’ make when they suppose 
that computers can achieve consciousness through the mere sophistication of their programming. 
They suppose that since computers can manipulate language they can therefore apprehend 
meaning. But this is a mistake. Language is not meaning.  
    There are a number of ways in which we might demonstrate this. We might suppose, for 
instance, that one can get at the primal meaning of a word through definition; say, by genus and 
species. But meaning itself cannot be constituted through the mere ordering of terms into genus 
and species. This is easy to show. For instance, suppose I give the definition of oloo as a tall 
member of the genus aga. Thus I have designated the meaning of oloo in terms of both genus 
(aga) and species (tall). This, however, has not in fact rendered the term oloo meaningful. In 
order to do so I would now have to give the meaning of aga. But if I were to give the meaning of 
aga in terms of some genus that were itself void of meaning the same problem would recur. The 
mere ordering of terms into genus and species, thus, does not suffice to render them meaningful. 
It should be clear that any other purely linguistic endeavor to render language meaningful will 
have the same problem. This implies that meaning itself is extra-linguistic.  
    There are many direct examples of the extra-linguistic character of meaning. The expression 
of a human face, for instance, is meaningful but is not, strictly, language. We can attempt to 
express its meaning linguistically, to say that the face is exhibiting ‘sadness’ or ‘joy’ or 
‘surprise,’ but it is not necessary to do so to experience the meaningfulness of the facial 
expression. Indeed, only the most accomplished writer can capture, through language, all that is 
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meaningful in a nuanced facial expression. The rest of us are able to judge whether or not it has 
been adequately captured just because we are privy to the meaning even though we may not have 
the linguistic skill with which to render it into words.  This example – and I believe such 
examples could be multiplied almost endlessly – is evidence that meaning is other than, and prior 
to, language.  
    What then is it? Meaning, as Heidegger’s work makes clear, refers to the concernful relations 
we have with ourselves, others, and the world. To fully state the meaning of something is, 
ultimately, to state its relevance to our (or some Dasein’s) concern. It is ‘concern’ through which 
the world is meaningful. If a computer is to knowingly manipulate meanings it must first of all 
be a concernful being. We have no reason to suppose its electronic circuitry can render it such, 
and hence no reason to believe computers can achieve independent intelligence. I place the word 
‘concern’ in quotes to indicate that it is an imprecise and vague word, scarcely sufficient for the 
profound reality we are trying to express with it. Unfortunately, we do not have a more precise 
word to express this. Philosophy cannot avoid attempting to say what is true just because it 
cannot say it precisely. In this case, the sin of omission would be far greater than any sin of 
commission we commit through imprecision.   
    What is the relation between meaning and language? This is a difficult and complex question 
whose surfaces we can only touch upon here. Language orders the meaningful world for us, and, 
in ordering it, shapes its meaning in particular ways. As has now been well recognized, language 
is essential to the human experience of the world. This is due to what might be called the 
‘fractionability’ of experience together with what Heidegger calls the ‘ecstatic’ nature of 
temporality. This here-and-now, this precise instant, does not in itself present things to me in the 
fullness of their meaning. The ‘pen’ refers to a potential project of writing which, in turn, refers 
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to potential projects of communicating, studying, publishing, etc. Not all of that to which the 
pen’s meaning refers, which helps constitute the pen’s meaning, is presented to me in the instant 
of my encounter with the pen. The pen’s meaning refers beyond the instant of my encounter with 
it, and this beyond to which it refers must somehow be available in my encounter with it in order 
for me to understand the pen as a pen. This is reflective of the ecstatic nature of concern itself. 
My concern for the things revealed in this here-and-now always extends beyond the 
instantaneousness of this here-and-now, to past and future, through memory and anticipation. 
This ecstasy of concern has its counterpart in an ecstasy of meaning-perception. Husserl’s 
analyses of retention and protension have shown this to be true at the most immediate level. 
Heidegger’s analyses of ‘world’ (in-order-to relations which resolve themselves in some for-the-
sake-of-which) have shown this to extend to Dasein’s most comprehensive engagement with 
things.  In effect, Husserl has given us the ‘micro’ of which Heidegger has given us the ‘macro.’  
Kant anticipated both in his notion of the ‘transcendental unity of apperception,’ which impels 
reason to seek the unification of experience in order to have it conform to the inherent unity of 
the mind. All three, I believe, express the same insight: Dasein, who is always in some here-and-
now, is, nonetheless, always also concernfully projected beyond the here-and-now in which 
Dasein is. Dasein’s Being has the paradoxical character of being in the instant and, within the 
instant, projected beyond the instant. It is language or, more generally, conceptuality, that 
permits Dasein to organize its world in a way that corresponds to its own projectedness beyond 
the instant. It is language that allows Dasein’s world to be, not a chaos of instantaneous and 
unique happenings, but an ordered whole of temporally extended ‘objects’ with consistent 
meaning. This constancy of meaning cannot find expression, i.e., have its Being, within 
temporality as such, insofar as the temporal is, as such, ephemeral.  It is the unifying power that 
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finds expression in language that gathers the temporal phenomena together into coherent, 
meaningful, objects, or, perhaps better, interprets the temporal phenomena as coherent, 
meaningful, objects; e.g. ‘pen.’ It is, then, only within a world whose meaning is gathered and 
ordered through language that human beings can live as human beings. This is the implication of 
Heidegger’s “Language is the house of Being.” Dasein is not a mere openness to a flood of 
discrete, unrelated, phenomena, but lives within the context of coherent, ordered, meanings. 
Language is the bearer of these ordered meanings.  
    Language, then, which gathers and orders the meaning of the phenomenal is, as many have 
pointed out, an essential, not an incidental, feature of Dasein’s Being. Through language we 
interpret the meaning of the world to ourselves; we synthesize experience into meaningful units 
and designate the way in which these units relate to each other and us. We thereby ‘construct’ the 
meaning of the world. I think it is important to note, however, that our capacity to so order the 
world is dependent upon the world’s orderability. The phenomena must, in effect, cooperate with 
our ordering of them. We, in turn, must order them in accordance with their orderability. We are 
not free to order them in any way we please. It is a great mistake to forget this. We do not invent 
the world, and there are physical limits to the ways in which we may, and ethical and spiritual 
limits to the ways in which we should, order them.  
   Language, then, orders meaning. Meaning, however, has a richness that language can never 
fully capture. There is, for instance, often more ‘going on’ in a facial expression than can be put 
into words. This itself is a function of the universalizing tendency of language, which, in order to 
universalize, must abstract from the particularity of experience. This is why only the most skilled 
authors are able to capture the nuances of those things most meaningful to us; e.g., the romantic 
relations between a man and a woman, the bonds that unite a mother and child, etc. This is also 
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the reason why narrative and imagistic language is often more immediately meaningful and, at 
the same time, less cognitively assimilable, than more abstract, conceptual language. As the 
extension of our terms expand, as we gather more under them, the richness of the meanings they 
convey diminishes while the range of their applicability increases.     
    Let’s take, for example, the biblical story of Abraham’s near sacrifice of Isaac. We ask: what 
does the story mean? Why does it not suffice to say: it means that Abraham was asked by God to 
sacrifice Isaac? Because, though this is clearly what the story says, what it says does not yet 
convey its meaning for us. The story narrates an event that took place some thousands of years 
ago, over the course of a few days. To grasp the story’s meaning for us, some thousands of years 
later, we must abstract from the particular occurrences that characterize that event to some 
meaning of universal, or at least very extended, applicability. The story, insofar as it is already 
expressed in language, is already an abstraction. Surely not everything Abraham experienced on 
his way to Moriah is captured in the language of the story. But now we must abstract even 
further if we are to say what the story might mean for us, and, beyond us, what it might mean for 
human Being in general. With each degree of abstraction we expand the range of meaning’s 
applicability at the cost of meaning’s immediacy. Let us suggest that the story means that one’s 
most precious relationships (e.g., Abraham’s relationship to his beloved son Isaac) achieve full 
sanctity only when acknowledged as gifts from God. We have now rendered the story’s meaning 
in a form that makes it relevant to all human beings at all times, not just to Abraham 4000 years 
ago. The story now serves as a prototype, a paradigm example, of the significance of faith. The 
example serves, as all such examples serve, to link the abstract meaning to an instance of 
concernful living. It is this linkage to living concern (Abraham’s care for Isaac) that brings forth 
a recognition of the full import of the meaning. The concrete richness of the story allows us to 
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engage with it empathically in a way that a mere recitation of the abstract meaning does not. The 
abstract meaning only has import as it pertains to our lived concerns. It is, then, only in stories 
expressive of such concern that religious meaning finds full expression. 
    This, I believe, answers the question of why Scripture does not present itself in abstract 
language from the first: because to do so would be to sacrifice reference to the immediate 
livingness essential to the religious message itself. Scripture is not concerned to give us an 
objective account of Being, to satisfy our intellectual curiosity about its physical or metaphysical 
structure, or our purely historical interest in the past. Scripture is intent to give us an account of 
the meaning of Being as lived.  It is, thus, essential to the biblical message itself that it not 
present the meaning of Being (life) in strictly objectivist terms, to be contemplated with 
dispassion and detachment. It endeavors, rather, to express the personal meaning, i.e., the 
meaning to each particular person in each particular here-and-now, of that which is most 
universal: God. The Bible, thus, is a book of persons: of Adam, Eve, Noah, Abraham, Sarah, 
Moses, Jesus, etc. It is a book of particular persons in living relation to that which is most 
universal. It is only in the particular that meaning has its import.  
    The reason Scripture must be demythologized, then, is not simply that it contains an obsolete 
cosmology or employs fantastic imagery. It must be demythologized because its particularity 
must be rendered universally meaningful. Even if there were no fantastic imagery, no archaic 
cosmology, Scripture would require demythologization in order to express its general relevance. 
Biblical hermeneutic is, as such, demythologization. Aquinas is as much a demythologizer as 
Bultmann. But Aquinas has rendered the meaning of the Bible into the relatively impersonal, 
objectivist, terms of Greek metaphysics. He himself, shortly before his death and after what is 
said to have been a personal, mystical, experience of God, is reputed to have called his own work 
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‘straw.’ The theological-Scriptural tradition, thus, presents us with two distinct modes of 
religious discourse: the particular-relational language of Scripture, and the universal-objectivist 
language of metaphysics. Both are inadequate in their own ways; the former because its 
particularism does not adequately convey its universal significance, the latter because its 
objectivism does not adequately convey its personal relevance. Heidegger’s work is exciting in 
that it presents us with universalist terms that are, nevertheless, non-objectifying. Heidegger’s 
language, awkward as it often is, seeks to preserve the relationality inherent to our primordial 
encounter with Being. We might call it, then, ‘universal-relational.’ As such, it promises a more 
appropriate approach to religious meaning.  
 
V.  ‘Dasein’ as Universal First-Person Singular 
    The centerpiece of Heidegger’s universal-relational language is his term ‘Dasein.’ “Dasein,” 
Heidegger writes, “is in each case mine” (my emphasis). Heidegger’s term ‘Dasein’ is, I believe, 
unique to language. It is a universal first-person singular. The word ‘I,’ of course, is a particular 
first-person singular. Strictly speaking, when I use ‘I’ I refer to me, Richard Oxenberg. But 
Dasein refers to any ‘me.’  Its very employment goes some distance in solving the problem of 
objectification. One, of course, could use the impersonal singular pronoun, ‘one.’  But it is 
inappropriate to employ an impersonal pronoun in speaking of personal relations; i.e., relations 
of personal concern. One could use the personal pronoun ‘I,’ but then the scope of one’s 
statement would be, strictly, limited to oneself. If we wish to speak of the personal relationality 
of the world in such a way as to make our speech universally applicable, we require a universal 
first-person singular. Heidegger provides us one in his term ‘Dasein.’    
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    Of course, there are special problems in the use of a universal first-person singular. Every 
first-person account, after all, is private. By what right does Heidegger, or anyone, speak for all 
first-persons? But this problem may be seen as merely the unmasking of a problem that exists, 
but is hidden, in ordinary objectified discourse. In objectified discourse one speaks of ‘man’ or 
‘the human being’ as if one is speaking of something that can be known in general terms, some 
‘objective essence’ we are all assumed to share.  Since, of course, no one has ever interviewed us 
all such a claim is, as such, presumptuous. Its presumptuousness is hidden in the implicit notion 
that ‘man’ is some objective datum that can be known as such. We might at first think that 
Heidegger’s use of ‘Dasein’ is equally presumptuous. And yet, properly considered, Heidegger’s 
should be seen as an exposed and confessed presumption. Indeed, Heidegger cannot know what 
is true of us all any more than can the objectivist. But once I understand that Dasein is in each 
case mine, which is to say, in my case me, I should also understand that the verification for 
Heidegger’s claims must also rest with me. Heidegger’s discourse, thus, is suggestive and 
invitative rather than dogmatic. I am to try it on for size and see if it fits. Perhaps I will find it 
does not fit – indeed, my work contends that Heidegger’s account of authenticity does not fully 
fit the authentic person as envisioned by the Judeo-Christian tradition, who is neither properly 
characterized as Being-towards-death, nor as das Man, but as Being-towards-life. In the 
following chapters we will explore this alternative account of Dasein, one that is in important 
ways informed by Heidegger’s own, but goes beyond his, one that is grounded in a reading of 
Jewish and Christian texts. Like Heidegger’s, however, it can only be presented as a suggestion 
and invitation.  
    Through the use of the universal first-person and the body of relational concepts (and, perhaps 
more importantly, the relational orientation) Heidegger provides us, we are able to give a 
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universal account that, at the same time, respects the personal relationality of Being. Heidegger’s 
language, thus, has given us a new thing under the sun: a universal-personal conceptuality; a 
way of speaking in universally applicative terms about ‘one’s’ personal relatedness with Being; 
therefore, also, a way of speaking of the personal character of Being in its universality: i.e., a 
way of speaking about God, understood as the universal foundation of (concernful) Being.      
    And yet, from the religious perspective, all is not well. What Heidegger gives with one hand 
he takes away with the other. Heidegger’s philosophy, in Being and Time and beyond, seems 
increasingly to emphasize the impersonal character of Being.  John Van Buren, for instance, 
writes: “In its most aggravated form, the later Heidegger’s essentialist bent led to . . .  an ultimate 
‘impersonal there is’ . . . What was suspended and completely effaced here was his youthful 
theme of Mir-Sein, to-me being, and Mir-Ereignen, eventing/enowning to myself . . . For the 
later Heidegger’s speculative depth-hermeneutics, Ereignis suddenly no longer included the 
Ereignis of the ‘Dasein of personal life’ in any sense.”172  Theodore Kisiel, in turn, speaks of 
“Heidegger’s lifelong attempt to ‘indicate’ an ultimately impersonal but active giving of being 
(Sinngebung) that ‘happens’ in and through the personal being of situated Dasein.”173  John 
Caputo similarly complains: “Heidegger’s Being [in contrast with Meister Eckhart’s ‘Godhead’] 
is by no means ‘fatherly’ or ‘loving’ or ‘benevolent.’”174 And: “Heidegger is not talking about 
any sort of personal relationship [with Being], but about ‘manifestness.’ He does not conceive of 
the coming to pass of manifestness in terms of the loving care of a father but, on the contrary, in 
terms of ‘world-play’.”175  Caputo concludes: “Heidegger’s thought seems to me to move close 
to the edge of despair.”176 As Heidegger ultimately envisions it, then, personal, situated, Dasein 
is situated in that which is, finally, impersonal. What might be considered Heidegger’s single 
most important insight from a religious perspective – that Being is primordially manifest in 
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relations of personal concern – becomes, if not entirely obliterated, then strangely muddied in his 
later work. We might engage in biographical speculation (not entirely inappropriate given 
Heidegger’s philosophical methodology) to understand why he finally tends in this direction 
when so much of his early work seemed an attempt to rescue the personal character of Being 
from the impersonalism of metaphysical objectivism, but I believe we can find the answer in 
Being and Time itself. Thrown-being-towards-death, considered as Dasein’s uttermost 
possibility, does not as such situate Dasein in a context of personal relationality.     
    The Judeo-Christian tradition, on the other hand, advances the belief that the fundament of 
Being is such as to allow Dasein a healthful, personal, relationship with that from which, in 
which, and toward which it fundamentally is. This tradition knows of death, and in very much the 
same terms in which Heidegger speaks of it, but denies its ultimacy as Dasein’s ‘uttermost 
possibility’: “Though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death,” says the Psalmist, “I 
shall fear no evil, for Thou art with me.” Death is a key phenomenon in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, but it is not final; Christ passes through death into eternal life, and invites us to follow 
him.     
    Might such a belief amount to nothing more than das Man’s refusal to accept its finitude? 
Perhaps. But now, certainly, we have a matter to consider. Heidegger’s conceptuality has 
provided us the means to examine this matter with more penetration than ever before. Dasein’s 
very Being, as an issue to itself, demands that we do so. It is to this task we turn in the remainder 
of our work.  
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Chapter VII: Creation and Fall 
 
And a lawyer stood up and put [Jesus] to the test, saying, “Teacher, what shall I 
do to inherit eternal life?” And He said to him, “What is written in the Law? How 
does it read to you?” And he answered, “You shall love the Lord your God with 
all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all 
your mind; and your neighbor as yourself.” And He said to him, “You have 
answered correctly; Do this and you will live.” (Lk 10:25-28)  
 
 
    We have before us a somewhat daunting task. We wish to extract from the Bible its 
hermeneutic of Dasein. We wish to do this in a manner that will have phenomenological 
viability; i.e., to show, if not the phenomenological basis of the biblical account itself, at least the 
way in which its account may pertain to that which can be shown to have some 
phenomenological basis. Finally, we wish to compare and contrast this account with Heidegger’s 
own. Our thesis, of course, is that the Bible does have an hermeneutic of Dasein that can be 
rendered in a phenomenologically viable way. Our argument for this thesis will be the working 
out of this hermeneutic itself.  
    We begin with certain working assumptions, the foremost of which is that the Bible can be 
read as a whole, coherent, work. Of course there is a huge literature examining the authorship of 
individual  biblical books, the historical conditions under which they were produced, their textual 
integrity as they have been passed down to us, etc. We will take note of these issues only to the 
extent that it serves our project to do so. Our project is not to engage in a textual or historical 
criticism of the Bible. It is to consider a religious account of Dasein that is related to, but differs 
from, Heidegger’s account in significant ways. Our intent, in other words, is to compare and 
contrast the biblical account of Dasein with Heidegger’s hermeneutic of Dasein in Being and 
Time, in an effort to more fully understand the existential implications of both.   
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    In approaching the Bible we are involved in a second-order interpretation; that is to say, we 
are interpreting the Bible’s interpretation of Dasein. To interpret is to make explicit an 
understanding. An understanding, as Heidegger presents it, discloses something in terms of its 
‘for-the-sake-of-which.’177  If we wish to understand the Bible’s understanding of Dasein, then, 
we will do well to begin by considering Dasein’s ultimate ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ as the Bible 
envisions it. This, in turn, will provide us the hermeneutical key for interpreting the biblical 
account as a whole.  
    In the passage quoted above we are given a summation of the Bible’s view of how Dasein may 
attain eternal life. We will have occasion to consider more carefully what the qualification 
‘eternal’ may mean in relation to ‘life’; but for now we simply note that the Bible presents 
‘eternal life’ as the consummation of life, the consummation of that toward which life rightly 
tends; in other word, Dasein’s ultimate ‘for-the-sake-of-which.’   
     Following Heidegger’s own hermeneutical principles, then, this biblical statement will serve 
as our key for unlocking the biblical interpretation of Dasein as a whole.  In other words, we will 
read the rest of the Bible with an eye toward the explication of this passage. Besides the term 
‘eternal life’ we find reference in this passage to ‘God,’ ‘Law’ and ‘Love.’ If we are to 
understand the passage we must understand these key terms. In this chapter we will consider the 
meaning of ‘God’ in relation to the biblical accounts of Creation and Fall. In the next, we will 
consider the meaning of ‘Law’ in relation to the biblical account of the giving of law at Sinai. In 
the ninth chapter we will consider the meaning of ‘Love’ in relation to the biblical account of 
Christ. In a final chapter we will consider the significance of all of this in relation to Heidegger’s 
overall hermeneutic of Dasein and, more generally, the philosophic pursuit of truth.     
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I.  Being and Wholeness  
    We recall that Heidegger began his discussion of Being-towards-death in an effort to get the 
‘whole’ of Dasein into his theoretical grasp. In other words, it began as an endeavor to envision, 
theoretically, the whole of Dasein. This theoretical project, however, quickly evolved into a 
discussion of Dasein’s own potentiality for Being as a whole. Heidegger writes: “The question of 
the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is one which is factical and existentiell. It is answered by 
Dasein as resolute. The question of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has now sloughed 
off the character indicated at the beginning, when we treated it as if it were just a theoretical or 
methodological question of the analytic of Dasein, arising from the endeavor to have the whole 
of Dasein completely ‘given.’ The question of Dasein’s totality, which at the beginning we 
discussed only with regard to ontological method, has its justification, but only because the 
ground for that justification goes back to an ontical possibility of Dasein.”178  In other words, the 
theoretical question of Dasein’s wholeness is itself grounded in the ontical possibility that Dasein 
can itself live as whole. This should not surprise us, given that the theoretician who investigates 
Dasein is always also Dasein. The philosophical project has, implicitly, an ethical dimension. 
Through philosophy Dasein seeks to understand itself, and through understanding itself, to 
realize itself more fully. Dasein’s desire to understand itself as whole, then, is part and parcel of 
Dasein’s desire to be whole.       
    We must consider this issue more carefully. What would  wholeness mean for a Being such as 
Dasein? We might endeavor to express this in temporal terms. Dasein, as temporal, finds itself 
always in some here-and-now. Each here-and-now is distinguishable from the next. Were there 
no connection between them Dasein would live a fragmentary life; indeed, it would scarcely be 
possible to speak of a single Dasein at all. There must, then, be that which connects these 
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discrete ‘here-and-nows’ in order for Dasein to exist as a continuous, whole, self. This, according 
to Heidegger, is the for-the-sake-of-which. It is the for-the-sake-of-which that gives coherent 
meaning to Dasein’s life and allows one instant of Dasein’s Being to connect with the next. 
Thus, I enter the office in order to sit at the desk. I sit at the desk in order to write. I write in 
order  to fulfill some potentiality of my Being. My entering the office, sitting at the desk, writing, 
etc. are connected to one another as elements of my project to actualize my potentialities. In this 
way I live from myself to myself. Dasein’s projection upon the actualization of its potentialities 
links each moment of Dasein’s life with the next and gives Dasein’s life unity. Such unity is not 
something achieved only at the end of life; rather it is phenomenally manifest in each moment, in 
what Heidegger calls the Augenblick, which may be understood as an existential state in which 
one’s experience of past, present, and future (i.e., the  “having-been,” “making-present,” and 
“ahead-of-itself”) are integrated in some discrete here-and-now. Thus, for authentic Dasein 
living toward its ‘for-the-sake-of-which,’ temporality ‘temporalizes itself,’ at each discrete 
moment, as whole.   
    But inauthentic Dasein does not live as whole. Its projects do not arise from its authentic 
potentialities but from ‘das Man.’ Dasein, as das Man, does not live toward its true potentialities 
and hence does not connect with itself. To become whole Dasein must become resolute; i.e., it 
must discover from itself, out of itself,  its own for-the-sake-of-which and live towards this. This 
itself requires, according to Heidegger, that Dasein live in the anticipation of death.     
    What has death to do with resoluteness? Heidegger writes: “The non-relational character of 
death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself...It makes manifest that 
all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with-Others, will 
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fail us when our ownmost potentiality for Being is the issue. Dasein can be authentically itself 
only if it makes this possible for itself of its own accord”179 
    Let’s consider this statement carefully: “All Being-alongside the things with which we 
concern ourselves, and all Being-with-Others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality for 
Being is the issue.” What does this exactly mean? Fail us how? Presumably, this reference to 
failure pertains to the issue Dasein is to itself, the issue that has launched our inquiry. This issue, 
in turn, has something to do with Dasein’s drive to realize its potentialities. Being-towards-death 
reveals that nothing in the world, nothing we can achieve through our worldly dealings, will 
finally resolve this issue. This realization, as Heidegger envisions it, liberates Dasein from 
enslavement to the world and its dealings, allowing Dasein to live as its own.  
     But this merely tells us how Dasein must not live if it is to achieve wholeness, it tells us 
nothing of how Dasein is to live. What is the issue Dasein is to itself? What are the potentialities 
it must live towards in order to be whole? Heidegger never tells us. Either he himself is unclear 
about it, or he does not feel it can be articulated, or he feels this cannot be communicated from 
one person to another but must be discovered by each for him- or herself.   
      For all intents and purposes, it is with this conclusion that Being and Time ends. It ends 
without having clearly articulated the issue Dasein is to itself, or providing a clear vision of just 
what authentic life would be like. We recall that Being and Time is a self-described incomplete 
work. Heidegger has told us from the beginning that the existential analytic of Dasein is merely 
preparatory for an investigation into Being as such, and that, given the entangled nature of the 
inquiry, even the existential analytic must remain tentative until the ontological analytic has been 
completed. Heidegger’s later work is his effort to move this project forward. But Being and Time 
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is especially valuable to us because, in bringing us to this point, it has brought us to the threshold 
of the religious understanding of human Being.  
     The Bible would agree with Heidegger that Dasein is, in some significant sense, in flight from 
itself as Being-towards-death. It would agree that Dasein must face up to its Being-towards-
death, i.e., its finitude,  in order to realize its truest potentialities. But it also articulates a vision 
of Being as such that allows it to say something of what these potentialities are. Thus, it 
completes Heidegger’s project in a particular direction, by presenting an ontological analytic of 
Being that places the existential analytic of Dasein in a particular context. What we now wish to 
do is explore this religious analytic.      
    
II.  God 
    What the Judeo-Christian tradition asserts (an assertion we find repeated in virtually all the 
world’s great religions) is that finite, individualized, Dasein is not and cannot be whole in itself. 
Ironically, it is Heidegger’s own analytic that can help us to see why this is so: “That in the face 
of which one has anxiety,” writes Heidegger, “is Being-in-the-world as such.”180 According to 
Heidegger, anxiety does not come to Dasein through a threat from without but is native to 
Dasein’s very Being. Dasein is anxious as such, Dasein as such is ‘not-at-home.’ As Dasein 
emerges from its lostness in das Man, as Dasein ‘comes back to itself,’ it is just then that its 
anxiety and not-at-homeness come to the fore. On the face of it, this seems the reverse of what 
one would expect. If das Man expresses Dasein’s false self, and anticipatory resoluteness 
Dasein’s true self, we would expect that Dasein would feel a stranger to its false self and at 
home in its true self. Indeed, if we remain true to Heidegger’s insight as to the disclosive 
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character of moods this conclusion forces itself upon us. It is, to say the very least, odd to say 
that just when Dasein comes into its ‘wholeness’ and ‘truth’ it should feel not-at-home.  
    Yet Heidegger’s analysis is not to be dismissed. His phenomenological observations ring true. 
They are based upon his recognition that Care is, implicitly, for-the-sake-of-itself, and his 
awareness that in das Man Dasein loses touch with this. Being-towards-death wrenches Dasein 
out of the falsity of das Man and delivers it back to itself; i.e., delivers it back to its realization of 
itself as Care. But surely here we have a paradox. If this is Dasein’s true Being why does Dasein 
flee from it? What is the meaning of Dasein’s angst?   
    To ask the meaning of something, we recall, is to ask what it is for. Is there something, then, 
that Dasein’s anxiety might be for? Anxiety, fallen into the world, says Heidegger, is fear. We 
fear this or that worldly eventuality, which is to say, we regard this or that worldly eventuality as 
threatening to our worldly concerns. Authentic anxiety, however, is not directed to this or that 
worldly circumstance but is of the very Being of Dasein itself. Does it thereby lose its character 
as disclosing that which is threatening? So it might appear, as there does not appear to be 
anything left that could be threatening to Dasein. Or have we, perhaps, missed something?  
    Would we be doing anything more than following the phenomenological clues in suggesting 
that anxiety reveals that Dasein’s very individualization is a threat to itself? Dasein’s 
individualization severs it from the remainder of Being – the world of other Daseins – and from 
the font of its Being – its own ontological basis. Might this be the reason Dasein feels not-at-
home in itself? To be home is to abide in that from which one is, that which provides the basic 
support for one’s Being. Ontologically speaking, then, to be ‘not-at-home’ is to be out of relation 
to the basis (and, hence, support) of one’s Being. Heidegger’s examination of Dasein’s 
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thrownness suggests just such a felt lack of relation. As thrown, Dasein experiences its basis as 
null. What is the meaning of this ‘nullity?’  
     Heidegger himself is not very clear on this. He writes: “[T]he ontological meaning of the 
notness [Nichtheit] of this existential nullity is still obscure.”181  Jean-Paul Sartre, in Being and 
Nothingness, however, provides a fuller phenomenological treatment of the meaning of nullity. I 
believe we can learn something by looking briefly at Sartre’s account. Sartre writes:  
I have an appointment with Pierre at four o’clock. I arrive at the café a quarter of an hour 
late. Pierre is always punctual. Will he have waited for me?  I look at the room, the patrons, 
and I say, ‘He is not here.’ Is there an intuition of Pierre’s absence, or does negation indeed 
enter in only with judgment? At first sight it seems absurd to speak here of an intuition since 
to be exact there could not be an intuition of nothing and since the absence of Pierre is this 
nothing. Popular consciousness, however, bears witness to this intuition. Do we not say, for 
example, “I suddenly saw that he was not there”?182 
 
    The absence of Pierre is not a mere logical judgment, but a phenomenon. One ‘sees’ that 
Pierre is absent. The absence of Pierre does not exist for everyone in the café but only for one 
looking for Pierre, only, that is, for one whose Being is in anticipation of Pierre, longing for 
Pierre.  How might we apply this to Heidegger’s Dasein? If Dasein’s thrown-Being-towards-
death has the aspect of nullity, and this nullity the aspect of anxiety (i.e., threat), does this not 
suggest that there is that in Dasein’s very Being that looks for, longs for, an absent basis? 
Dasein’s nullity, then, would have the meaning of privation.183  
    This in turn would make clear the meaning of authentic Dasein’s anxiety.  Dasein’s utter 
individualization brings anxiety because Dasein is not, ontologically, an utter individual. Dasein, 
considered strictly in itself, as enclosed in thrownness and Being-towards-death, is now revealed 
as incomplete, fragmented, de-prived, severed from its ontological basis and support (home). Its 
utter individualization would now represent the impossibility of its ever fulfilling its need for 
such support. Thus Dasein’s anxious awareness of its finitude evidences its essential relation to 
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infinitude, just as Sartre’s intuition of Pierre’s absence is testimony to Sartre’s relatedness to 
Pierre. If Dasein is, as such, a relatedness to infinitude then a full understanding of Dasein will 
demand an account of this relatedness.  
    In the Bible, of course, we find just such an account. Here it is God who is the true ontological 
whole. Finite Dasein is a part of this whole, but cannot hope to achieve wholeness by itself, nor 
through its world. What Heidegger calls Dasein’s thrownness religion calls its creatureliness. 
Ontologically, Dasein’s Being is not ‘in itself’ but in relation to the whole of what-is, as rooted 
and unified in God. Thus Dasein’s Being is relational as such. Dasein exists, and is able to exist, 
only as relation. Dasein qua Dasein, Dasein considered strictly in itself, is cut off from the font 
of its own life and is, as such, towards death. But for just this reason Dasein is not properly 
considered strictly in itself. Relationality is essential to Dasein’s Being. The destruction of 
Dasein’s relationality is the destruction of Dasein.  
     It appears that Heidegger’s very methodology prevents him from asking after the whence of 
Dasein’s thrownness; such whence not being phenomenally apparent. The Bible, of course, 
declares this whence to be God. What is the ground of the Bible’s claim? In the Christian 
tradition, of course, we can find the Anselmian and Thomistic ‘proofs’ for the existence of God, 
but these proofs have their roots in Greek metaphysics, not in that which is native to the 
Christian tradition as such. Religion rests its claim on what it calls revelation; i.e., the 
disclosedness of God to human beings as recorded in the Bible. The Christ of the New Testament 
does not endeavor to prove his claims through Aristotelian demonstration, but asks for faith.  
How are we to regard such claims, and such a request? 
    I wish to suggest that we cannot simply dismiss them on methodological grounds. In the 
Gospel of Matthew Jesus is recorded as saying: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see 
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God” (Mt 5:8). One may draw the inference that the impure in heart will not see God, or not see 
God clearly. From the Christian view all human beings are, to some degree or other, impure in 
heart. Then how is this claim to be assessed?  
     If there is a correlation between purity of heart and the seeing of God this suggests that such 
‘seeing’ is not an empirical experience available to anyone with physical eyes, but a mode of 
Dasein’s Being. It is not that one sees some being that one then identifies as God but that one’s 
Being-in-the-world is modified in a way that yields an experience of God. Sartre writes, “[I]f I 
should finally discover Pierre, my intuition would be filled by a solid element, I should be 
suddenly arrested by his face and the whole café would organize itself around him as a discrete 
presence.”184 Of course, God is not going to be visible as Pierre is visible, but what is significant 
in Sartre’s account is not that Pierre is suddenly physically visible, but that the presence of Pierre 
has overcome the absence of Pierre, which has changed the character of the whole café. The 
whole café, which was organized around Pierre’s absence, is now organized around Pierre’s 
presence. Likewise, for the one who ‘sees God,’ I suggest, the whole café (i.e., the world) 
organizes itself around his/her sense of the presence of God. God is apparent, not as a discrete 
being (Seiendes), but as the consummate arché and telos of Being (Sein), through which the 
world achieves its ordered wholeness.  Dasein’s individual wholeness is realized only through its 
relatedness to this wholeness, a relatedness that resolves the nullity pertaining to thrownness and 
death.  
 
III.  The Eternal  
    The Bible’s ‘In the beginning . . . ’, then, may be read as a statement concerning Dasein’s 
ultimate, ontological, basis and support – its home. In effect, it confirms what Heidegger’s 
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phenomenological observations have already indicated: that Dasein is neither at home in the 
world nor in itself. It purports to reveal, however, something that Heidegger’s phenomenology 
does not: that Dasein does indeed have a home, a home it shares with all other Daseins and the 
world at large. This home is not visible as a datum in the world.  It is that in which the world is.  
    ‘In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth,’ i.e., the world of Dasein. Since 
Dasein is Being-in-the-world-with-others the whole of Dasein’s world can be a whole only 
insofar as each element within it shares with the others a common point of reference. The 
revelation of God as creator, then, is also the revelation of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-
whole (with others). Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is revealed as contingent on 
Dasein’s establishment of some sort of healthful relationality with God.    
    Thus, the Bible employs the chronological notion of ‘beginning’ to convey the existential 
sense of home; i.e., that which would resolve the not-at-homeness native to individualized 
Dasein. As the infinite basis of Dasein’s finitude God is that through which the dilemma of 
Dasein’s nullity can be resolved. Insofar as Dasein’s nullity expresses itself temporally, in the 
null basis and null term of thrown-Being-towards-death, the in-finity which resolves it must also 
be expressible temporally. Eternity is the temporal expression for God’s infinity. The Bible’s ‘In 
the beginning . . . ’  expresses the eternality of God.  
    As we discussed in the last chapter, the Bible’s language is particular-relational. It depicts one 
particular being (God) creating others at a particular point in time. Traditional theology translates 
this into the universal-objectivist language of metaphysics. The particularistic language of the 
Bible is translated into a language concerning  God’s ‘eternality,’ ‘infinity,’ ‘aseity,’ etc., i.e., a 
discussion of God’s metaphysical attributes, what God objectively is ‘in himself.’  For the 
metaphysician, the significance of God’s act of creation is no longer primarily historiological, 
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i.e., an answer to the question ‘how did the world come to be?,’ but causal, i.e., an answer to the 
question ‘what does the world ultimately depend upon?’ Both these questions have been 
criticized by Heidegger as ‘onto-theological,’ expressions of Dasein’s desire to achieve mastery 
over Being through cognizing it objectively from ‘the ground up.’ It is my contention, though, 
that authentic religion is not onto-theological in the Heideggerian sense. Both the historiological 
question and the metaphysical question may be seen as expressions of Dasein’s yearning for 
wholeness. If we are going to assess this yearning phenomenologically we must find a way of 
rendering it into universal-relational language; that is, we must ask the question: ‘What might 
eternity mean for Dasein?’   
    In considering this question it will aid us, I think, to have before us Augustine’s metaphysical 
treatment of the question of time and eternity in the Confessions: 
A fickle-minded man . . . might wonder why you, who are God almighty, Creator of all, 
Sustainer of all, and Maker of heaven and earth, should have been idle and allowed countless 
ages to elapse before you finally undertook the vast work of creation. My advice to such 
people is to shake off their dreams and think carefully, because their wonder is based on a 
misconception. How could those countless ages have elapsed when you, the Creator, in 
whom all ages have their origin, had not yet created them  . . . You are the maker of all time . 
. . if there was no time before heaven and earth were created, how can anyone ask what you 
were doing ‘then? If there was no time, there was no ‘then.’ 
    Furthermore, although you are before time, it is not in time that you precede it. If this were 
so, you would not be before all time. It is in eternity, which is supreme over time because it is 
a never-ending present, that you are at once before all past time and after all future time.185    
 
    Our concern, again, is not to assess the metaphysics of Augustine’s conception of time, but to 
understand what meaning it might have for Dasein. The Bible’s ‘In the beginning…’ addresses 
the question of Dasein’s origin, a question arising out of the incompleteness Dasein experiences 
in its thrownness. In asking the question of its origin Dasein is asking after the possibility of its 
wholeness. To clarify this question we need to become even clearer as to what ‘wholeness’ itself 
means. 
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     Experientially, the idea of wholeness is related to that of sufficiency. We can see this clearly 
by comparing the ideas of ‘whole’ and ‘part.’ That which is partial requires connection, relation, 
to something beyond itself. That which is whole is sufficient as itself. What Dasein ultimately 
seeks, in asking the question of its origin, is not an account of some first efficient cause that will 
help explain the mechanics of its emergence, but an account of that which can resolve the 
incompleteness and insufficiency it experiences in its thrown-Being-towards-death and, thereby, 
make of it a whole.  
    As we have discussed, Dasein’s life is lived in time, or better, through time. Time itself is 
fragmentable; it may be segregated into discrete moments. But now we might note that Dasein’s 
very experience of itself as finite is an experience of itself as but a fragment; a fragment of  a 
whole it intuits only in the mode of absence; i.e., only through feeling its own insufficiency in 
relation to it. On the face of it, one might think that Dasein’s Being, though finite, nevertheless 
fills its present. Dasein, after all, is not absent to itself in the present (which gives rise to the 
notion that if Dasein could only divorce itself from concern for past and future and focus its 
attention entirely in the now, understood as this instant, it would find fulfillment). But this notion 
proves to be the result of too superficial an analysis. Dasein’s awareness of its thrownness, and 
its Being-towards-death, though not an awareness of what Dasein is at present, nevertheless 
qualifies Dasein’s experience of the present. The nullity of Dasein’s past and future are somehow 
experienced as a deficiency in what Dasein is, i.e., Dasein’s Being, at present. 
    Dasein cannot separate its concernfulness in the present from its concern for past and future, 
for its present concern is, as Heidegger has shown, temporally ec-static; projected upon its future 
on the ground of its past. Thus, despite what may seem the plenum of Dasein’s present, finite 
Dasein experiences itself as needing more, as temporally de-ficient. In the above quotation, 
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Augustine speaks of eternity as a “never-ending present.” One might well ask: what is the value 
of such never-endingness, given that one can only be at one moment at a time? It is only insofar 
as this moment  requires the next merely to be satisfied with itself that never-endingness has 
value. In Dasein’s angst over its finitude we see just this. Dasein’s present is experienced as 
insufficient, as needing its future merely to be satisfied with itself.  This, then, indicates the 
projective, i.e., temporally extended,  nature of Dasein as Care. Dasein’s self-concern is not 
situated in the present as divorced from past and future, but is temporally extended over past and 
future.   
    To the extent that Dasein experiences its finitude as anxiety-arousing (i.e., threatening), then, 
Dasein proves itself to be concernfully projected beyond finitude. The very character of Dasein’s 
concern, in other words, indicates a vocation to in-finitude. 
     And yet we encounter a paradox. Though Dasein’s concern is projected beyond the present, it 
is still only possible for Dasein to be in the present. The concern with past and future is in the 
present. Dasein’s sense of thrownness and Being-towards-death are qualifications of Dasein’s 
present. It is Dasein’s present that is deficient, Dasein’s present that looks beyond itself for 
something more, and it is just for this reason that Dasein seeks to rush away from its present into 
its future.  
     The “never-ending present,” then, is the expression for a mode of temporality in which this 
sense of deficiency is resolved. Eternity is the sufficiency of the now. It is essentially a  
qualitative, not a quantitative, modification of time.  It is a temporal expression for ontological 
wholeness. God – whose Being is bliss – is envisioned as ontologically whole (sufficient). God 
transcends, comprehends, and completes all that is fragmented. If we endeavor to express this in 
temporal terms we say that God is ‘before’ the beginning and ‘after’ the end, but the very 
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paradoxicality of such expressions indicates that we are using the terms ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
suggestively, to express God’s ontological comprehension of the discursivity of time.  
    The distinction between eternity and time, then, is not the distinction between a totality and its 
parts, as if one might arrive at the concept of eternity through conceptually stringing all the parts 
of time together and considering them at once. Rather, it is the distinction between that which is 
temporally sufficient and that which is temporally deficient, and, as such, needful. For eternity to 
be experienced at all it must be experienced in the now. It must be experienced as the sufficiency 
of the now. Eternity is a kind of peace, joy, abiding contentment in the now. It is ultimately to be 
understood as an axiological, not a quantitative, qualification of time. Given this, we might now 
ask after the axiological character of eternity: How must one be, axiologically, in order to 
experience temporality as whole, i.e., as eternal? Judeo-Christian religion gives us its answer in 
the passage quoted at the start of this chapter: the human being accesses eternity – eternal life – 
through the fullness of love. It is through love that Dasein overcomes its sense of ontological 
deficiency and participates in the eternality of God.   
    We can relate this notion of eternity to Heidegger’s analyses of authentic and inauthentic 
temporality. Temporality, as Heidegger shows, is not reducible to ‘clock time.’ Clock time, to 
express it in the terms we developed in chapter two, may be thought of as merely the ‘factuality’ 
of temporality; i.e., it has practical value for society but does not reveal the phenomenal meaning 
of temporality. Temporality is the Being-towards of Dasein. The character of Dasein’s 
temporality is determined by the character of its Being-towards.  Dasein, as self-projective, is 
always Being-towards . . . something. Inauthentic Dasein’s Being-towards is dispersed in the 
busyness of das Man. Only when Dasein becomes resolute does its Being-towards take upon 
itself thematic integrity, which allows Dasein to consolidate itself as whole: “Everyday Dasein 
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has been dispersed into the many kinds of things which daily ‘come to pass’…So if it wants to 
come to itself, it must first pull itself together from the dispersion and disconnectedness of the 
very things that have ‘come to pass’ . . . ”186 Such ‘pulling itself together’ is achieved, according 
to Heidegger, when Dasein affirms its thrownness and Being-towards-death in the ‘moment’ of 
resolute ‘vision;’ i.e., the Augenblick.  Authentic temporality is unified in the Augenblick. The 
Augenblick is a moment whose meaning is informed by the integration of Dasein’s past, present, 
and future in the present. Authentic Dasein, abiding in the Augenblick, lives as whole. Heidegger 
writes: “One’s existence in the moment of vision [Augenblick] temporalizes itself as something 
that has been stretched along in a way which is fatefully whole in the sense of the authentic 
historical constancy of the Self” (my emphasis).187  
    Religion would question, however, whether wholeness is indeed possible under the telic 
context of thrown-Being-towards-death. If thrownness and Being-towards-death present 
themselves as in some sense null, and if nullity is an experience of privation (i.e., deficiency), 
then thrown-Being-towards-death is incomplete, fragmentary, as such. This conclusion is 
reinforced for us by Heidegger’s own emphasis on the futurity of authentic temporality: “The 
primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future.”188 Temporal Dasein 
is concernfully projected upon its future. The prospect of no-future, then, must be the frustration 
of its projectedness, not its wholeness. And this is indeed what the Bible sees – it is just for this 
reason that the inevitability of death is associated with a sense of despair and meaninglessness: 
“[H]ow the wise man and the fool alike die! So I hated life, for the work which had been done 
under the sun was grievous to me; because everything was futility and striving after wind” (Eccl. 
2:16-17).  
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    Augustine’s metaphysical account represents eternity as a “permanent standstill.”189  But this 
now seems the result of too objectivistic an analysis. Eternity is not the stopping of temporality, 
but its fulfillment, its wholeness. We may well ask, then, in what dimension of Being can the 
temporal be said to be more or less whole? We have already answered: it is in the axiological 
dimension; eternity is realized in – as – love. The mystic’s ‘eternal now’ is not a freeze-frame in 
which time has literally stopped.  Rather, it is the present Moment experienced under the full 
telic context of ontological wholeness: Here-and-now, in all its finite particularity and facticity,  
presents itself as the center of eternity. Wholeness is achieved, not through being at every here-
and-now ‘at once,’ but through being at this here-and-now, centered in the whole. The mystic is 
aware that every here-and-now is just such another center.190     
    If this analysis is correct we cannot simply oppose eternity to time, as if the two were 
contraries. Rather, eternity is to be understood as a mode of temporality; in Heidegger’s 
language, eternity is the way in which temporality ‘temporalizes’ itself as whole.  Heidegger’s 
concept of the Augenblick appears to be his attempt to present a secularized, finitized, version of 
such temporal wholeness. But, as we have said, the angst and not-at-homeness accompanying 
finitude indicate that ‘finite wholeness’ is an oxymoron. From the Judeo-Christian perspective 
finite Dasein advances on wholeness only through loving (running-towards, Vorlaufen) that 
which is whole as such: God. Significantly, such wholeness requires of Dasein not only a 
‘vertical’ transcendence toward God but a ‘horizontal’ transcendence toward others. These two 
must proceed apace, like the expansion of a sphere. Only thereby does Dasein resolve into 
wholeness all that is present to it as Being-in-the-world-with-others. Thus the religious person’s 
pursuit of wholeness cannot be divorced from the demand for ethical relation; a concern at best 
slighted in Heidegger’s treatment of authenticity. 
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     It is not temporality as such that is to be opposed to eternality, then, but fragmentation. As the 
Bible presents it, the potential for such fragmentation is a function of the creation itself. The 
Bible never tells us why God creates the finite world; it is written from the standpoint of a 
creation already in place (an indication that the Bible is to be read as a revelation about God, but 
not as a text by God). The question of the Bible is not ‘why does God create?,’ but ‘how is the 
creation, and the things within it (especially human beings), to exist in relation to one another so 
as to overcome fragmentation and achieve their potential for wholeness/goodness?’  Any answer 
to this question requires a diagnosis of what stands in the way. The Bible gives us this diagnosis 
in its accounts of creation and fall.   
 
IV.  Creation 
    As the Bible presents it, the creation does not emerge from God fully formed but proceeds as a 
process of ordering taking place over the course of six days. At first the earth is “without form 
and void,” i.e., chaos. Over the six days of creation God orders the world into a form which 
he/she finally declares “very good” (Gn. 1:31).   
   The goodness of the creation, in other words, is not inherent to each individual thing as such, 
but is a function of a certain order; a way in which the individual elements of the creation are to 
be related to one another as whole. The creation can potentially be in dis-order, and thereby 
express lack of goodness, or evil. The human being, then, shares in the goodness of the creation 
only insofar as he/she is in appropriate relation to the whole. 
    On the sixth day the human being (male and female) is made in the ‘image of God.’ If we 
understand God as he/she who is ontologically whole as such, then the human being, made in the 
image of God, may be interpreted as an image, a reflection, of such ontological wholeness. God, 
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as whole, is for-the-sake-of-itself. The human being, then, as image of God, shares in God’s 
ontological structure as ‘for-the-sake-of-itself.’ Heidegger has given us an analysis of this 
structure and dubbed it ‘Care.’ According to the Great Commandment quoted at the start of this 
chapter, however, Dasein can realize itself as for-the-sake-of-itself only in living for-the-sake-of-
others as well. This does not make Dasein less the image of God but more the image of God, as 
God’s creativity is an expression of God’s being ‘for-the-sake-of-others.’191  Nevertheless, 
Dasein’s very Godlikeness, as for-the-sake-of-itself, presents Dasein with the power to enclose 
itself in itself and live strictly for-itself. This is sin. Ironically, the Bible characterizes sin in the 
same terms Heidegger characterizes authenticity: it is towards-death. ‘Proximally and for the 
most part,’ says the Bible, sin is the condition of humankind.   
    As many exegetes have noted, a careful reading of Genesis shows that there are two creation 
stories, the one we have been reviewing and the one beginning at Genesis 2:4 and including the 
story of Eden and Fall. In the first story God completes the creation in six days and rests “from 
all his work” on the seventh day. In the second story God creates Adam and Eve, and does not 
appear to get much rest after that. This raises the question: On what ‘day’ do Adam and Eve fall? 
There is nothing in the second story to suggest how its chronology is to be mapped to the first. If 
we understand the creation of Man/Woman to culminate in their attaining ‘the image of God,’ 
then it is possible to read the story of the Fall, and indeed the entirety of human history as we 
know it, as taking place on the sixth day of creation. On this reading, the entire story of fall and 
redemption, the whole of ‘salvation history’ from Eden to Calvary and beyond, is a factor in the 
perfecting of Man/Woman.192 The ‘seventh day’ points to the telic context of peace and perfect 
relationality that is, from a temporal point of view, always futural; as the fulfilled ‘Kingdom of 
God.’   
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    This would allow us to sketch a preliminary biblical response to the theological ‘problem of 
evil.’ To the question: ‘why is the world filled with such evil?’ we may respond ‘It is still in 
process of creation.’ As such it is still, in no small measure, ‘without form and void.’193 Its 
perfection, further, depends upon the perfecting of those ‘made in the image of God’: 
Man/Woman. Their story begins at Genesis 2:4.    
 
IV.  Eden and Fall       
    Christianity represents the chaos and evil of human life as due to a ‘fall from grace.’ 
Heidegger also employs the term ‘fallenness’ to speak of Dasein’s immersion in the life of das 
Man. We now wish to compare these two notions of fallenness. We will do so in three discrete 
steps. First (1), we will provide a phenomenological reflection that will ground our reading of the 
biblical text on which the Christian understanding of ‘fall’ is based. Next (2) we will provide our 
own symbolical interpretation of this text guided by this reflection. Finally (3) we will compare 
this with Heidegger’s own discussion of Dasein’s fallenness.  
 
1. Phenomenological Reflection 
    Heidegger writes: “From an existentiell point of view, the authenticity of Being-one’s-Self has 
of course been closed off and thrust aside in falling; but to be thus closed off is merely the 
privation of a disclosedness which manifests itself phenomenally in the fact that Dasein’s fleeing 
is a fleeing in the face of itself.”194   Dasein, according to Heidegger, is “closed off” from its 
authenticity due to its fallenness, but such ‘closed-offness’ is to be understood as the privation of 
a more primordial ‘un-closedness,’ i.e., authenticity. Similarly, the Christian doctrine of original 
sin bespeaks a primordial innocence lost due to the fall of Adam and Eve. In both cases a 
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concept of primordiality is at play that cannot be reduced to the chronological. Heidegger does 
not mean to say that there was once a time, in everyone’s life, when he or she ‘fell’ from 
authenticity. Nor can the Eden story be read as history.  
     True, Augustine and others have insisted that the biblical account of the Fall be accepted as 
historical record. Considering the propriety of symbolical exegesis of the Genesis story, for 
instance, Augustine writes: “There is no prohibition against such exegesis, provided that we also 
believe in the truth of the story as a faithful record of historical fact.”195 There are, however, 
grave difficulties in doing so. Quite apart from the difficulty of reconciling the story with modern 
anthropological and biological evidence, the story, literally construed, undermines itself, 
depicting God as startlingly unjust. To condemn the whole of humankind for a single act of 
disobedience, into which the first couple were seduced by a malicious fiend, and which, for all 
that, had the character of a victimless crime (apart from the punishment visited by God upon the 
hapless ‘criminals’) would be in violation of  virtually every principle of justice ever advanced, 
including those advanced by the Bible itself. The lex talionis rule of justice (eye for eye, tooth 
for tooth) would require that God, in retribution for Eve’s sin, steal a bit of fruit from Eve, not 
condemn the entire human race to perdition. The Eden story, thus, demands a symbolical 
exegesis, not as a means to reconciling it with modern science, but as a means to explicating its 
own biblical intentions.196 The story shows every sign of being symbolical by intent.  
    But this means that we must interpret its historical primordiality to signify a primordiality of 
another sort. The chronological primordiality of Eden must be taken as symbolizing an axio-
ontological primordiality. Man/Woman are fallen, not from what they have been, but from what 
they ought to be. It is certainly no accident that the Bible locates this ‘fall’ at the very beginning 
of human history. It thereby indicates that every human being is always already under its sway. 
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The implication is that human beings, in general, live in tension with the axiological demands of 
of their own potential for wholeness, a tension phenomenally manifest as both nullity and ‘guilt’ 
(or nullity as guilt, as we will discuss next chapter).  
    But this raises a question. In what sense may we speak of an ontological primordiality that is 
not also a chronological primordiality? Metaphysically, this question has traditionally been 
answered  through an analysis of potentiality. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysic ‘act’ is 
said to precede ‘potency’ universally, though potency may, of course, precede act in any 
individual case.  Thus the individual, in potency, is said to have an inherent predisposition for 
actualizing a state of Being that it may never have, chronologically, known.  If we now imagine a 
being who is in some resistance, for whatever reason, to its own fulfilled actualization, we may 
speak of this resistance as, in some sense, a ‘fallenness’ from what it ‘ought’ to be but never has 
been. Implicit in this metaphysic is the notion of ‘form.’ Every being in potency is in potency to 
a specific form that its very Being is impelled to actualize.  
    Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein may be read as an endeavor to explicate the 
ontological form of Dasein phenomenologically. Dasein, as Care, says Heidegger, is ‘for-the-
sake-of-itself.’ This is the structure (i.e., ‘form’) of Care. Dasein achieves authenticity only to the 
extent that it lives as such. The Great Commandment, with which we began this chapter, 
suggests that Dasein’s form requires that it live for the sake of others and God as well. Are these 
two claims compatible? We will consider this question in chapter nine. For now, though, we may 
simply note that for factical Dasein the demand to love itself and the demand to love others are 
certainly in tension. Dasein, as ‘for-the-sake-of-itself,’ lives in a world of others who are also 
‘for-the-sake-of-themselves,’ with whom Dasein comes into conflict.   
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     Of course, were one to judge the matter universally and disinterestedly one would see that 
each ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’ has its own inherent legitimacy. In other words, each for-the-sake-
of-itself, as for-the-sake-of-itself, has the ontological ‘right’ to be for-the-sake-of-itself. By use 
of the word ‘right’ I do not mean to import an ethical standard foreign to our ontological 
analysis, but merely to indicate the inherent appropriateness of a thing’s being what it is. That is 
to say, it is proper to a ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’ that it be ‘for-the-sake-of-itself.’ Were Dasein, 
then, fully sensitive to the universal, ontological, situation it is in, it would implicitly ‘love its 
neighbor as itself,’ insofar as only thus would it respond to its neighbor in a manner appropriate 
to the Being of its neighbor (as ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’).  In doing so it would merely be 
responding appropriately to the truth of Being as a whole, i.e., universally considered.  
     But if, with Heidegger, we understand ‘truth’ to refer to the disclosedness of Being, we might 
now ask whose Being discloses this universal truth?  It is not any individual Dasein’s Being.  
The notion of a universal truth of Being, then, refers us to some being, or mode of Being, whose 
truth transcends each individual Dasein, while, at the same time, including each. In the Bible, of 
course, this is represented by the figure of God. Factical Dasein, insofar as it does not ‘love its 
neighbor as itself,’ fails to abide by God’s truth, which is inclusive of all. The Biblical claim is 
that Dasein, as ‘image of God,’ can only achieve its perfection and fulfillment by living in 
accordance with God’s truth. Dasein’s failure to do so, then, is – as the Bible presents it – sin and 
fall.  
    There is, of course, no evidence that there was ever a time in human history when human 
beings in general were not, in this sense, ‘sinful and fallen.’ The very structure of Dasein places 
its own concerns immediately before it in a manner that privileges these concerns above those of 
others.  One must, in effect, ‘wake up’ to the concerns of others. I don’t believe it is helpful to 
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read the biblical story of the Fall as an effort to lay blame upon human beings for not being what 
they haven’t had the ontological maturity to be. However, if we were willing to entertain 
religious claims as to the revelatory status of the biblical text, we might read the story of the Fall 
– and the whole of the Bible – as an effort to ‘wake human beings up’ through disclosing to them 
their ontological situation as seen from the universal perspective, i.e., from the perspective of 
God. From this perspective human culture is a tragedy of self-alienation and other-alienation due 
to a failure of love. The name the Bible gives to such alienation is ‘death.’ The Bible’s 
paradigmatic account of this alienation is provided in the story of Eden and Fall.   
 
2.  Symbolical Interpretation 
    It is important to distinguish between the Man/Woman created ‘in the image of God’ at the 
end of the first creation story and the Adam of the Eden story. This Adam is not created ‘in the 
image of God’ but from the dust of the ground, and although God breathes the spirit of life into 
him, thereby making him a living soul, he is a living soul still very much ‘of the dust.’ We are 
privy to the spectacle of God’s trying to find a ‘helpmeet’ for Adam by first creating and then 
parading all the beasts of the earth before him to see if one is suitable; as if it is not yet entirely 
clear that Adam is anything more than a beast himself. Finally, no beast proving adequate, God 
creates Eve from Adam’s side. Adam and Eve, in other words, are ambiguous creatures from the 
start. They are invested with the spirit of God but encased in earthen matter, i.e., in that which is, 
intrinsically, ‘without form and void.’  
     They are placed in the garden of Eden and told they may eat of any tree in the Garden but the 
one growing in its midst: the tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil. On the day they eat of this 
tree, they are told, they will “surely die.” It is sometimes wondered why God would place a tree 
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in the midst of Eden and then forbid Adam and Eve to eat from it. The puzzle is solved if we 
understand Eden itself to symbolize the creation in perfect axiological balance. Adam’s relation 
to Eve, and the first couple’s relation to their world, are, in Eden, in perfect harmony. Each 
perfectly complements the other. The tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil, then, standing in 
the center of this garden, is expressive of just this balance. In other words, the tree of the 
knowledge of Good and Evil represents the axiological order of God – what we have called 
God’s ‘truth of Being’ –  which governs the harmony of the creation. It is this harmony that is 
thrown off when the human being, seeking to make herself a ‘god,’ (i.e., a whole unto herself) 
eats of the fruit of this tree in order to become, in her own separate person, the supreme 
axiological center. The eating of the fruit, then, is the biblical paradigm for all acts of sin. Every 
act of sin entails a usurpation of the divine axiology, which governs the harmony of the creation, 
through the centering of value exclusively in oneself; i.e., through an exclusionary intensification 
of one’s ‘for-the-sake-of-oneselfness.’ This did not happen once at the beginning of history, but 
happens again and again. This exclusionary centering of self in self, of course, is the sin of pride, 
which produces a societal state of Hobbesian war, as each atomic individual, taking 
himself/herself as supreme, wars with every other in pursuit of domination. We do not wait long 
for such war to begin in the Bible. The very next thing to happen after the first couple’s 
expulsion from Eden is the murder of one of their children by the other.  
    But what induces Adam and Eve to commit this ‘original sin?’ For all of Eden’s harmony, 
there is something already out of balance in the garden; there is a serpent slithering in the grass. 
This devious ‘snake in the grass’ – an image suggestive of the hidden danger lurking in all 
temptation – must, I believe, be understood to represent an element in Adam and Eve 
themselves. Only thus can the serpent tempt them. The serpent, we are told, is the most clever of 
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all the animals in Eden. Might it, then, represent the burgeoning intelligence of Adam and Eve as 
coupled with their own animality? If we are able to give up the notion of Adam and Eve as 
already perfect this interpretation recommends itself. Adam and Eve in Eden are half-formed 
creatures; no longer beasts but not yet fulfilled in their humanity. The strange figure of the 
talking serpent, the animal invested with logos, suggests just this ambiguity. It is this alliance of 
reason, with its capacity for apprehending the whole, and animality, with its particularized self-
concern, that now rises up in self-awareness to assert its ‘in-itselfness.’ Adam and Eve now seek 
to bring the Whole under the dominion of their own particular appetites and desires. Thus, the 
eating of the fruit is the usurpation of the divine axiology; the individual now pursues axiological 
supremacy just as if her particularized appetites were that for the sake of which everything else 
exists. In doing so human beings sever their relation to the true Whole and plunge their world 
into moral chaos. The harmony of Eden dissolves to be replaced by a world of intensive rivalries 
– a world of violence, pain, isolation, hardship, and death: our world. 
    To take this one step further, we can recognize with Kierkegaard, Tillich and others, that it is 
freedom itself that is the ontological condition for the possibility of such axiological self-
centeredness.  Freedom entails self-sovereignty, which, in turn, entails the ability to distinguish 
between self and other, I and not-I.  Only a being who can cognitively distinguish itself from its 
world can be free. Such freedom is both the glory of the human being and the precondition for 
disharmony and discord, for it permits the individual  to behave independently of its world. 
Ontologically, freedom is the creature’s discontinuity with the whole. An unfree being is wholly 
determined by its surroundings and instincts, a mere continuation of its circumstances. Such a 
being is not distinct from its environs. It is through freedom that the human being attains the 
status (as Kant would say, the dignity) of a separate and distinct self.  
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    But such separateness comes at a price. The consciousness of separateness is also the 
consciousness of finitude. To know oneself as separate is to know oneself as bordered by that 
which is not oneself. Freedom, separateness, and finitude, thus, are co-constituting. It is  freedom 
that provides the human being with the potential to be an ‘image of God,’ i.e., an analog of 
wholeness amidst the greater whole, a finite circle within the infinite circle. But such freedom 
carries the danger of ethical and spiritual rupture, the danger that the free being will employ its 
volitional independence to seek axiological and ontological totality; i.e., to seek to center Being 
in itself.  It is this, then, to which the talking serpent ‘tempts’ Adam and Eve: to employ their 
newly minted rationality and freedom, which makes each of them an analog of God, to become 
God.197 Again, we must not suppose that this story refers to an actual historical event; rather it is 
the Bible’s diagnosis, presented in mythical form, of what is wrong with human beings in 
general: our freedom and rationality tempt us to seek to center the whole of Being within 
ourselves, which results in ethical and spritual rupture.     
    We are especially concerned to understand the meaning of death in this story. That the human 
being, as compounded with earth, is destined to a physical death is expressed elsewhere in the 
Bible: “My Spirit shall not strive with man forever, because he also is flesh; therefore his days 
shall be one hundred and twenty years” (Gn. 6:3).  But the death decreed for Adam and Eve in 
Eden is clearly not the physical one figured in this passage. In their expulsion from Eden Adam 
and Eve lose access to the Tree of Life. Just as the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil may 
be seen to represent the universal axiology of God, so the Tree of Life may be taken to signify 
the ontological wholeness of God. It is the Tree of eternal life that Adam and Eve lose access to 
when they seek to make their own finite lives absolute. Dasein loses eternity, or its sense of 
eternity, due to its axiological self-centeredness. In seeking to center value in itself Dasein 
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imprisons itself in itself, uprooting itself from the whole to which it belongs and severing its 
relation to its true home.   
    It is only now that Adam and Eve are thrown-being-towards-death. Prior to the eating of the 
fruit Adam and Eve are “naked and not ashamed” (Gn. 3:25).  Such nakedness signifies 
unhiddenness; the openness of self to self and self to other. Upon eating the fruit they become, 
quite literally, ashamed of themselves. I think we must see that it is their nakedness they become 
ashamed of, not their crime. This is indicated by the fact that they seek to hide their nakedness 
from God. Such nakedness is now the exposure of their ontological deficiency, their 
vulnerability and finitude, exposed as finitude, as deficiency, only due to loss of relation to the 
infinitude, the sufficiency, of God; an exposure made all the more dangerous for the fact that 
their sin has instituted a world of murderous rivalries. It is symbolically significant that Jesus, in 
the moment of overcoming this primal sin, is once again ‘naked and unashamed’ – on the Cross. 
    It is, we would say, the angst of thrown-being-towards-death that we see figured in the shame 
of nakedness that now overwhelms the humans. It is no longer safe for each to be exposed to the 
other, nor even to themselves. Their only relief from the angst and uncanniness of death is the 
illusion that they can indeed make themselves little gods, i.e., that they can achieve wholeness in 
their own finitude; if not altogether by themselves, then at least corporately.198 But for this they 
must hide their thrown-Being-towards-death, the proof of their ontological insufficiency, not 
merely from each other, but principally from themselves. Adam and Eve now cover themselves 
up, hiding themselves from each other and from God. The reign of loneliness and alienation is 
instituted. The dictatorship of das Man has begun.  
    The curses now pronounced upon them by God merely articulate the ontological exile they 
have thrown themselves into. They are banished from the Tree of Life, and the harmony of Eden 
Richard Oxenberg; Being-Towards-Life/Being-Towards-Death 
 
179  
is now overcome by discord: discord between mother and child (Gn. 3:16), man and nature (Gn. 
3:17), husband and wife (Gn. 3:16) and, as we shall soon find, brother and brother. God, who 
once walked in the Garden in the ‘cool of the day’ (Gn. 3:8), now becomes increasingly remote. 
His visage, from here to the incarnation, will primarily be a visage of wrath.          
    But this is myth and, as we have said, we must insist upon its mythical character if we are to 
extract its meaning. The Eden story refers us to something universal to the human condition: the 
moral and spiritual desolation consequent upon the paradox of human Being as finite image of 
the infinite God. This is a problem inherent to the human condition as such, a problem, as the 
Bible will propose, whose ultimate solution is Christ: the fully integrated God-man. Christ is not 
a second Adam, but a perfected Adam; an Adam matured beyond animality to become a willing, 
conscious, partner of God.    
     In the Eden story we also have the revelation of a potentiality for homefulness that the human 
being – factical Dasein – only knows as longing. To such longing there is attached a sense of 
ruptured be-longing; hence a vague nostalgia for a lost home. But just because Dasein has been 
banished from the Tree of Life it can only know of this banishment from the perspective of 
death. It can only know of its own lack of wholeness, its own angst and not-at-homeness. In 
Heidegger’s treatment of Being-towards-death may we not recognize a  phenomenological 
account proffered from just this perspective?    
 
3.  Heidegger And Eden   
    The Heidegger of Being and Time does not speak of life. Life does not appear as a category in 
Heidegger’s thought. The fall of which Heidegger writes is a fall from death, from the 
authenticity of Being-towards-death into the inauthenticity of das Man. Significantly, Heidegger 
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conflates the symbols of fall and flight, which in the Bible are carefully distinguished, often 
using the terms interchangeably. We see this in the quoted passage at the beginning of section 1. 
Dasein’s flight into das Man is its fall from authenticity. Dasein’s fall into the ‘world’ is its flight 
in the face of itself. In the Eden story, on the other hand, the moments of fall and flight are 
sharply discriminated. First Adam and Eve fall from God’s grace (from life), and only then flee 
from their nakedness; i.e., from the exposure of their finite vulnerability. The fall is from life into 
death. The flight is from death into hiddenness. The flight is not the fall, but a flight from the fall. 
In fleeing from their nakedness, their finite vulnerability, Adam and Eve are fleeing from the 
‘death’ brought on by the fall.  
    In the Eden story, in other words, we can note three distinct moments, as three stages of 
Dasein’s fallenness. There is, first of all, the primordial moment of life, of harmony with God, 
which is to say, with all Being. Then there is the moment of fall, of rupture with God and the 
remainder of Being. Finally there is the moment of flight, of hiding from self, God, and the rest 
of Being. The angst of guilt and shame is a function of the rupture with life. The rupture has 
opened a gap of nothingness between Dasein and its own ontological groundedness in God. In 
response to the angst associated with this rupture Dasein flees from the truth of itself. In 
Heidegger’s account, these three moments are collapsed into two; what the Bible sees as a 
moment of rupture is, for Heidegger, the primordial moment, there is nothing prior to it, nothing 
conditioning it, and hence it is not a moment of rupture, nor of guilt in the ordinary sense, but 
merely of angst-ridden nullity. Such nullity, according to Heidegger, is itself  the paradoxical 
‘ground’ of Dasein. The angst associated with it has no meaning beyond itself. It reveals Dasein 
to be an issue to itself but tells us nothing of what this issue portends. Having arrived at this 
angst we have arrived at the bottom of meaning. The angst just is.  
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    The Bible places this angst in a larger context. The angst, and the nullity, are symptoms of 
rupture, of axiological disorder. It is only sinful Dasein who experiences its basis as null, and, 
hence, itself as ‘not-at-home.’ At a deeper level than Heidegger’s phenomenology yet knows, 
says the Bible, is another possibility; a possibility of harmony and peace, of homefulness. Such is 
the true bottom of Dasein. The Eden story professes to reveal this true bottom, but it is a 
revelation ‘as in a dream.’ It is for factical Dasein only a hope, an invitation to hope. Factical 
Dasein lives outside the gates of Eden, amidst the reality of alienation and rupture. 
    Heidegger’s phenomenology and the Eden myth, then, may be seen as presenting the same 
phenomena from two different perspectives. Heidegger traces Dasein from its alienation in das 
Man back to its prior flight from death. The Edenic myth follows Dasein from its primordial 
homefulness in God forward to its subsequent fall into death. At the juncture of the two is the 
moment of death itself, which the Bible suggests has to do with a misrelation to the categories of 
good and evil; i.e., a misrelation to the universal axiology of God. The Heidegger of Being and 
Time does not yet see the possibility of homefulness and thus takes Dasein’s truth to consist in an 
affirmation of its not-at-homeness. But the Bible professes to see farther. Dasein has a home, but 
must re-form itself axiologically to know it.  
    Thus, the biblical perspective places Heidegger’s account of the flight into das Man into a new 
context. There is a peculiar, even touching, moment at the end of the Eden story. After God has 
pronounced his awful curses upon Adam and Eve, he makes “garments of skin” for them to wear 
as they are about to embark into the world outside of Eden (Gn. 3:21). Adam and Eve are no 
longer able to be naked and unashamed, as they were in their ‘innocent’ animality. Rather than 
abandon them to their angst-ridden nullity, however, God now makes clothes for them himself. It 
will be a long time before they will be able to return to healthful nakedness. In the meantime it is 
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better for them to be covered up than exposed in their forlornness. Ironically, the Bible seems 
here to suggest that the life of das Man, for all its inauthenticity, is preferable to the life of 
radical self-involvement. Even an inauthentic social norm is better than none at all.    
    It is possible, then, to read the Eden story and Heidegger’s phenomenology as mutually 
reinforcing. The Bible would agree that factical Dasein is Being-towards-death, and Being-
towards-death is the ‘utter individualization’ of Dasein. Further, Being-towards-death does bring 
with it a sense of angst, not-at-homeness, and guilt, which, indeed, does drive Dasein to cover 
itself up in the inauthenticity of das Man. We find all of this confirmed in the biblical account.  
But the Bible claims to be privy to something about Dasein that Heidegger is not. It professes to 
know the whence of Dasein’s Being-towards-death.  It knows this – so anyway it says – because 
it knows something of the whence of Dasein itself.    
    And it is from this biblical perspective that we can also make sense of the imperative force of 
Heidegger’s ‘call of conscience.’ Why this difficult call back from the tranquility of das Man if it 
is only a call into the angst and literal ‘point-lessness’ of Being-towards-death? The game seems 
hardly worth the candle. But if the call into death is itself only a prelude to a further call into life 
then the insistence of the call makes sense; it is an implication of Dasein’s very Being as Being-
towards-life. It is the imperative implicit in life that calls Dasein back from its lostness to face 
itself. This call out of das Man, through death, into life, is biblically figured in the story of the 
Hebrews’ exodus from slavery in Egypt to freedom in the promised land. To get from the one to 
the other, however, the Hebrews must pass through the desert, the land of death and austerity, 
where the Law is issued.   
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Chapter VIII. The Revelation of Law 
 
 
I.  Outside Eden 
    Cain murders Abel in a moment of furious envy over God’s preference for Abel. In a different 
world, Cain might have celebrated his brother’s happiness; Abel might have invited Cain to 
share in it. But the axiological presuppositions of the world outside of Eden, as the Bible presents 
them, are those of rivalry and war, as each competes with the other in pursuit of personal 
supremacy. It is significant, I think, that envy is at the root of the first biblical murder, as 
opposed to competition for material goods. The Bible sees the rivalry between human beings as 
centered in a spiritual, not a material, battle for preeminence. Each wants to dominate for the 
sake of domination itself.  
    Heidegger calls Dasein’s concern with its status vis-à-vis the other ‘distantiality’: “In one’s 
concern with what one has taken hold of, whether with, for, or against, the Others, there is 
constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether that difference is merely one that is to 
be evened out, whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind the Others and wants to catch up in 
relationship to them, or whether one’s Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out to 
keep them suppressed.”199 Distantiality is one way in which Dasein is in thrall to others: “[T]his 
distantiality which belongs to Being-with, is such that Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-
another, stands in subjection [Botmässigkeit] to Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken 
away by the Others.”200  
    Applying this understanding to the biblical text, we might read Cain’s murder of Abel as an 
expression of Cain’s ontological subjection to Abel. Cain experiences his own status in Being as 
strictly relative to Abel’s.  In murdering Abel, Cain seeks to free himself from the oppressive 
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weight of Abel’s success. Abel must die for Cain to live. What are the dynamics that account for 
this?  
    On Heidegger’s interpretation, Dasein’s subjection to others is due to its failure to fully 
differentiate itself from them; a function of its flight into das Man. Heidegger doesn’t spend a 
great deal of time examining what he calls ‘distantiality.’ He notes it and moves on to a treatment 
of the life of das Man in general. But what Heidegger, rather abstractly, calls ‘distantiality,’ is at 
the heart of the Bible’s understanding of human sinfulness. We must, then, consider it more 
fully.  
    From the biblical perspective, at Dasein’s root is a desire for communion with infinite Being 
(eternal life) stemming from Dasein’s primordial ontological provenance in God. Factical 
Dasein, cut off from God, is a desire for infinite Being frustrated within the bounds of finitude. 
Frustrated Dasein seeks to overcome these bounds through mastery over its world. Fallen 
Dasein, thus, (now in the biblical sense of fallen) seeks what amounts to a finite infinity; to 
become infinite in its own finite person, its own ‘Being-in-the-world,’ which involves the 
subordination of ‘its’ world (and, therefore, all other persons) to itself. This desire for worldly 
infinity, however, is perpetually frustrated and troubled, as Dasein continues to be haunted and 
plagued by the limitations of its finitude. It is this troubled desire for a finite infinity that drives 
the dynamics of the phenomenon Heidegger calls ‘distantiality’: Dasein’s status in relation to 
others becomes the measure by which it assesses its own status in Being.   
    We recall that eternity is available only as a qualification of the now. Through the expansion 
of its mastery over its now Dasein is able to persuade itself, in the now, of its progress in 
securing its ontological standing; of course always, only, in a troubled, haunted, self-deceptive 
way. When Dasein suffers defeat at the hands of the other its self-deceit is unmasked, it is hurled 
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back into the angst of its finitude, which then releases itself as rage at the defeating other. The 
other is now testimony to Dasein’s ontological impotence. In murdering, enslaving, or simply 
denigrating the other, Dasein eliminates and/or refutes the testimony of its impotence and 
reinstates itself in its own eyes. Here we have the birth of every form of malice. 
   From the biblical perspective, then, we would interpret Dasein’s failure to individuate itself 
from others as a function of its isolation from God. Dasein cannot endure the isolation of its bare 
finitude and flies into the world of das Man in order to escape it, reassuring itself of its 
ontological prowess through its relations to others. The Bible does not see a Darwinian struggle 
for survival at the root of human rivalry but a spiritual struggle for dominion. Ironically, this 
struggle for dominion over the other is itself an expression of Dasein’s subjection to the other. 
Dasein is, in effect, enslaved to its need to dominate the other. Envy is the dominant spirit of this 
struggle. One’s progress toward dominion is not only measured by, but indeed has its very Being 
in, one’s status vis-à-vis the other.  
    It is in this context that we may understand the meaning of the Hebrews’ enslavement in 
Egypt. Such slavery is a symbol, and more than a symbol, for the self-enslavement of sin. The 
symbolic richness of the biblical narrative is extraordinary at this point. On the one hand, the 
Hebrews are, in effect, a people born as slaves. Prior to their enslavement in Egypt they are not a 
people but merely a family; a family rife with envious rivalries. Jacob deceives his father Isaac in 
order to steal his brother Esau’s birthright. Jacob’s envious sons sell their brother Joseph into 
slavery, which results, through a convoluted turn of events, in their own descendants becoming 
slaves. The enslavers have become the enslaved. The Hebrews have now become a people as 
slaves. As such, they express humanity’s self-victimage. The sins of the fathers have been visited 
upon the children; not as an expression of justice, but of the injustice bred of sin. There is 
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nothing at all in the Bible to suggest that the Hebrew slaves are a morally exemplary people. But 
they are a people with moral potential, expressed in the righteousness of their father Abraham. 
They are, additionally, a people whose craving for freedom, a craving intensified by the 
hardships and injustices of slavery, will allow God to imprint his/her law of righteousness upon 
them – in order, eventually, to have them convey it to the world.   
    In the Bible’s Egypt the possibilities of human life are reduced to two: the overweening 
arrogance of Pharaoh and the miserable destitution of the slave; i.e., the life of one who has 
succeeded in possessing ‘his’ world, and the lives of those who, by that very fact, have been 
dispossessed of theirs. The Hebrews are enslaved to Pharaoh and Pharaoh is enslaved to his need 
to enslave them, i.e., his own hardened heart, which brings disaster.  
    God now interrupts this all-too-human dynamic by promulgating a law from a vaster sphere of 
Being. It is God who now demands ‘possession’ of the world. But God’s demand for possession 
is not on the order of Pharaoh’s, for there is an ontological difference between God and Pharaoh, 
with the most profound axiological implications. God is he/she from whom, in whom, and 
toward whom all have their Being. God’s axiology is universal, all-inclusive. God, then, is the 
only one for whom possession of the world is not usurpation; thus God’s law has a legitimacy 
that Pharaoh’s cannot. If we are to understand the nature of divine authority we must explore the 
meaning of this legitimacy.   
 
II.  The Legitimacy of Divine Law  
For this commandment which I command you today is not too difficult to you, nor is it 
out of reach. It is not in heaven that you should say, “Who will go up to heaven for us to 
get it for us and make us hear it, that we may observe it?” Nor is it beyond the sea that 
you should say, “Who will cross the sea for us to get it and make us hear it, that we may 
observe it?” But the word is very near you, in your mouth and in your heart, that you may 
observe it.  (Deut. 30:11-14)  
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    “The word is very near you, in your mouth and in your heart”: These words express the 
fundamental paradox of law, which we must consider if we are to understand the claim to 
legitimacy of biblical law. We will consider this in relation to Heidegger’s analysis of the ‘call of 
conscience.’ 
    Whence does law derive its right to command? Heidegger writes that the call of conscience 
“comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me.”201 This expresses the paradoxical nature 
of law as such. On the one hand, law speaks from beyond the individual’s will. One’s will is 
addressed by the law and, if law is legitimate, should be subordinated to the law. But were law to 
speak merely in the name of some other will then it would be indistinguishable from despotism 
and bullying. Law, to be legitimate, must speak in the name of that toward which the will is 
properly ordered; that is to say, law must be in some sense proper to the one commanded by it, it 
must be “in your mouth and in your heart,” otherwise it would not be law but mere imposition.   
    Law, thus, implies a schism in the one to whom it is issued, between what one factically is and 
what one ought to be. For Heidegger, the call of conscience calls from Dasein’s authentic Being 
to Dasein’s inauthentic Being, calling the latter to return to the former. Biblical law implies a 
similar schism. It calls to fallen Dasein for the sake of redeemed Dasein, subjecting Dasein to 
law in order to liberate Dasein from sin. When Dasein is fully liberated from sin it will then no 
longer be subject to an extrinsic law; then the law will have been ‘written on its heart’ (Jer. 
31:33), its ‘is’ and ‘ought’ resolved. This reconciling of self with self is the process of 
sanctification, through which Dasein is made ‘holy,’ i.e., whole. As the above quote indicates, 
then, the legitimacy of divine law derives from its roots in the ontology of Dasein itself.   
    The Jewish prayer over the Sabbath candles expresses the sanctifying intent of law: “Blessed 
art thou O Lord our God, King of the Universe, who sanctifies us with His commandments and 
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has commanded us to light the lights of Shabbat.” We now wish to consider in what way biblical 
law ‘sanctifies.’ Kant also shows a recognition of the sanctifying power of law in his praise of 
duty: “Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating 
but requirest submission . . . where is the root of thy noble descent . . . ? This root cannot be less 
than something that elevates man above himself as a part of the world of sense, something which 
connects him with an order of things which only the understanding can think . . . ”202  For Kant, 
the very purpose of law is to “elevate man above himself as part of the world of sense.” The root 
of duty is (for both Kant and Heidegger) the very personhood of Dasein as ‘for-the-sake-of-
itself.’ This root, Kant writes, is “nothing else than personality, i.e., the freedom and 
independence from the mechanism of nature regarded as a capacity of a being subject to special 
laws (pure practical laws given by its own reason), so that the person belonging to the world of 
sense is subject to his own personality so far as he belongs to the intelligible world”203 (my 
emphasis). For both Heidegger and Kant, then, the source of law and/or conscience is the very 
individuality of Dasein, who, in order to maintain its individuality, must free itself from, in 
Heidegger’s case, das Man, in Kant’s case, “the world of sense.” For each law is, in a sense, a 
way in which Dasein extracts itself from subjection to its world.   
    But this, I wish to contend, expresses only half the meaning of biblical law. Divine law is not 
predicated upon the individuality of Dasein as a value in itself, but upon the universality of God, 
to which Dasein is called. It is not in returning Dasein to itself, but in lifting Dasein up to partake 
in the universal, that biblical law sanctifies.  
    To grasp this it is critical that we come to some understanding of the nature of divine 
universality. Kierkegaard, in Fear and Trembling, opposes universality to particularity, and thus 
speaks of the need for a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ (understood as universal law) for 
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the sake of affirming the particular.
204
 But in this, it seems to me, Kierkegaard (or his 
pseudonym, De Selentio) fails to take account of the infinite inclusivity of divine universality.  
Aquinas, on the other hand, argues that, though the human apprehension of the universal always 
entails some abstraction from the particular, the same limitation does not apply to God: “God 
knows whatever proceeds from Him immediately. When this is known God once more knows 
whatever proceeds from it immediately; and so on for all intermediate causes down to the last 
effect. Therefore, God knows whatever is found in reality.”205 According to Aquinas, it is not 
God, but we, who have trouble knowing particulars.
206
 Yet Kierkegaard’s point is not entirely to 
be dismissed. Aquinas often speaks as if God’s universal knowledge is impersonal and static, a 
vast organizational chart so to speak, with human beatitude consisting of little more than a 
glimpse of this chart: “Since the vision of the divine substance is the ultimate end of every 
intellectual substance [e.g., man], as is evident from what we have said, and since the natural 
appetite of everything comes to rest when the thing reaches its ultimate end, the natural appetite 
of an intellectual substance must come to rest completely when it sees the divine substance . . . 
Now the natural appetite of the intellect is to know the genera and species and powers of all 
things, and the whole of the universe.”207 
    What this seems, anyway, to neglect, is what Heidegger calls the disclosive character of 
moods, and what we have emphasized as the concernfulness at the root of Being and meaning.  
To properly know Dasein is not simply to know the genus and species to which Dasein belongs, 
but to know the character of Dasein’s concerns, its fears and longings, its hopes and dismays. It 
is only insofar as God knows this that God can be said to know Dasein in Dasein’s particularity. 
Aquinas’ metaphysical reasoning (informed, as it is, by Aristotle) commits him to a belief in a 
wholly dispassionate God, but such is inconsistent with the biblical portrait.  To get a correct 
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understanding of the biblical view of God’s knowledge, then, we must couple the Thomistic 
notion of the inclusivity of divine universality with the Heideggerian notion of the disclosive 
character of moods. Only thereby do we envision a God whose knowing is, at the same time, a 
feeling for the ‘widows and orphans.’   
    Biblical law, then, calls the human being to ‘know’ the world as God does; a knowing  
indissolubly linked with a feeling for the other; i.e., com-passion. Let us consider, for instance, a 
passage from Leviticus: “The stranger who resides with you shall be to you as a native among 
you, and you shall love him as yourself; for you were aliens in the land of Egypt” (Lv 19:34).  
What is noteworthy here is the rationale given for the injunction: “for you were aliens in the land 
of Egypt.” The wrongness of mistreating the alien is disclosed in the suffering caused by such 
mistreatment; a suffering only another alien can fully understand. It is just because the Hebrew 
slaves have themselves suffered the injustice of slavery that they are able to understand the 
wrongness of injustice – the moral ‘law’ is but an implication of this. In Heideggerian terms, the 
truth of ethical violation is disclosed only through existential participation in the Stimmungen 
(moods) associated with it. But how, we might ask, can God know what it is like to suffer as an 
‘alien in the land of Egypt?’ We can only conclude that God’s knowledge is, or entails, an 
empathic participation in suffering itself.
208
   
    This is to say that God’s knowledge is not primarily ‘objectivistic,’ but personal. It is 
universal-personal, or, in the terms we developed in chapter six, universal-relational. This 
suggests, again, why Heidegger’s conceptuality, as Noack remarks, “moves in a dimension 
which alone makes room for doing genuine theological ‘thinking’ once again.” Heidegger has 
found a conceptuality that allows us to convey the universality of God without obscuring the 
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personal relationality of God, which is critical to the meaning of God from a spiritual-religious 
point of view.     
    The law, then, calls the human being to enter into the universal-personal relationality of God; 
to care for those God cares for; to, in effect, live as a partner of God. It is this that is sanctifying, 
dignifying, and ennobling. Far from requiring a ‘suspension of the ethical’ to affirm the 
particular (as per Kierkegaard), the ethical law commands Dasein to enter into empathic 
participation with each particular, and ennobles Dasein by lifting up its particularity, not into 
abstract generality, but into the wholeness of divine Being, which manifests itself as com-passion 
for each as each. Far from inducing in Dasein an ‘utter individualization’ (as per Heidegger) the 
law directs Dasein to an ‘utter universalization’ through which every individual in Dasein’s 
world (every ‘neighbor’) is to be cherished and respected as kin. Far from merely liberating 
Dasein from the ‘heteronomy of the sensual’ (as per Kant), the law is to open Dasein to the 
beauty and uniqueness of the world in all its sensuous particularity ( ‘Blessed are you, oh Lord 
our God. . . who brings forth bread from the earth’). Biblical law calls Dasein to full, ethical, but 
also sensual, involvement in the particular as particular, and does so in the name of that which 
comprehends every particular: the universal-relationality of God.   
    Biblically, then, law calls Dasein beyond itself into the life of God. It is only through 
participation in the life of God, so the Bible asserts, that Dasein is able to overcome the dilemma 
of its finitude. Only through participation in true infinitude (God) can Dasein’s longing for 
infinitude be truly (and healthily) resolved. Dasein’s failure, or inability, to respond to this call is 
Dasein’s abandonment to the essential nullity of its finitude. It is this abandonment to nullity 
that, biblically speaking, creates the angst of death and guilt.  In the next few sections we will 
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explore the concepts of nullity, guilt, and sin, in dialogue with Heidegger’s interpretations, but as 
these may now be understood in the context of the biblical texts.    
 
III.  Law and Nullity 
[The] calling back in which conscience calls forth, gives Dasein to understand that 
Dasein itself – the null basis for its null projection, standing in the possibility of its Being 
– is to bring itself back to itself from its lostness in the ‘they.’209 
 
    As Heidegger presents it, the call of conscience calls Dasein back from its lostness in das Man 
to an awareness of the true structure of Care as ‘for-the-sake-of-itself,’ an awareness that 
includes an acknowledgement of Being-guilty and Being-towards-death, which are accompanied 
by a sense of not-at-homeness and angst. The call of conscience, in making Dasein aware of its 
utter individualization, at the same time makes Dasein aware of its nullity. We now wish to enter 
into a deeper reflection as to the meaning of ‘nullity’ in light of the biblical understanding of 
Dasein. In doing so we hope to be able to shed some light on the meaning of the phenomenon of 
guilt as well.  
    We recall that Dasein’s nullity has three aspects, corresponding to the three temporal ecstases 
of Dasein. First, Dasein is null insofar as it is thrown; i.e., released into a world not of its own 
making from a somewhere it does not know. Second, Dasein is null insofar as it is towards 
death; i.e., projected upon the possibility of no further possibility. Finally, Dasein is null insofar 
as it is free; i.e., confronted with options it must choose between, thus, not determined to any one 
thing in particular. Dasein, says Heidegger, “is permeated with nullity through and through.”210 
Such nullity, says Heidegger, is the basis of Dasein’s primordial guiltiness: “Thus ‘care’ – 
Dasein’s Being – means, as thrown projection, Being-the-basis of a nullity (and this Being-the-
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basis is itself null). This means that Dasein as such is guilty, if our formally existential definition 
of ‘guilt’ as ‘Being-the-basis of a nullity’ is indeed correct.”211 
    But Dasein’s nullity, for both Heidegger and the Bible, is not altogether negative in the 
existential sense; i.e., it is not altogether something Dasein must undo. Indeed Dasein’s nullity, 
in respect to past (thrownness), present (freedom), and future (death), may be recognized as 
constituting the borders of Dasein’s Being, allowing Dasein to be a separate being, not a mere 
continuation of that from which Dasein issues, nor a mere extension of that to which Dasein 
relates. Dasein’s nullity, thus, has a positive aspect; it is the very possibility of Dasein’s status as 
a ‘being unto itself,’ having an ontological standing of its own. A rock, for instance, though 
distinguishable spatio-temporally from its environs, has, we presume, no sense of self. In order 
for it to acquire one it would have to know itself as discontinuous in some way with its 
environment. If it did not experience itself as discontinuous, it could not be ‘this rock,’ but 
merely an extension of the whole of which it is a part. Finite consciousness, as Sartre has perhaps 
most elaborately pointed out, involves a rupture, a disruption, in the continuity of ‘being-in-
itself.’ It is such discontinuity that is then manifest as the ‘nullity’ of ‘thrown-free-projection.’  
    Indeed, from a religious perspective we might say that the possibility of such nullity, the 
possibility of a being defined by such nullity, is the very possibility of creation itself. Were there 
no possibility of circumscribing a being with ‘nothingness,’ i.e., separateness from the whole, 
there would be no possibility of any self distinguishable as a finite self. Religiously speaking, 
without ‘nullity’ there could be no one but God. The Jewish Kabalist Adin Steinsaltz, for 
instance, writes: “The very essence of creatureliness is the feeling of being separate, of being 
itself. And this capacity of a thing to be itself, even though its very life and existence, physically 
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and spiritually, are incessantly dependent on Divine mercy, on His Chesed, is the miracle of His 
concealment.”212   
    In the last chapter we suggested that Dasein’s nullity might be thought of as a kind of 
privation. Our present considerations now seem to suggest something else. Indeed, there is a 
passage in which Heidegger appears to flatly deny any privative character to Dasein’s nullity.  
He writes: “Existential nullity has by no means the character of a privation, where something is 
lacking in comparison with an ideal which has been set up but does not get attained in Dasein; 
rather, the Being of this entity is already null as projection; and it is null in advance of [vor] any 
of the things which it can project and which it mostly attains.”213 Heidegger’s point is that 
Dasein’s nullity is essential to Dasein’s existence as such. It is a feature of what Dasein 
essentially is rather than a symptom of some distortion or privation of what it is. Nullity is an 
ontological condition for the very possibility of a being such as Dasein; i.e., a finite self-relation 
situated in a world not of its making. Dasein’s nullity, formally considered as ‘thrownness,’ 
‘freedom,’ and ‘mortality,’ is not a consequence of its having been deprived of something it 
should have in order to realize itself as Dasein. On the contrary, such nullity is itself an essential 
condition for the possibility of Dasein as such. 
    In light of this must we now retract our suggestion that Dasein’s nullity be regarded as 
privative? On the contrary, from the Judeo-Christian perspective, Dasein’s nullity, which is also 
its finitude, may be regarded as its privation of that very in-finity of Being which is God. This 
privation is what Steinsalz calls “the miracle of His concealment.” 
    From the religious perspective, in other words, one might imagine three ‘strata’ of Dasein’s 
Being. There is, first of all, the stratum of Dasein’s discrete Being-in-the-world, Dasein’s finite 
individuality, concerned for itself. There is, second of all, the stratum of ‘nullity,’ which borders 
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Dasein’s Being, allowing Dasein to be a discrete being, separate from the whole. But, thirdly, 
there is the stratum of God, of infinite Being, from which Dasein is (properly) separated, but in 
which it is to find its proper home, the resolution to its nullity. Heidegger, good phenomenologist 
that he is, never ventures in thought beyond the second stratum. He does not see past the 
impersonal Nothing to that to which religion attests, the personal ground of Being. Others, 
however, report that they have seen farther. Karl Rahner, for instance, writes: “[W]e can say 
without hesitation: a person who opens himself to his transcendental experience of the holy 
mystery at all has the experience that this mystery is not only an infinitely distant horizon. . . He 
experiences rather that this holy mystery is also a hidden closeness, a forgiving intimacy, his real 
home, that it is a love which shares itself, something familiar which he can approach and turn to 
from the estrangement of his own perilous and empty life.”214  
    The nothingness is indeed a not-at-homeness, insofar as Dasein, as concernful Being, is only 
at home in concernful Being. But such nothingness, though privative, is not essentially evil or 
bad. It becomes such only to the extent that Dasein becomes closed in upon itself. Only then is 
Dasein abandoned to the nothingness. It is the Judeo-Christian contention that Dasein is not 
essentially or properly closed in upon itself but open to the remainder of what-is: to the world of 
others, and, ultimately, to the infinity of God. Such openness is not, and cannot be, an 
unbreachable connectedness, for were it so Dasein would lose its dignity as a separate self, 
would be subsumed in the whole. Such openness, then, must be realized through a volitional act, 
i.e., a choice for openness.
215
 Biblically, Dasein is directed to such choice by the divine 
command, the law:  
Hear, O Israel! The Lord is our God, the Lord is one! You shall love the Lord your God 
with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might.  
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These words, which I am commanding you today, shall be on your heart. You shall teach 
them diligently to your sons and shall talk of them when you sit in your house and when 
you walk by the way and when you lie down and when you rise up . . . You shall write 
them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates. (Dt 6:4-9)  
 
    Dasein is commanded to transcend the nullity bordering its finitude through relation to – love 
of – the infinitude of God. The Oneness of God bespeaks God’s ontological wholeness and 
inclusivity. Every separate being derives its Being from the Being of God. The proclamation of 
God’s Oneness, then, is the proclamation that separateness – and the nullity that makes it 
possible – are not ontologically fundamental. Underlying separateness is a more primordial 
unity. The wholeness of God stands on the other side of Dasein’s nullity as that to which Dasein 
is to be open. From the biblical perspective, Dasein is only, finally, “towards-death” to the extent 
that it becomes, somehow, shut off from its openness to the infinite life of God. It is only then 
that Dasein is subject to the Unheimlichkeit (not-at-homeness) of itself. That Dasein should feel 
not-at-home when shut up in itself, when shut off from God, is fully confirmatory of this point of 
view.  
    Jesus supplements the central command of Deuteronomy with the command in Leviticus to 
“Love your neighbor as yourself” (Lv 19:18) thereby giving us the ‘Great Commandment’ 
quoted at the start of the last chapter. In both the Jewish and Christian traditions love of God is to 
be actualized through love of neighbor. The vertical relation to God cannot be divorced from the 
horizontal relation to neighbor, and this because God is not merely one being among others, but 
the fundament of all beings. Through such love, then, Dasein relates itself, opens itself, to the 
whole of Being. In this way Dasein’s nullity is transfigured into what we might call a 
‘transparency.’ The metaphor ‘transparency’ suggests a medium through which communication 
takes place. Dasein’s separateness is not thereby cancelled, but, to use a religious term, 
‘redeemed’; i.e., restored to its true value. Dasein retains its separateness, its individuality, but 
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this separateness is now in transparent communion with the whole of Being and the font of 
Being. Dasein does not thereby forfeit its individuality but first of all secures it. All of this is to 
provide Dasein with a life that may be characterized as Being-towards-life; through which 
Dasein overcomes the ‘sting’ of death.  
    From the biblical perspective, then, Dasein’s true ‘call of conscience,’ figured in the giving of 
law at Sinai, is ultimately a call out of an orientation defined by death into one defined by life. In 
responding to it Dasein overcomes the not-at-homeness of its nullity. The biblical account, in 
effect, comprehends and extends the Heideggerian. It does not so much deny Heidegger’s 
phenomenological findings as place them in a broader context from which they appear in a new 
light. Dasein’s nullity is affirmed but seen to have a dual aspect: it is indeed the condition for 
Dasein’s individualization and separateness, but it is also the possibility of Dasein’s openness to 
infinity. The angst accompanying such nullity is now seen as symptomatic of Dasein’s closure 
upon itself; a closure that is not ontologically inevitable. When Dasein opens itself in love its 
nullity is unveiled as transparency, its angst transformed into awe.  
    From this perspective, as well, we are able to answer one of the questions we asked at the end 
of chapter three: Why should the flight into das Man be tranquilizing? The answer now becomes 
apparent. It is because Dasein, not at home in itself, has its ultimate home in God and its 
proximate home in the society of others. Dasein, shut off from God and others, shut in on itself, 
is furthest from home and, hence, most anxious. The society of others, even lostness in the 
society of others, provides some tranquilization for Dasein because it opens Dasein, in however 
limited and distorted a fashion, to some of the life of which it is, in itself, bereft. Still, such 
relation to others remains lostness just to the extent that Dasein seeks to ground itself in these 
relations. This endeavor turns out to be the meaning of what Heidegger calls ‘distantiality’: 
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Dasein seeks to provide for itself, in its comportment to others, the ontological standing that can 
only be found through God. This perverts its relation with others, enslaving itself to its very need 
to enslave others, in its effort to fill the void of its nullity.   
 
IV.   Nullity and Guilt 
[W]e define the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty!’ as ‘Being-the-basis for a Being 
which has been defined with a ‘not’ – that is to say, as ‘Being-the-basis of a nullity’. 216 
 
    As we have seen, Heidegger takes pains to dissociate his concept of guilt, Schuld, from the 
conventional one of moral transgress, wishing to signify rather the ontological condition for the 
possibility of any kind of indebtedness, including moral indebtedness. He does make some effort, 
in Section 59 of Being and Time, to suggest a relation between his ontological notion of 
Schuldigsein and the moral notion of guilt, but his treatment of this, in my view, is strained and 
unconvincing. The question we wish now to consider, however, is the relationship between 
nullity, indebtedness, and guilt from the perspective of the religious analytic of Dasein we have 
been developing.  
    Thomas Aquinas writes: “[T]hat which is necessary to the perfection of each thing is due to 
it”217 (my emphasis). If we posit, with Christianity, that eternal life is necessary to the perfection 
of Dasein, then Dasein’s very Being is, in some sense, deficient with respect to what it requires 
for true well-being. It is not nullity per se, then, but nullity as deficiency that constitutes Dasein’s 
primordial indebtedness; Dasein owes it to itself to overcome its deficiency.  Its null basis 
discloses this primordial deficiency, insofar as it discloses Dasein’s finitude, but it does not in 
itself constitute it. Dasein’s deficiency is a function of its nullity and finitude in relation to its 
drive for wholeness and infinitude. What Dasein’s nullity discloses is that, as finite, Dasein 
hasn’t the power to discharge its debt to itself. Thus, the existential indebtedness of Dasein might 
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be expressed thus: Dasein’s Being requires infinity of itself but finds that it hasn’t the means to 
to ‘pay’ for it.     
    As we have seen, this sense of ontological deficiency manifests itself as anxiety; Dasein is 
anxious over its need, and inability, to provide a solid basis for itself. It is this anxiety of 
deficiency that is represented as the shame of nakedness in the Eden myth. Such anxiety becomes 
guilt when Dasein comes to see itself as somehow responsible for its own deficiency. In this 
respect the revelation of law is ambiguous: it reveals the way to eternal life and, by revealing this 
way, reveals Dasein’s default in respect to it. From the Christian perspective, the revelation of 
law is, at once, the disclosure of Dasein’s true telos and the exposure of its – often willful –  
divergence from it. It is this exposure that yields a guilt that is ontological: Dasein comes to see 
that the very tendency of its Being is in resistance to the axiology (the law) of God. As Paul 
laments: “The good that I want, I do not do, but I practice the very evil that I do not want” (Rom. 
7:19). Thus, the revelation of law is also the revelation of ‘original sin.’    
 
V.  Guilt and Original Sin 
    Finite Dasein, then, as for-the-sake-of-itself, is for-the-sake-of-eternal-life. Eternal life is not 
an abstraction but, reading from the Great Commandment, realized in the life of love for God 
and neighbor. Eternal life is the perfection (i.e., completeness, wholeness) of life. Every Dasein, 
insofar as it lives at all and knows something of life, implicitly knows something of eternal life, 
even if only in a privative mode.  This privation is manifest phenomenally as loneliness, 
isolation, angst, despair. But finite Dasein, due to its very finitude, cannot at first fully grasp the 
character of eternal life. The call to eternal life, thus, first comes to Dasein from without. 
Biblically, this takes place, initially, through the revelation of law.     
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    As Care, Dasein is implicitly concerned with itself. As finite, Dasein’s concern may confine 
itself to itself. Such confinement is not moral culpability, but mere animal egoity, until 
confronted by law. The law makes explicit Dasein’s implicit vocation to infinitude. It calls 
Dasein to rise above the confines of its finitude and live in accordance with the dictates of 
infinitude. The law reveals to Dasein that the very finitude of its Care is in default in respect to 
the demands of infinite Care. It is in relation to law that the ‘simple’ angst of Being-towards-
death is revealed as the angst of guilt. Thus Paul writes: “The Law brings about wrath, but where 
there is no law, there also is no violation” (Rom 4:15). Had Dasein no vocation to infinitude, to 
self-transcendence, there could be no guilt, as there is none for animals. This suggests a two-
tiered ‘origin’ for what the tradition calls ‘sin.’ First, there is the origin of the existential 
proclivity for exclusionary self-involvement. Next, there is the first awareness of it as wrong. It 
is only in the light of this awareness that sin becomes, in Paul’s words, “utterly sinful” (Rom 
7:13). This distinction, I think, will allow us to give a phenomenological interpretation of the 
Christian doctrine of original sin.  
    The human being, as we know her, begins her career outside the gates of Eden. We have no 
recollection of an historical ‘fall,’ nor any reason to suppose that such a thing actually occurred 
in human history. Nevertheless, the ‘call of conscience’ as articulated through law, gives us to 
understand that our exclusionary self-involvement is itself guilty; now in the moral sense, i.e., in 
the sense of that which should not be. The actual developmental, historical, and/or biological 
origin of such self-involvement is of no account, so long as we understand that the purpose of 
law is to change us, not to blame us. Our basic inclinations are guilty in respect to the true values 
of life, in respect to our true vocation, in respect to those we hurt, even if, until the encounter 
with law, we cannot clearly understand this. It is this sense of ontological guiltiness, guiltiness 
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with respect to the way we are in our basic inclinations – for which we are not really to blame 
but nevertheless, now, for the first time, responsible – that, I suggest, underlies ‘original sin’ as a 
phenomenon.  The Christian doctrine of ‘original sin’ (primordial sin) arises from the conviction 
that the human being is to turn, not from this or that questionable doing, but from her 
fundamental axiological orientation, an orientation she did not consciously choose, but that 
nevertheless de-fines (and con-fines) her. It is not predicated upon a past transgression, but upon 
a vision of human perfection. The law calls for a metanoia (change of heart and mind); in Paul’s 
terms, a turn from the life of the ‘flesh’ to the life of the ‘Spirit,’ from egoity to love. Paul 
complains that the law demands change, but cannot produce it, a complaint that constitutes one 
of the fundamental arguments between Judaism and Christianity. Nevertheless, the law, though 
convicting us of guilt, is not essentially a curse but a blessing, for it reveals the possibility of an 
escape from the ‘sting’ of death.     
    Thus, from the Judeo-Christian perspective, Heidegger – at least the Heidegger of Being and 
Time – fails to identify the ultimate thrust of the call of conscience in supposing it to be a call 
that terminates in the awareness of Being-towards-death. As a result, Heidegger’s concept of 
Being-towards-death acquires a disturbing ambiguity that it never sheds in the pages of Being 
and Time. Through anticipatory resoluteness, writes Heidegger, Dasein is to “take over in its 
thrownness that entity which it itself is, and take it over wholly.”218 By ‘take over’ here, 
Heidegger appears to mean ‘take over’ from its prior subjection to das Man. With this, the Bible 
would agree. But, from the religious perspective, such liberation from das Man is to be but the 
first stage in a process through which Dasein is to come to understand its ‘thrownness’ as 
‘creatureliness,’ and thereby recognize its fundamental rootedness in the life of  God. To the 
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extent that Dasein endeavors to ‘take itself over wholly’ without such recognition, it closes itself 
in upon itself and shuts itself off from the very Life it seeks.   
    Thus, anticipatory resoluteness might signify two distinct, even diametrically opposed, modes 
of Being, depending upon the broader context in which it is understood. On the one hand, to the 
extent that it involves the honest acceptance of one’s finite limitations, it is suggestive of the 
attitude of Christian humility, which Christianity sees as an essential component of the life of 
faith. On the other hand, to the extent that it involves a willful insistence upon the axiological 
ultimacy of one’s finite, individualized, being, it is suggestive of the attitude of hubristic pride, 
which Christianity sees as at the root of sin. In Heidegger’s later work, with the development of 
his concept of Gellassenheit, Heidegger moves decisively in the former direction. At the time of 
his writing of Being and Time, however, there is much to suggest that this ambiguity was 
unresolved, and perhaps even unrecognized, by Heidegger himself – which might go some 
distance in explaining his disastrous attraction to Nazism. It appears that Heidegger saw in 
‘authentic’ National Socialism the potential to wrest Dasein from its lostness in das Man, and 
either failed to understand, or, for a time, was positively enamored of, the catastrophic hubris at 
Nazism’s core. 
      
VI.  Sin and Despair     
    The ambiguity in Heidegger’s account of Being-towards-death bespeaks a duality in the 
phenomenon itself that we will do well to consider. Indeed, given this duality, we can identify 
three distinct existential modes Dasein might occupy in its relation to death. Let us call the first 
‘self-enclosed Being-towards-death,’ accompanied by moods of angst and Unheimlichkeit. The 
anxiety arising from such self-enclosure conditions the flight into das Man. Das Man, then, is the 
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second mode, which we might label ‘self-concealed Being-towards-death’; many never progress 
beyond this point. In Being and Time Heidegger suggests (although with some ambiguity) that 
authenticity involves a return from this second to the first existential mode.  
     And yet, from the spiritual perspective, we can identify a third mode, consequent upon the 
recognition that both the life of self-enclosure and the life of das Man are existentially 
inadequate. Let us call this ‘self-transcendent Being-towards-death,’ through which Dasein, 
finally in acceptance of its finite limitations, turns, in humility, to that from which, and upon 
which, it is. This is faith. From the Christian point of view, this third mode is the passageway 
from death to eternal life, a passageway figured (as we will discuss in the next chapter) in the 
Cross of Christ.   
       In Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death we find a treatment of these three existential 
modes, the first two identified with the life of despair and the last the life of faith. A brief look at 
Kierkegaard’s work will aid us in our development of the religious perspective. 
      Kierkegaard writes: “The human self is . . . a derived, established relation, a relation that 
relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another. This is why there can 
be two forms of despair in the strict sense. If the human self had itself established itself, then 
there could be only one form: not to will to be oneself, to will to do away with oneself, but there 
could not be the form: in despair to will to be oneself. This second formulation is  . . . the 
expression for the inability of the self to arrive at or be in equilibrium and rest by itself, but only, 
in relating itself to itself, by relating itself to that which has established the entire relation.”219 
    The first form of despair – not to will to be oneself – corresponds closely to Heidegger’s 
conception of the inauthentic life of das Man: “in falling . . . we flee in the face of the 
uncanniness which lies in Dasein,”220 i.e., we flee from ourselves. And yet, what Heidegger sees 
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as authentic life, in which Dasein “takes itself over,” appears to correspond to Kierkegaard’s 
second form of despair, the despair of the one who ‘wills to be oneself.’  Unlike Kierkegaard, the 
Heidegger of Being and Time never considers that Dasein’s thrownness might imply an essential 
relation to that which throws; i.e., that Dasein is, in Kierkegaard’s words, “a derived, established 
relation.”   
    The first form of despair (to will not to be oneself), Kierkegaard continues, is itself derivative 
of the second form: “Yet, this second form of despair (in despair to will to be oneself) is so far 
from designating merely a distinctive kind of despair that, on the contrary, all despair ultimately 
can be traced back to and be resolved in it.”221 Again, this is strangely confirmatory of 
Heidegger’s own insight: “Only to the extent that Dasein has been brought before itself in an 
ontologically essential manner through whatever disclosedness belongs to it, can it flee in the 
face of that in the face of which it flees.”222 For both Heidegger and Kierkegaard the flight into 
das Man, the will not to be oneself, is a response to the distress native to a prior (more 
primordial) encounter with self. Heidegger sees this more primordial self-encounter as Dasein’s 
authenticity, and if by ‘authenticity’ we mean ‘honest self-encounter,’ perhaps it is. But from 
Kierkegaard’s perspective it is just this authenticity – this honest self-encounter – that is at the 
root of despair; hence the flight into das Man.  
     Why is authentic Dasein in despair? Because Dasein is ontologically deficient in itself. An 
honest encounter with self reveals just this deficiency; which is why Dasein flees from such 
honest self-encounter into the self-concealment of das Man.   
     For Kierkegaard, the only solution for such despair is faith. Kierkegaard defines faith thus: 
“in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself the self rests transparently in the power that 
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established it.”223 The nullity of Dasein’s thrownness is only resolved through a transparent 
relationship with that which throws: the font of Life. Only thereby is despair overcome.  
    For Kierkegaard, then, both forms of despair are rooted in finite Dasein’s inability to establish 
itself, through itself, as ontologically sufficient. This despair plays itself out in what the apostle 
John calls, ‘love of the world,’ i.e., the troubled and self-deceitful struggle to establish 
ontological sufficiency through mastery over the world on which one materially depends.  John 
writes: “If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the 
world, the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the boastful pride of life, is not from the 
Father but is from the world. The world is passing away, and also its lusts; but the one who does 
the will of God lives forever” (1 Jn 2:15-17). The “lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and 
the boastful pride of life” are means through which self-enclosed Dasein seeks to establish 
ontological sufficiency. They are expressions of what Kierkegaard calls ‘the will to be oneself.’ 
Few have the personal, political, and/or economic power to live this prideful life without 
compromise. The defeated ‘pride of life,’ its nullity exposed through defeat, flees into das Man, 
where it takes its satisfactions where it can find them.    
    In contrast, the divine Law commands Dasein to extend itself beyond itself. Its love must 
transcend itself toward God and others. The law reveals that neither the life of das Man nor the 
life of self-enclosure constitutes the true life of Dasein. Opposed to both is the life of the Spirit, 
the life of faith and love. The lusts of the world are ‘passing away,’ i.e., ‘towards-death,’ but “the 
one who does the will of God lives forever.” For Christianity, this life of the Spirit is revealed in 
the life of Christ. 
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Chapter IX. Christ  
 
      Christ is the fully realized “image of God” (Gn. 1:27). He is one who no longer neFeds the 
Law written on tablets, for he has it written on his heart (Jer. 31:33). He embodies the spirit of 
the little child, who can command the voracious wolf and lion (Is. 11:6). In Platonic terms, we 
would say he manifests the ideal ‘form’ of the human being. He is a revelation of human Being 
in its fullest spiritual actualization. 
     This is the core Christian claim; a claim obscured by Christian theologies that emphasize 
‘belief’ in Jesus as a means to divine favor. If we understand Heidegger’s Dasein as Being-in-
the-world-with-others, then we might understand Christ as Being-in-the-world-with-others-in-
God.  The ‘in’ here has dual import:  For Christ, God is both the  from which and toward which, 
the ultimate basis and the ultimate telos, the “alpha and the omega” (Rev. 22:13) of his Being.  
The figure of Christ presents a vision of human wholeness in full accord with the human 
vocation to infinitude. 
     This marks a basic difference between the Judeo-Christian vision of Man/Woman and the 
Dasein of Being and Time: Whereas Heidegger envisions a finite wholeness, a wholeness of 
Dasein in itself, Christianity (and Judaism) contend that Dasein’s Being, in its intrinsic thrust, 
stands always in relation to the whole of Being. Dasein can either live in concord with this whole 
or as alienated from it, but in no way can Dasein escape it. Indeed, Heidegger’s own 
phenomenology testifies to this: Confined strictly to itself, Dasein is not-at-home. 
    Nevertheless, the Bible fully recognizes that ‘everyday’ Dasein, cut off from its basis in God, 
will try to achieve a finite wholeness, will endeavor to become ‘a god unto itself,’ either in its 
own individuality or corporately (e.g., the  Tower of Babel). This pursuit of finite wholeness 
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closes Dasein in on itself; it is the principle spiritual malady of human beings, manifest, in 
traditional Christian terms, as the sin of Pride.
224
 
    Heidegger’s phenomenological findings, then, are largely confirmed in Judaism and 
Christianity. Heidegger has faithfully, and with great penetration, documented the very mode of 
Being these traditions consider typically human. But, from the religious perspective, Heidegger’s 
interpretation of it is skewed. Heidegger attempts to interpret the meaning of human existence in 
its own terms, a procedure only hermeneutically sound to the extent that human meaning is 
consummated in itself. If, however, human Being bears an essential relation to infinitude, then its 
meaning must be given in terms of that relation. For Christianity, Christ reveals the relation to 
infinitude through which human life finds its true meaning. Indeed, Christ, as the God-man, is 
the perfect instance of the relation itself. Through active comportment toward the truth of Christ, 
the human being overcomes existential death and enters upon its genuine telic context of life. In 
this chapter we will explore the meaning of this.   
 
I.  Love and Transcendence 
    The central axio-ontological claim of Christianity is that “God is love” (1 Jn 4:8). The central 
spiritual claim of Christianity is that, as called to participate in this universal love, one is to “love 
God with all one’s heart, mind, and soul” (Mt 22:37). The central ethical claim of Christianity is 
that such love of God entails “loving one’s neighbor as oneself” (Mt 22:39), where neighbor is 
defined as anyone in need of love (Lk 10:30-37). To the extent that one achieves this, one lives 
the life of Christ (1 Jn 2:3-6), becomes participant in God’s love (1 Jn 4:16), and enters into 
eternal life (Jn 17:3). In this and the following sections we will try to make sense of these ideas.  
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    The apostle Paul makes a distinction between what he calls the life of the “Spirit” and the life 
of the “flesh”: “For those who are according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, 
but those who are according to the Spirit, the things of the Spirit. For the mind set on the flesh is 
death, but the mind set on the Spirit is life and peace” (Rom 8:5-6). By ‘flesh’ Paul does not 
mean the physical body per se, but – in the terms we have developed – that of us that is 
circumscribed by nullity; i.e., our separate Being. The term ‘flesh’ metaphorically suggests that 
by which our separateness is contained. ‘Flesh,’ thus, may be read as an expression for finite 
self-enclosure. If Paul were writing today he might speak rather of ‘ego.’ As Paul presents it, the 
flesh, as such, is concerned for itself, and ready to subsume the world in itself and for the sake of 
itself: “the mind set on the flesh is hostile toward God; for it does not subject itself to the law of 
God, for it is not even able to do so” (Rom 8:7). But the human being is not doomed to the life of 
flesh, but has the capacity for the life of Spirit: “However, you are not in the flesh but in the 
Spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you” (Rom 8:9). Spirit is the capacity for 
transcendent relation with God and others, the capacity for love: “[T]he fruit of the Spirit is 
love…” (Gal. 5:22). Sin, then, is the domination of flesh over Spirit in the human being,225 a 
domination that leads to transgression against others and alienation from God.  
     As we suggested in the last chapter, from the Christian perspective both the life of das Man 
and the life of anticipatory resoluteness must be seen as variations on the life of the flesh. What 
Paul calls the life of the Spirit does not appear as a possibility in Heidegger’s thought.226 It is not 
that Heidegger overtly denies its possibility, it is that he takes no notice of it – true, in his later 
work, with the development of his concept of Gelassenheit (itself bearing some relation to the 
thought of the Christian mystic Meister Eckhart
227
), we begin to detect a groping toward it – still, 
in my estimation anyway, his thought remains far from it to the very end.  Nevertheless, 
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Heidegger’s phenomenological insights, categories, and distinctions can serve us in explicating 
the meaning of the life of the Spirit.  
   
II. Transcendent Interest  
     The life of ‘the flesh’ is the life of exclusionary self-interest. Dasein, as Care, is implicitly, 
even necessarily, self-interested, i.e., for-the-sake-of-itself. Self-interest, in and of itself, is not 
sin. It becomes sin only when restricted to itself; when it becomes, for the person whose self-
interest it is, the foundation of all value. Sin is primarily a spiritual, not an ethical, category 
(though, of course, with ethical implications). Sin is alienation from God. Dasein’s axiological 
self-centeredness marks a rupture in its relationship with God. 
     As we interpreted it in chapter seven, such exclusionary centering of value in oneself is the 
symbolic meaning of ‘eating from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil,’ which closes 
off  access to the ‘Tree of [eternal] Life’; the tendency to such self-centeredness is made all but 
inevitable by human individualization and freedom; in other words, it is a function of human 
ontology as such (“the intent of man’s heart is evil from youth,” Gn. 8:23). The human being 
must be opened up to the love of God, the love that is God.  This is no simple process. The whole 
of the Bible may be read as a record of the human struggle to achieve such an opening.  Indeed, 
the name ‘Israel,’ according to the Bible’s own etymology, means ‘one who struggles with God.’   
    The life of the Spirit is the life of divine love (agape), which is neither a life of selfless 
obedience to heteronomous command (‘law’) nor a life of self-interestedness in the ‘fleshly’ 
(egoic) sense, but a life of transcendent interestedness; i.e., an interestedness of universal scope, 
of caring for the caring of all. This manifests itself, globally, as a concern for justice, and locally, 
as a concern for the encountered other, i.e., the ‘neighbor.’  
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    From the standpoint of ordinary human conceptuality the life of agapic love appears a 
paradox. Interestedness seems to imply self-concern (as Heidegger’s analyses have made clear: 
one is interested in the ‘in-order-to’ ‘for-the-sake-of’ some potentiality of oneself). How, then, 
can there be an interestedness that transcends self-concern? The New Testament is well aware of 
this paradox, almost seems, at times, to revel in it: “Whoever wishes to save his life will lose it, 
but whoever loses his life for My sake will find it” (Mt 18:24). “Whoever exalts himself shall be 
humbled and whoever humbles himself shall be exalted” (Mt 23:12) “[W]hoever wishes to be 
first among you shall be your slave” (Mt 23:11), etc. In other words, in order to satisfy the thrust 
of one’s self-interest one must first of all eschew self-interest. 
      The solution to these paradoxes is given in the formula for consummated human Being as 
‘Being-in-the-world-with-others-in-God.’ The fulfilled human being moves beyond his or her  
private (and futile) self-concern to become participant in the eternal and universal concern of 
God, a concern comprehensive of all. Self-concern is not thereby effaced but infinitely extended. 
This transformation and elevation of self-concern is the fulfillment of the Great Commandment – 
it is to love God with all one’s heart, mind, and soul and one’s neighbor as oneself. This is 
eternal life.      
    Eternal life, thus, is not to be thought of as a specific telos one actualizes once and for all at 
some ‘eschatological’ moment. Nor can it be thought of as simply the endless continuation of life 
as we ordinarily live it. Rather, it is participation in the life of divine love; a participation that has 
its own mode of temporalization, its own projects, its own desires and goals. In this respect it 
may be thought of as a telic context – an ultimate hermeneutic of life – under which one may 
live; a telic context  distinct from the telic contexts of das Man and Being-towards-death.  
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    Still, given that most human beings do not have the psycho-spiritual maturity to live wholly 
within the telic context of eternal life, the struggle for it may indeed be thought of as the pursuit 
of a telos; i.e., a specific goal to be realized. To realize this telos, to transcend the telic context of 
Being-towards-death and enter upon the telic context of eternal life, I suggest, is the deep 
meaning of ‘salvation.’       
 
III.  Love and Salvation 
Whoever wishes to save his life will lose it… 
 (Mt 18:24) 
 
    The Jewish philosopher-theologian Emmanuel Levinas complains that Christianity, as a 
religion of ‘salvation,’ dangerously misprioritizes the ethical relation: “[T]he fact that the 
monstrosity of Hitlerism could be produced in an evangelized Europe shook within the Jewish 
mind the plausibility which Christian metaphysics could have for a Jew used to a long 
acquaintance with Christianity. This plausibility involved the primacy of supernatural salvation 
with regard to justice on earth. Has not this primacy made at least possible a great deal of 
confusion on earth, and this extreme limit of human dereliction? The famous incomprehension 
towards supernatural salvation shown supposedly by worldly Jews . . . appeared abruptly not as 
an example of pigheadedness but as a moment of supreme lucidity, and the Jews began to 
believe that their stiff necks were the most metaphysical part of their anatomy.”228  
    Although I believe Levinas’ critique to be justified with respect to much traditional and 
popular Christian doctrine, a careful reading of the New Testament suggests that any 
prioritization of concern for salvation over concern for the ethical relation misconstrues Christ’s 
message; whose entire thrust is the perfection of the ethical relation. It is just for this reason that, 
as quoted above, “whoever wishes to save his life will lose it…” One is not to pursue the ethical 
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as a means to salvation (such is legalism), but as salvation itself. Salvation is the overcoming of 
self-enclosed Being-towards-death. The perfected ethical relation, consummated as love, is this 
overcoming: “Love is the fulfillment of the law” (Rom. 13:10).   
    Then whence the emphasis on salvation? I believe, again, we can use Heideggerian concepts 
and categories to clarify the relation between salvation and the ethical, and, in the process, 
perhaps, identify some of institutional Christianity’s historical failings.     
    First we must attempt to clarify what salvation saves from. Although a few isolated passages 
in Scripture may be read as supportive of the common conception that Christ’s sacrifice saves 
from the supernatural punishment to be visited upon the unjust, the overwhelming testimony of 
Scripture, both Hebrew Bible and New Testament, makes it clear that the Messianic salvation 
made available through Christ is not a salvation from punishment per se, but from sin itself. 
Isaiah, describing the Messianic age in a famous passage, writes: “And the wolf will dwell with 
the lamb, and the leopard will lie down with the young goat, and the calf and the young lion and 
the fatling together; and a little boy will lead them . . . They will not hurt or destroy in all my 
Holy mountain, for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the water covers the 
sea” (Is 11:6-9). This passage depicts a world in which sin has been overcome, not punishment. 
The angel who reveals Mary’s pregnancy to Joseph tells him: “She will bear a Son and you will 
call his name Jesus, for He will save His people from their sins” (Mt 1:21, my emphasis).  Jesus, 
explaining the meaning of the freedom he brings, declares “Everyone who commits sin is the 
slave of sin” (Jn 8:34, my emphasis). We could multiply such passages almost endlessly. Christ’s 
salvation is from sin, not punishment.    
    Sin is alienation from the love of God. This alienation has a dual consequence. It leads to 
ethical transgressions among the unloving: the problem of justice. And it leads to alienation from 
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the eternal (hence, ‘death’) for the one bereft of love: the problem of salvation. That concern 
over personal salvation should take precedence over concern for the other is itself a function of 
sin; i.e., an instance of failing to embody the universal love of God. This, I take it, is the gist of 
Levinas’ complaint against the traditional Christian emphasis on salvation. There is every reason 
to believe it would be Christ’s complaint as well.   
    Still, given that Christ’s message is first of all broadcast to ‘sinners’ this distortion is not only 
to be expected but even, in some sense, to be recognized as a necessary stage in spiritual 
development. Dasein, as Care, is implicitly concerned for itself. As said, this is not itself  ‘sin,’ 
but simply the ontological structure of finite Care. Care becomes ‘sin’ only when con-fined to 
itself. Viewed from the biblical perspective, such confinement may be seen as opposed to the 
fundamental thrust of Care itself. As Heidegger has shown, Dasein’s self-concern is ec-static. 
Even Dasein’s self-concern is not restricted to the Being of Dasein at the present instant, but is a 
concern for Dasein as temporally extended into the past and future. There is a sense, then, in 
which the Dasein of this instant may be said to have an implicit ‘empathic regard’ for its 
extended self (although sinful Dasein, living for ‘today,’ can often be deficient even in this). 
Were we to assume that Dasein’s ec-static concern were ontologically restricted to itself then we 
could not envision the possibility of agapic love. But Dasein’s very thrownness, or, in Christian 
terms,  ‘creatureliness,’ suggests the possibility of something else. Dasein’s Being is not 
grounded in itself, but, from the religious perspective, in God. It is God who is the basis of 
Dasein’s ecstatic temporality. This suggests the possibility that Dasein’s ecstatic reach can 
extend beyond its own finite personhood; can potentially reach as far as God’s. Dasein, as ‘child 
of God,’ whose ecstatic temporality is of God, may be thought to have the potentiality for 
universal empathic regard. And, indeed, this is just what is commanded in the Great 
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Commandment. This, then, is life in the Spirit of God, through which Dasein’s concern 
ecstatically transcends its finitude while, nevertheless, remaining centered in Dasein as a 
discrete, finite, self.  
    It is interesting to note that this provides a vision of infinite transcendence more nuanced and 
complex than found in strictly monistic accounts of divine unity. Christ does not meld into the 
Father like a drop of water into the ocean. Rather, Christ retains his own separateness and 
individuality, i.e., finitude, while participating in infinitude through love. Separateness is not 
undone, but redeemed.   
    Suggested here is that the very temporal-projective structure that makes possible Dasein’s self-
concern also makes possible Dasein’s other-concern. The former is merely a limitation of the 
latter, the latter an extension of the former. It is the ecstatic nature of Care that allows for both 
‘selfishness’ and love. Sin is smallness. Christ calls upon Dasein to grow in Care. One is to love 
one’s neighbor as oneself. The ec-stasy of Care, which constitutes Dasein’s own self-relation, is 
now to constitute Dasein’s relation to the other as well, thereby extending Dasein’s concernful 
domain. In this way, Dasein fulfills itself as ‘image of God,’ satisfies the demand for justice, and 
also resolves the issue of its own finitude, i.e., the demand for salvation. 
    Care, says Christianity, is telically ordered to infinitude. Given this, there is a continuity 
between concern for the self and concern for the transcendence of the self. The first is an 
instance of self-love, the latter an instance of other-love, but both are expressions of love. Even 
self-love is love. The problem is that the self, con-fined to self-love, by that very fact fails to 
fulfill self-love. Given its finitude and its vocation to infinitude, the self must transcend itself in 
order to fulfill itself. This, then, is the root of all the Christian paradoxes that suggest that one 
must deny oneself to save oneself.   
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    This paradox leads to another: What should properly motivate Dasein in the pursuit of love? 
Should it be motivated by the desire for ‘salvation’ (the desire to escape the angst of death), the 
desire to fulfill itself as ‘image of God’ (the desire for the joys of eternal life), or by recognition 
of the inherent worth of the other (love itself)? The first two may be thought of as corresponding, 
loosely, to the categories of  ‘servile’ and ‘filial’ fear as developed in classical Christian 
theology. Thomas Aquinas writes: “Through faith there arises in us an apprehension of certain 
penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with Divine Judgment. In this way, then, faith is 
the cause of the fear whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear. It is also 
the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be separated from God. . . . Of the first fear . . . 
formless faith is the cause, while formed faith is the cause of the second.”229  
    The fear of punishment is prompted by one’s sense of guiltiness (conscience) which then 
motivates one to overcome such guiltiness and the punishment (‘death’) it betokens. This 
produces faith in the form of ‘servile fear,’ an inferior form of faith, according to Aquinas. 
Superior is the faith characterized by ‘filial fear’; the faith of one who has attained a certain 
nearness to God and is anxious to preserve it. Servile fear dreads the presence of guiltiness. Filial 
fear dreads the loss of blessedness. I suggest, however, that even filial fear is deficient in respect 
to the true beatitude forecast by Christ. To be anxious to be ‘like unto God’ is, by that fact, not to 
be ‘like unto God.’ God is not anxious to be like unto God but anxious (so to speak) for the good 
of the creation. Ultimately, the proper motivation for love is just love itself. We do not require an 
ulterior motive for our own self-concern, nor, ideally, should we require an ulterior motive for 
our concern for the other; who we are to love as we love ourselves. But in saying that ‘love’ is to 
motivate love we must be careful to note that it is not the empty ideal of love that is to be valued, 
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but the other. To value the other is love (as any mother understands in respect to her child. She 
does not value ‘love’ she values the child. That is love.)  
    But this, then, presents Christianity with a dilemma. Love can only motivate to the extent that 
love is present. What is to motivate us to love when love is not present? Only the negativity of 
the absence of love can do so; i.e., the threat that one may be enclosed in death. When only 
‘death’ is present, only death can motivate. Love motivates to love, it is inherently self-affirming. 
Death motivates an escape from death, it is inherently repulsive. Again, we note the striking 
concord of Heidegger’s phenomenological findings with Christianity, while, at the same time, 
noting their (perhaps equally striking) interpretative discord. Heidegger characterizes Being-
towards-death as repellent; Dasein flees it into the life of das Man. Christianity agrees. But 
whereas Heidegger somehow arrives at the conclusion that this inherently negative state is 
nevertheless to be affirmed by Dasein, Christianity, in effect, remains true to the phenomenon. 
The repellent character of death is to motivate one to seek Life.  
    What, then, leads Heidegger to the conclusion that the negativity of Being-towards-death 
constitutes Dasein’s authenticity? It is, of course, the fact that the life of das Man, into which 
Dasein flees, is also inherently dissatisfying and ultimately angst-ridden. If the mode of Being-
towards-death is repellent, then the escape into das Man is alienating.
230
 Dasein is caught 
between two negativities. Only by accepting the repellent character of Being-towards-death, says 
Heidegger, can Dasein overcome its self-alienation and be true to itself. Das Man, as the denial 
of Being-towards-death, is a self-falsification. Dasein must return to its Being-towards-death to 
return to the truth of itself.  
    All of this, again, accords well with the Christian interpretation. But Christianity makes one 
important addition that places the meaning of the entire complex in a new light. As das Man, 
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Dasein is indeed alienated from itself as Being-towards-death. Dasein must face up to its Being-
towards-death to recognize the truth about itself. But as self-enclosed Being-towards-death 
Dasein is still alienated, although now from God. Since Dasein’s true home is in God, such 
alienation from God, in the deepest sense, is still alienation from self. To be reconciled with God, 
then, Dasein must first be called out of its lostness in the world (das Man), to a recognition of its 
status (its hopelessness) as Being-towards-death, only then to be called beyond Being-towards-
death, to a recognition of its vocation to Life. This movement, from world, to death, to life, is 
figured in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ.  
    This suggests that salvation is a process that must take place in stages. The first stage may well 
produce in Dasein ‘servile fear,’ as Dasein comes to see the deathly implications of its own self-
enclosure. The second stage may well produce ‘filial fear,’ as Dasein comes to see the possibility 
of transcending such self-enclosure in the life of God. But fully consummated Being-towards-life 
is perfect love. John writes: “There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear” (1 Jn 4:18).  
If perfect love casts out fear it follows that the life of one consummated in love is free of fear, 
and must, therefore, have another motivation. This motivation, as we’ve said, can only be love 
itself.  
      
IV.  Love and the Oneness of God 
    Sanctification is the process of salvation; it refers to Dasein’s gradual transformation into one 
who lives the Life of God. In Paul’s writings we can see this process proceeding through its three 
ethico-spiritual phases. There is, first of all, the separated human being prior to the reception of 
the law that calls her beyond herself; pursuing her own private, finite, interests, free of guilt per 
se but nevertheless full of anxiety and towards-death. Then there is the human being who has 
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received the law, and come to realize her deficiency (guilt) in respect to it, a guilt which makes 
manifest the desolation of unredeemed finitude. In effect, under the law the ‘simple’ anxiety of 
Being-towards-death becomes the anxiety of guilt, as one comes to see one’s deathliness as a 
function of one’s failure to abide by the law (the imperatives) of God. This Paul terms the ‘curse’ 
of the law. These two phases may be thought to correspond more or less with Dasein as das Man 
on the one hand, and Dasein as called by conscience on the other. But Paul now sees a third 
phase. With the help of the Holy Spirit the human being is to be transformed from the life of 
exclusionary self-involvement (flesh) to the life of love (Spirit). Love is at once the tacit 
fulfillment of the law and freedom from the ‘curse’ of the law. The transformed human being 
loves spontaneously and joyously, as the expression of her own perfected will – no longer from 
fear of repercussions. This resolves both the existential and the ethical dilemma consequent upon 
nullity/separateness, which is the dilemma of human finitude itself. Given individualization, each 
Dasein’s Care is centered upon itself, separating it from God and others. Were separateness 
ontologically fundamental there would be no escape from the state of Hobbesian war. But the 
Oneness of God bespeaks the axiological unity of the creation. Love is the form of this unity. 
Through love, Dasein fulfills its own Being-towards-life in its very caring for, and communion 
with, the other. Through love Dasein participates in the Oneness of God. 
    Thomas Aquinas expresses the unitive character of love: “[S]ince each thing in its own way 
wills and seeks its proper good, if it is the nature of love that the lover will and seek the good of 
the one he loves, it follows that the lover is to the loved as to that which in some way is one with 
him. From this the proper nature of love is seen to consist in this, that the affection of the one 
tends to the other as to someone who is somehow one with him. On this account it is said by 
Dionysius that love is a ‘unitive power’.”231 Love is the reflection in the creation of the unity of 
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God; as such it is the overcoming of radical separateness (i.e., ‘alienation’) and, hence, ‘not-at-
homeness.’ Such is eternal life.  
    Eternal life, then, is not a reward for the ‘good work’ of ethical behavior. But neither may it be 
thought of as essentially divorced from the demands of the ethical. It is, rather, Dasein’s 
participation in the truth of Being itself – not the truth of this or that particular being, nor a truth 
that hovers above every particular being in meaningless abstraction, but the truth of each and 
every being as seen in the context of divine unity. To live in accordance with such truth is the 
fulfillment of the ethical. Dasein’s self-enclosure severs it from this truth. The redemption of 
Dasein’s separateness through love is its reinstatement in this truth.  
    For Christianity, the way to such reinstatement is through the life revealed by – and as – 
Christ.  
 
V.  Christ 
    Expressed in Heideggerian terms, the figure of Christ reveals perfected Dasein, Dasein 
instated in the universal truth of Being. As such Christ is the ‘Son of Man’; i.e., the perfect 
realization of human potentiality. But, from the Christian perspective, this perfect realization of 
human potentiality is such only as ‘Son of God’; i.e., only as the realization of the potentiality of 
God’s creative logos. The human does not stand on its own. Its perfection is accomplished in, 
through, and with the Spirit of God. Dasein’s spirit of ecstatic self-concern must be joined with 
God’s Spirit of ecstatic infinite-concern. Only thereby is Dasein’s spirit brought into its own 
perfection. Only thereby does it enter the telic context of Life.  This joining of the human spirit 
with the divine Spirit is the meaning of Christ, the God-man.   
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    In the Gospels, Christ is not presented as an object of worship but of emulation-participation; 
we are to become like Christ. In the Gospel of Mark, for instance, Jesus is depicted as 
specifically discouraging a worshipful attitude toward himself: “As He was setting out on a 
journey, a man ran up to Him and knelt before Him and asked Him, ‘Good Teacher, what shall I 
do to inherit eternal life?’ And Jesus said to him, ‘Why do you call me good? No one is good 
except God alone” (Mk. 10:17-18). Jesus goes on to say that the way to eternal life is through 
observance of the principle commandments, and, beyond this, ‘following me’ (Mk 10:19-21). In 
Matthew Jesus says: “Not everyone who says to Me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter the kingdom of 
heaven, but he who does the will of My Father who is in heaven will enter” (Mt 7:21). Even in 
the Gospel of John, where Christ’s identification with God is most pronounced, Jesus makes it 
clear that devotion to him is to take the form of participation in the life he discloses: “He who 
has My commandment and keeps them is the one who loves Me; and he who loves Me will be 
loved by My Father, and I will love him, and will disclose Myself to him” (Jn 14:21). The 
commandment referred to here is that of love: “A new commandment I give to you, that you love 
one another as I have loved you, even as I have loved you, that you also love one another” (Jn 
13:34).  
     It is only in this light that we can read what is perhaps the central biblical statement on the 
significance of Christ: “I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father but 
through Me” (Jn 14:6). The ‘through’ here is clearly a ‘through’ of existential participation: i.e., 
one achieves nearness to God only through participation in the mode of Being disclosed by 
Christ; or, in Heideggerian terms, only through a mode of Being-in-the-world characterized by 
the Befindlichkeit of Christ-like love. Although this text is often cited as a proof-text of Christian 
exclusivism, what is touted here is not the need for exclusive worship of Christ as a divine 
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personage, but the need for adoption of the existential disposition revealed by Christ. In the very 
same Gospel Jesus repudiates the chauvinistic particularism so common to institutional religion 
in general, and so prevalent in historical Christianity.  He says to the Samaritan woman who asks 
him whether the proper place of worship is on the holy mountain of Samaria or in the Temple of 
Jerusalem (representing two contending religious institutions):  “Woman, believe Me, an hour is 
coming when neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem will you worship the Father . . . an hour 
is coming, and now is, when the true worshippers will worship in spirit and truth; for such people 
the Father seeks to be His worshippers. God is spirit, and those who worship Him must worship 
in spirit and truth” (Jn 4:21-24).  
    ‘Spirit and truth,’ of course, are neither places nor institutions. To worship in ‘spirit and truth’ 
is to enter into a new mode of Being-in-the-world; to become, in Paul’s words, “a new creation” 
(Gal 6:15). This new mode of Being is one that overcomes human self-enclosure. Dasein is no 
longer to be ‘of itself’ but ‘of God’: “[A]s many as received Him, to them He gave the right to 
become children of God…who were born, not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will 
of man, but of God” (Jn 1:12-13, my emphasis). Birth, of course,  is the beginning of finite 
Dasein’s earth-career, as physical death is its end. One born of ‘the will of the flesh,’ then, is one 
whose existence is con-fined within the borders of birth and death. But she who ‘receives Christ,’ 
i.e., participates in the ‘truth,’ or, as we might now say, the ‘disclosedness,’ of Christ, has her 
beginning and end transparently opened to the infinity of God, thereby overcoming finitude. 
Heidegger writes: “Understood existentially, birth is not and never is something past in the sense 
of something no longer present-at-hand; and death is just as far from having the kind of Being of 
something still outstanding, not yet present-at-hand but coming along. Factical Dasein exists as 
born; and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death. As long as Dasein 
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factically exists, both ‘ends’ and their ‘between’ are, and they are in the only way which is 
possible on the basis of Dasein’s Being as care. Thrownness and that Being towards death in 
which one either flees it or anticipates it, form a unity; and in this unity birth and death are 
‘connected’ in a manner characteristic of Dasein. As care, Dasein is the ‘between’.”232 
    But the ‘between’ of Christ and the ‘between’ of Heidegger’s finite Dasein are different. The 
former entails the breaking open of the borders encasing the latter. Christ lives ‘between,’ i.e., as 
centered in, eternity, whereas finite Dasein lives only as centered in the nullity of its own null-
basis and null-term. Insofar as Dasein is its between, Christ and Heidegger’s Dasein constitute 
two distinct modes of Being for Dasein, each with its own distinct kind of unity. The unity of 
Heidegger’s Dasein is enclosed in its own finitude. The unity of Christ is projected infinitely 
toward God and neighbor. Given the Bible’s claim that the very Being of Christ is revelatory (‘I 
am the truth’), Christ’s mode of Being cannot be regarded as available only to Jesus. Traditional 
Christian emphasis on the metaphysical uniqueness of Jesus, it seems to me, tends to obscure 
this. All who participate in the Being of Christ, says Paul, are “sons of God through faith in 
Christ Jesus” (Gal 3:26). Jesus is the perfect embodiment and exemplar of a mode of Being to 
which all are called.
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 To ‘believe in’ Christ, then, is to devote oneself to (‘project oneself 
upon’) the potentiality for Being revealed in Christ. This, not intellectual assent to a creed, is the 
basic meaning of Christian faith.  
    Christ, then, provides a picture of human wholeness in contrast to Heidegger’s. Christ is whole 
as a continual, and limitless, transcendence toward the infinite. Conceptually, Christ’s wholeness 
is not predicated upon the termination (or anticipated termination) of self-projectivity, i.e., death, 
but upon the infinity of self-projectivity native to the divine life. The Christian idea of Trinity 
captures the eternal livingness of God. The Son is eternally ec-static toward the Father and the 
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Father eternally ec-static toward the Son. The Son, incarnate as the Christ, calls for all to 
participate in this eternal ec-stasy of Father and Son: “The glory which You have given Me I 
have given to them, that they may be one, just as We are one; I in them and You in Me, that they 
may be perfected in unity…” (Jn 17:22). This, finally, is a conception of wholeness consistent 
with the self-projectivity of ek-sistence. Yet wholeness is not compromised by such infinite 
projectivity. For wholeness is realized, finally, not temporally but axiologically. Eternity is the 
axiological wholeness of time. That which is still outstanding – the future – is com-prehended by 
the relation of love. Time doesn’t cease; there is still the surprising, the new, the unexpected, the 
astonishing . . . but no longer the utterly alien. Even the horrible and terrible are com-prehended 
by love: “Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death I fear no evil, for You 
are with me” (Ps 23:4). 
    Being-towards-life, then, is the telic context under which Dasein lives its ec-static wholeness. 
Given the self-projectivity of existence it entails, I believe, a hope and expectation of continued 
existence beyond physical death; but this is not its essence. It is the axiological quality of 
existence that is expressed in the idea of eternal life, not the temporal quantity. Christ reveals life 
lived under the telic context of eternal life. The Christian is one who accepts Christ’s call to such 
a life as his/her supreme telos, a telos which is itself but an opening into the telic context of 
eternal life. 
    The telos of Christ is opposed in the Christian tradition to the telos of Anti-Christ, expressing 
the one who lives wholly under the telic context of self-enclosure. Though these are figuratively 
represented as warring parties, the weapons of this war are axiological, the battleground the 
‘soul’ of man/woman. There is a sense in which Jesus only fully becomes the Christ through 
overcoming the temptations of Anti-Christ. The encounter of Christ with Anti-Christ is 
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graphically depicted in the Gospels as the ‘temptation in the desert.’ An examination of this will 
allow us a fuller appreciation of the meaning of Christ.  
 
VI.  Christ and Anti-Christ.     
    There is a parallel between the temptation of Christ in the desert and the temptation of Adam 
and Eve in the garden. Adam and Eve succumb to the Satanic temptation and thereby turn their 
garden into a spiritual desert. Christ overcomes the temptation of Satan and thereby turns the 
spiritual desert back into a garden: “He who believes in Me…” says Christ, “From his innermost 
being will flow rivers of living water” (Jn 7:38). If we understand Christ to be expressive of 
perfected ek-sistence; i.e., transcendent regard, then Satan may be thought of as expressing the 
principle of perfect in-sistence; i.e., self-enclosed regard.  
    And yet Satan’s in-sistence is a paradox in a way that Christ’s ek-sistence is not. As perfect 
ek-sistence Christ has regard for all that is. But Satan’s in-sistence cannot be regard for only 
himself; for the self, as such, is Being-in-the-world. Satan’s in-sistence, then, must also be 
projected toward the world, but with a difference. Whereas Christ wishes to honor the Being of 
all that is, Satan wishes to subsume it in the self. Christ wishes to be open to infinity, Satan 
wishes to enclose infinity within himself. Both, in effect, have their eye on infinity. Christ loves 
it. Satan lusts after it.  
    It is significant that the temptation of Christ takes place in the desert, for the desert 
surroundings make the temptations all the more tempting. One of the problems biblical exegetes 
have always had in treating of the temptation of Adam and Eve in Eden is explaining why, 
amidst such lush surroundings, they would have succumbed to sin. Even if we explain it as a 
moment in which ‘curiosity got the better of them’ such would hardly seem to warrant the 
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horrific penalties and curses brought down upon them. Nor do we entirely escape the problem by 
insisting that the story be taken as symbolic. We still need to say what the story is symbolic of: 
The story, as we interpret it, intends to disclose the axio-spiritual destitution of humankind. The 
symbol of Eden, then, serves as an image of that of which human life is destitute. The symbol of 
ejection from Eden indicates, not only that humankind is ‘fallen,’ but that from which it is fallen; 
i.e., the ‘garden.’     
    But for factical Dasein, sin does not tempt from the garden but from the desert. Satan offers a 
way out of the desert of death. This is by no means an inconsiderable part of Satan’s allure. But, 
says the Bible, it is a false way: all that glitters is not gold.  
    Each of the temptations of Jesus may be seen as expressing one or another way in which the 
human being seeks ultimate satisfaction through worldly acquisition. One might pursue material 
goods (‘wealth’); turn the rock into bread (Mt 4:4). One might pursue self-glorification (‘fame’); 
entice the angels to honor one (Mt 4:6). One might pursue imperial dominion (‘power’); conquer 
the kingdoms of the earth (Mt 4:8-10). Each of these are ways in which the human being might 
seek to subsume the goods of the world within the self. They are tempting just insofar as the self 
is impoverished, for they promise, in their various ways, to alleviate the self’s poverty. But the 
Christian message is that the poverty of the self cannot be, and is not to be, alleviated through 
subsumption of the world. First, the pursuit of such is ethically problematic, insofar as it 
necessarily involves transgression against the other. Second, the pursuit of such is spiritually 
problematic, insofar as infinity cannot be contained within the finite. Even the most wealthy and 
powerful remain ‘thrown-Being-towards-death’: “Truly I say to you,” says Jesus, “it is hard for a 
rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven” (Mt 19:23). The rich man becomes attached to his 
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riches, and bloated in self-importance. Such attachment and bloatedness close the self upon 
itself. The way to Life is otherwise.  
    Christ’s life is, at once, the repudiation of these ways and the pointing to another way. Rather 
than extract bread from rock, Christ offers himself as ‘living bread’ for the nourishment of the 
spirit (Jn 6:51). Rather than be elevated to the heights by angels, Christ falls to his knees to wash 
the feet of his own disciples (Jn 13:3-5). Rather than conquer the kingdoms of the world, Christ 
stands silent as the might of imperial Rome crucifies him. Life, Being-towards-life, is won 
through the giving of oneself to the other and to God. Only thereby does one open oneself to 
communion with infinity. Only thereby does the desert become the garden. It is through such 
givingness that human Being is transformed from deathliness to life. The New Testament’s 
principle expression of this is in the death and resurrection of Christ.   
 
VII.  The Cross of Christ        
    The crucifixion/resurrection of Christ bespeaks a hope: that death is not Dasein’s ‘uttermost 
possibility.’ A world wherein death is construed as Dasein’s uttermost possibility differs 
profoundly from one in which it is not. The Cross is Christianity’s variation on  Heidegger’s ‘call 
of conscience’; but whereas the latter calls Dasein into acknowledgement of Being-towards-
death, the former calls Dasein through death to eternal life.      
    It is a symbol rich in meaning, in Paul Ricoeur’s phrase, ‘multivocal.’ In this section we will 
examine some of the more prominent of these meanings.   
    First of all, the Cross of Christ is presented as the consummation of all the sacrificial rites 
prescribed in the Hebrew Bible.
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 But to understand this properly we must see Christ’s sacrifice 
as the criterion of these sacrifices, not vice-versa. That is, we are not to understand the sacrifice 
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of Christ in terms of the prescriptions for sacrifice in the Hebrew Bible, rather we are to 
understand the prescriptions for sacrifice in the Hebrew Bible in terms of the sacrifice of Christ. 
Jesus says to the Pharisees: “Go and learn what this means: ‘I desire mercy, not sacrifice’” (Mt 
9:13, my emphasis). In light of this, the sacrifice of Christ cannot be read as sacrifice in the old 
sense. It is first of all to be understood as an act of mercy or compassion. True, much is made in 
the Christian tradition of the salvific efficacy of Christ’s ‘blood,’ but this must be understood in 
reference to the Hebrew Bible’s association of blood with life: “For the life of the flesh is in the 
blood, and I have given it to you on the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood 
by reason of the life that makes atonement” (Lv 17:11). What makes for atonement is the blood 
by reason of the life, not by reason of the pain inflicted or endured in sacrifice. It is not the 
spilling of blood that makes for atonement, but the giving of life.  
    Literally, of course, blood is not life. Blood stands for life in the Mosaic sacrificial rites. Every 
transgression may be seen as, in some sense, a transgression against life. God is the font of life 
itself. Self-enclosed Dasein, as for-the-sake-of-itself, confines its life to itself, and often seeks to 
subsume the life of the other in itself. This attitude is renounced through the symbolical offering 
of one’s life to God. In the sacrifice God is symbolically acknowledged as the proprietor of all 
life. For this same reason the blood, which is associated with life, is not to be eaten: “For as for 
the life of all flesh, its blood is identified with its life. Therefore I said to the sons of Israel, ‘You 
are not to eat the blood of any flesh…” (Lv 17:14). One has the right to eat the flesh of animals 
but not the life of animals. The life is to be returned to God. Life is holy. It is to be revered, not 
consumed.  
    Modern sensibilities (perhaps rightly) recoil at the bloodiness of animal sacrifice. In ancient 
Israel, however, the slaughter of animals for food was daily routine (as it is still, of course, in the 
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meat factories of the modern world). What distinguishes the sacrifice as sacri-fice, then, is not its 
violence or infliction of death, but its symbolical offering up of life to God. In the light of Christ, 
such offering up is now revealed as an expression for the self-giving of love. As such, it 
expresses one’s renunciation of the self-withholding of sin. This implicit meaning of sacrifice is 
made explicit by Christ: “This is My commandment, that you love one another just as I have 
loved you. Greater love has no one than this, that one lay down his life for his friends” (Jn 15:12- 
13). The sacrifice of Christ is, first of all, an act of love.  
    Further, this act of love is to be understood as, initially, God’s act of love: “For God so loved 
the world that He gave His only begotten Son that whoever believes in Him shall not perish, but 
have eternal life” (Jn 3:16). It cannot properly be read, then, as an endeavor to appease God’s 
wrath through satisfying God’s mysterious need for blood. Rather, insofar as Christ represents 
God, it expresses the self-giving of God to humanity, and insofar as Christ represents 
humankind, it expresses the self-giving of humanity to God. Such mutual self-giving constitutes 
the atoning (at-one-ing) of God and humanity; i.e., the (re)establishment of partnership between 
God and Dasein. Such partnership is the very meaning of Christ, as the God-man. This 
partnership is accomplished, not through the shedding of blood, but through the sharing of love. 
It is love that atones. This is what is revealed, not merely in the Cross of Christ, but in the 
entirety of Christ’s life and teachings. The very Being of Christ is this mutual self-giving of God 
to man/woman and of man/woman to God.  
    Still, there is no ignoring the fact that the Cross of Christ is also a spectacle of horrific 
violence. This leads us to another of the meanings of the Cross. The crucifixion of Christ is both 
an expression for, and an instance of, the sinfulness of humanity; the violence human beings 
inflict upon one another, and the violence human beings contain within themselves. Human 
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beings subject themselves, and each other, to death. The crucifixion of Christ expresses the self-
victimage of humanity. On the Cross Christ ‘takes upon himself’ the sinfulness of humankind. 
As Paul says: he becomes “sin on our behalf” (2 Cor 5:21). In so doing he enters into the very 
despair of death: “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me” (Mk 15:34), and overcomes it 
through faith and love: “Father, into your hands I commit my spirit” (Lk. 23:46). Christ’s 
conquest of the darkness reveals the ontological primordiality of light over darkness: “In Him 
was life, and the life was the Light of men. The Light shines in the darkness, and the darkness 
did not [overcome]
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 it” (Jn 1:4). On the Cross, Christ journey’s into the very heart of darkness 
and vanquishes it with the light of love.  
    This, again, may be seen as a further elaboration of the symbolical meaning of sacrifice. 
Through self-giving one escapes the self-enclosed darkness of sin, and opens oneself to the light 
of relationality. Darkness and light are primal metaphors for isolation and relation respectively. 
She who is in literal darkness is cut off from visible relation with others. When the light returns 
visual relation is restored. Love, then, i.e., perfect relation, is the ‘light’ that conquers the 
‘darkness’ of death.  
    Finally, these meanings of the Cross find their consummation in the Pauline understanding of 
the Cross as signifying the redemptive process of ‘death to the flesh’ and ‘rebirth in the Spirit.’ 
Paul writes: “[I]f we have become united with Him in the likeness of His death, certainly we 
shall also be in the likeness of His resurrection, knowing this, that our old self was crucified with 
Him, in order that our body of sin might be done away with, so that we would no longer be 
slaves to sin; for he who has died is freed from sin. Now if we have died with Christ, we believe 
that we shall also live with Him” (Rom 6:6-8).  
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    For Paul, the call of conscience calls Dasein from its immersion in everyday life, through an 
encounter with death, to eternal life. Paul writes: “I was once alive apart from the Law; but when 
the commandment came, sin became alive and I died” (Rom 7:9). This cannot be read as saying 
that human beings did not engage in acts of sinfulness until the giving of Law. Rather, it is Law 
that brings the consciousness of guilt and desolation, which then arouses despair and resentment, 
producing further guilt and desolation: “for sin, taking an opportunity through the 
commandment, deceived me and through it killed me” (Rom 7:11).  
    Paul seems here to be doing his best to provide his own phenomenological account of the ‘call 
of conscience.’ It parallels Heidegger’s in significant ways but, of course, diverges from it in 
critical ways. As with Heidegger, Paul experiences the call of conscience (given form through 
the Law) as convicting him of living wrongly (for Heidegger, ‘inauthentically’). As with 
Heidegger, conscience makes Paul aware of himself as towards-death. But Paul has no doubt as 
to the negativity of such a state: “Wretched man that I am! Who will set me free from the body 
of this death?” (Rom 7:24). Paul’s answer, of course, is Christ, whose self-surrender to God (and 
as God) lights the way from death to life: “For the mind set on the flesh is death, but the mind set 
on the Spirit is life and peace” (Rom 8:6).  
    The Cross of Christ, then, expresses the passage from ‘everyday’ consciousness (‘das Man’), 
through the consciousness of death (‘Being-towards-death’), to the consciousness of life in the 
Spirit of God (‘Being-towards-life’). This through-way is the life of faith itself. In this sense the 
whole of the Christian life is the life of the Cross. Dasein’s spirit of self-enclosed concern (the 
flesh) must be opened up to the Spirit of God. This opening, which is at the same time a ‘death,’ 
which is at the same time a ‘rebirth,’ takes place on, and through, ‘the Cross,’ i.e., not without 
pain, difficulty, and sacrifice. Paul clearly believes that this work of redemption cannot be 
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achieved through mere self-exertion. It will unfold, however, for the one who earnestly seeks it: 
“Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to 
you” (Mt 7:7).  
 
VIII.  The Spirit of Truth 
I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Counselor to be with you  
forever – the Spirit of truth. The world cannot accept him, because it neither sees him 
nor knows him. But you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you.  
(Jn. 14:16-17, my emphasis)  
 
    The one who dies is not the same as the one who is reborn. Prior to the resurrection Jesus’ life 
is largely pedagogic; he is, primarily, a moral and spiritual teacher. After the resurrection Jesus is 
a bestower of the Spirit of God: “He breathed on them and said to them ‘Receive the Holy Spirit’ 
(Jn 20:22). In a sense, Jesus is only completed as Christ through the crucifixion-resurrection. 
Christ discloses the path each human being is to follow, from death to life, from self-enclosure to 
openness to the divine Spirit. Christ, as the ‘Way,’ reveals it.  
    In the above passage the Holy Spirit is referred to as ‘the Spirit of truth.’ I believe we will be 
able to tie many of the strands of our entire work together through an examination of this idea. 
    What are we to understand by the word ‘spirit’? In its Latinate roots, the English word spirit is 
related to the word for ‘breath,’ as in the word re-spirat-ion. This connection can be found as 
well in the Hebrew and Greek words for spirit: ruach and pneuma. It is easy to see the 
relationship between the idea of breath and life, as the most immediate sign of death is the 
cessation of breathing. The Greek word for spirit, pneuma, can also mean wind, as can the 
Hebrew ruach.  It is easy, again, to see an analogical relation between the idea of ‘breath’ and 
the idea of ‘wind.’  
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    But we might note that these bear more than an analogical relationship. The ‘wind’ is just that 
which we breathe when we breathe in. That which we breathe out is just the ‘wind.’ Wind and 
breath are, in other words, physically continuous. The wind is the ‘objective’ of which the breath 
is the ‘subjective.’ The wind is the ‘public’ of which the breath is the ‘private.’ The word wind, 
further, expresses the stirring of the environing atmosphere. In some sense all things are within 
that which is stirred when the wind is stirred. In this much broader sense, then, ‘spirit’ may be 
understood as referring to that within which things are. The spirit is that ‘livingness’ within 
which things have their relation to us and for us. I suggest that its meaning is more or less 
equivalent to what Heidegger means by Being (Sein), when he takes pains to distinguish Being 
from beings (Seiendes).   
    Spirit always manifests itself with a certain quality. We can speak of a spirit of anger, a spirit 
of peace, a spirit of hatred, a spirit of love. As Heidegger has pointed out, these words express 
something more than mere subjective emotion. They are ways in which Being is disclosed. Such 
disclosures are, in the terms we are now developing, modifications of spirit. But what do we 
mean when we say that things are disclosed in these ways? What is modified in these 
modifications of spirit are not the spatio-temporal (empirical or sensible) attributes of things, but 
the way in which they matter to us. Meaning, we have said, expresses the way in which things 
matter to us. Such mattering cannot be rendered in spatio-temporal terms, and it is for just this 
reason that meaning cannot be reduced to empirical categories: this is just where the logical 
positivists went wrong. To hate someone, to love someone, expresses a quality of relation that is 
independent of spatio-temporal relations and, therefore, cannot be explicated in purely spatio-
temporal terms. Nevertheless, love and hatred are not mere private emotion. They are qualities of 
Richard Oxenberg; Being-Towards-Life/Being-Towards-Death 
 
234  
concernful relation. They express ways in which things and people are related to one another in 
the sphere of spirit.   
    Spirit, then, is also the domain of meaning. When Christ says “I am the truth” he is professing 
to reveal (‘disclose’) the true meaning of human existence. Such meaning cannot be rendered in 
spatio-temporal terms; it is axio-relational. 
    The Judeo-Christian claim is: God is Spirit. That which ultimately Is is spirit. The spatio-
temporal has its Being within spirit, but spirit cannot be reduced to it. It is because Heidegger’s 
concept of Being is, in effect, a concept of spirit that Heidegger’s philosophy has such resonance 
for religious thought.  The whole of Scripture concerns the relationship between the human spirit 
and the divine Spirit. The human spirit, says the Bible, is derived from, ‘created by,’ the divine 
Spirit, but has its own separateness and volitional independence. God’s endeavor to conform the 
human spirit to the divine Spirit would have to be construed as abject despotism were it not for 
the fact that the former is already and always ontologically embedded in the latter. The human 
being, ontologically grounded in God, finds its own truth only in right relation to the truth of 
God, which, in turn, entails right relation with every other spirit grounded in God. Such right 
relation is ‘love.’ Our love, inclined to self-enclosure due to individualization and freedom, is to 
open itself up toward God and others. This is the meaning of the Great Commandment. Such 
opening conducts us through death (as self-enclosure) to eternal life. Christ’s crucifixion and 
resurrection reveal the way from death to life.      
    In the end, Christianity envisions a partnering of the human and divine, a partnering that 
resolves the dilemma of human finitude; the dilemma of ‘death.’ This partnering is the meaning 
of Christ, as the God-man. Christ says to his disciples: “I no longer call you servants, because a 
servant does not know his master's business. Instead, I have called you friends, for everything 
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that I learned from my Father I have made known to you” (Jn. 15:15). The human spirit is to 
commune with – ‘befriend’ – the divine Spirit, such that the divine love becomes the human love 
as well. In this way God becomes, in Paul’s evocative phrase, “all in all” (1Cor. 15:28).   
    It is the Christian claim that it is only through such love that Being as such is disclosed in 
truth. In our final chapter we will reflect on the significance of this claim for both the religious 
and philosophical pursuit of truth.   
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Chapter X. Philosophy and Religion 
 
 
    “The question before us,” we began, “is how to arrive at a healthful understanding of human 
existence.” Actually, there are two related questions implicit in this one.  There is the substantive 
question of just what would constitute a ‘healthful understanding of  human existence,’ and the 
procedural question of how to arrive at it.  Given that any  process must be appropriate to its task, 
these questions cannot be isolated from one another. How we arrive at a ‘healthful 
understanding’ will itself depend upon what such an understanding entails.   
    As we have seen, Heidegger’s Being and Time addresses both procedural and substantive 
questions in its examination of Dasein. It is a complicating factor in Heidegger’s work that his 
analytic of Dasein is, at once, an explication of the existential-ontology of Dasein and, at the 
same time, an exploration of just how such an explication must proceed.  Logically speaking, we 
would prefer to know how to proceed before we begin the process, but such is not possible in the 
examination of Dasein, where the one who inquires is also the one inquired about.  Knowing the 
correct process for unveiling the subject itself depends upon knowing something about the 
subject.  
    Our work has exhibited a similar complexity. On the one hand, I have wanted to say 
something about religion and, in particular, the Judeo-Christian message, especially as these may 
be illuminated by Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. On the other, I have entered into questions 
concerning how such an examination of religious claims must proceed, given their peculiar 
nature.  These cannot be separated from one another. What we can know is inextricably bound up 
with how we can know it. This is especially true in the religious sphere. God is not an ‘objective 
datum,’ visible to anyone with physical eyes. God is Spirit, disclosed only in the context of 
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human concern, and, therefore, only through an openness to oneself in one’s concerns. As has 
now been said a number of times, this makes Heidegger’s examination of the ontology of 
concern of particular relevance to philosophy of religion.  
    But, as we have also now said a number of times, Heidegger’s explication of Dasein does not 
finally penetrate into that about Dasein that would legitimize faith. Heidegger – at least the 
Heidegger of Being and Time – does not see the possibility of an authentic relation with the 
infinite. Thus, from the religious point of view, Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein is incomplete.  It 
has been my contention that just as Heidegger’s work can help us uncover religious meanings, so 
these very religious meanings can help us penetrate more deeply into the existential structure of 
Dasein as Heidegger himself presents it. In this final chapter I would like to try to pull the entire 
argument of this work together, so as to bring out, in sharper relief, the manner in which both 
these claims prove to be true. In doing so, I hope also to be able to say something about the 
relationship between the philosophic and religious pursuit of truth.       
 
I. Philosophical Inquiry    
    “Philosophy,” writes Heidegger, “is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its 
departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the 
guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns.”236 
Philosophical inquiry, as Heidegger here notes, has its point of departure and point of return in 
the existence of Dasein. It is Dasein who asks the questions of philosophy, and Dasein who is to 
be the peculiar beneficiary of the answers. Philosophical inquiry is distinguished from 
technological inquiry in just this respect: whereas technical knowledge is pursued for an end 
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other than the knowledge sought, philosophical knowledge is pursued ‘for its own sake’; i.e., 
pursued for the peculiar value of knowing itself. 
    What is this peculiar value?  Heidegger writes: “In existing, Dasein understands itself, and in 
such a way, indeed, that this understanding does not merely get something in its grasp, but makes 
up the existentiell Being of its factical potentiality-for-Being.”237 Dasein’s self understanding 
(which entails Dasein’s ‘world’ understanding, given that Dasein is ‘Being-in-the-world’), is not 
merely the understanding of something that Dasein can then manipulate for other ends (i.e., is not 
technical knowledge), but is a determining factor in who Dasein is. Dasein is, in some significant 
sense, its understanding of itself.  Given, further, that what Dasein is, at any point in time, 
conditions the possibilities of what Dasein may become, Dasein’s self-understanding determines, 
as well, what Dasein may be.   
    Dasein, Heidegger tells us, is a being whose Being is an issue to itself; i.e., a being 
intrinsically concerned with what it may be. Philosophy, then, far from an idle pursuit, is an 
expression of Dasein’s concern to realize itself, to actualize its onto-noetic potentiality to fully be 
itself through fulfilling the Socratic dictum to fully know itself. It is just for these reasons that we 
can speak of a ‘healthful’ or ‘unhealthful’ understanding of human existence. The quality of 
Dasein’s self-knowing determines, in no small degree, the quality of Dasein’s Being.  
    The question Dasein asks about Being, then, is also the question Dasein asks about itself.  
“This question,” Heidegger tells us at the start of Being and Time, “has today been forgotten.”238 
Heidegger’s point, as I read him, is not that we are no longer asking this question at all, but that 
we have lost touch with what is essential to it; we are no longer asking it from out of the 
authentic concern that motivates it, but as if it were an objective question, a technical question. 
There is, indeed, a place for asking such technical questions about human Being; sociology, 
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psychology, anthropology, etc., all seek knowledge about the objective structure of the 
characteristically human. But philosophy is, or should be, something else. Philosophy is the 
pursuit of self-knowing, where ‘self’ is understood as every first-person singular, every discrete 
me, concerned for itself.   
    This is an understanding of philosophy we see already expressed in the works of Plato. In the 
Gorgias, for instance, Socrates says to his dialogue partner Polis, “I believe that nothing worth 
speaking of will have been accomplished in our discussion unless I can obtain your adhesion, 
and yours alone, to the truth of what I say…”239  Philosophical truth has no value, perhaps no 
meaning, apart from the concerned subject who pursues that truth. Its value is precisely in its 
power to address the fundamental concerns of that subject.  
    It is convenient to point to Descartes as the one whose philosophy, in establishing a strict 
dichotomy between subject and object, conditions the ‘forgetting of the question’ for modern 
thought. We discussed this at length in chapter one. It is, however, a bit unfair to lay the full 
burden on Descartes. At worst Descartes’ philosophy is symptomatic of a human tendency the 
Platonic Socrates is already protesting at the inception of Western philosophy:  
Men of Athens, I honor and love you, but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I 
have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, 
exhorting anyone whom I meet after my manner, and convincing him, saying: O my 
friend, why do you who are a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, 
care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and honor and reputation, 
and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you 
never regard or heed at all? Are you not ashamed of this? And if the person with whom I 
am arguing says: Yes, but I do care; I do not depart or let him go at once; I interrogate 
and examine and cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue, but only says 
that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less. And 
this I should say to everyone whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but 
especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For this is the command of 
God, as I would have you know; and I believe that to this day no greater good has ever 
happened in the state than my service to the God.
240
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    Knowledge that allows for “laying up the greatest amount of money and honor and reputation” 
is, of course, technical knowledge. It is controlling knowledge, ‘know-how’: Ge-stell.241  But 
philosophy, as the Platonic Socrates here envisions it, has another end: the establishment of 
virtue, i.e., arête, perhaps best translated as ‘perfection of the soul.’ Such virtue is achieved, 
according to Plato-Socrates, primarily through self-knowing, which, then, is the particular task of 
philosophy.
242
  
    What conditions the ‘forgetting of the question’? This is a question we must ask, not only in 
order to get philosophy back on track, but as an authentic philosophical question in itself. Dasein 
‘forgets’ the question through some tendency in him/herself. Dasein, Heidegger tells us, is a 
being who is, to a considerable degree, in flight from its Being. Dasein, as das Man, is in flight 
from itself as Being-towards-death. Dasein’s forgetting the question of itself is part and parcel of 
Dasein’s desire to escape itself.  
    Heidegger’s prescription for Dasein, which he takes to be Dasein’s prescription for itself 
(rendered in the call of conscience), is to face up courageously to its Being-towards-death. Only 
thereby can Dasein live authentically, and only thereby can the authentic philosophical project be 
resumed; a project which, in his later work, and to distinguish it from inauthentic philosophy, 
Heidegger simply calls ‘thinking.’   
    I have suggested, however, that there is a deep ambiguity in Heidegger’s concept of Being-
towards-death, one that Heidegger himself is never able to resolve. Why, we have asked, should 
Dasein feel not-at-home in its very Being? That Dasein should feel not-at-home with itself 
implies, at very least, that Dasein intimates a sense of ‘home’ that it experiences as somehow 
missing.  What is the significance of this?    
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    On reflection, it is Heidegger’s own phenomenology that allows us to answer this question:  
Dasein, Heidegger tells us, experiences its ultimate basis and ultimate term as null; it feels no  
connection with where it has come from nor with where it is finally going. This sense of nullity 
gives rise to a feeling of anxiety (threat) and not-at-homeness (alienation), which leads it to flee 
into the life of das Man, in an effort to find there the home it cannot find in itself. In other words, 
Dasein experiences its very Being, as enclosed in finitude, as a threat to the basic thrust of its 
Being. A simple inference (which Heidegger does not make) yields the insight that existence is 
inherently inimical to finitude. The thrust of life is towards-life (not death), hence Dasein seeks 
to escape its thrownness upon death.   
    This means that finite Dasein is, inherently, a dilemma to itself. Were this the last word on the 
matter there would be no hope for a restoration of the philosophical project (as Socrates/Plato 
envisioned it), for there would be nothing for this project to pursue. The soul cannot be perfected 
if the very tendency of its Being is in opposition to itself. It can fly into das Man, or stoically 
resolve upon its finitude, but neither will allow it to escape the dilemma that it is to itself; i.e., the 
‘sickness unto death’ that Kierkegaard sees as despair.  
    It is just here that religion has something to say of relevance to the philosophical project itself. 
Being-towards-death is not, says religion, Dasein’s ‘uttermost possibility.’  On the contrary, 
Dasein’s ‘uttermost possibility,’ a possibility derived from its provenance in God, is eternal life. 
Heidegger is right in recognizing ‘everyday’ Dasein as in flight from Being-towards-death, but 
he has failed to see this in its broadest context. Being-towards-death is not primordial for Dasein, 
but the expression of a rupture in Dasein’s rootedness in God.  
    But has traditional religion expressed itself, or even understood itself, in a manner that has 
made all this clear? In chapter six we noted that traditional theology has itself been characterized 
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by the same inappropriate objectivism that Heidegger complains has distorted philosophy. 
Indeed, in later works Heidegger notes this explicitly and dubs this distortion, evident in both the 
philosophical and theological traditions, ‘onto-theology.’243 Onto-theology approaches the 
question of Being, and the question of God, as if asking a technical question. It seeks to know 
Being and/or God as an objective datum that might then be dealt with to serve this or that end. 
Salvation becomes a matter of doing this or that thing, professing this or that belief, so as to 
affect a change in the condemnatory disposition of God. It is perhaps insufficiently noted that 
Jesus’ strongest protest was reserved for the religious authorities of his time, whose ‘legalistic’ 
(in our terms, ‘objectivistic’) distortions kept their adherents from a genuine experience of divine 
grace: “Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You shut the kingdom of 
heaven in men's faces. You yourselves do not enter, nor will you let those enter who are trying 
to” (Mt 23:13 NIV). 
    A longer work might have entered into a more detailed critique of the theological tradition 
itself. We have had to content ourselves, in chapter six, with indicating the problematic nature of 
metaphysical objectivism for religious understanding.  
    Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology, we’ve argued, provides a more appropriate 
approach to religious ideas than metaphysical objectivism. Our task in the second half of this 
work, then, was to employ this very method in a reading of the Bible, with the aim of unveiling 
the Bible’s alternate understanding of human Being; an understanding with the potential to 
resolve the dilemma that finite Dasein is to itself. In the next section we will briefly summarize 
the conclusions we have come to in this regard.   
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II. Contending ‘Telic Contexts’     
    Neither ‘death’ nor ‘eternal life’ can be understood as temporal eventualities that Dasein may 
some day arrive at. One who has literally died is no longer there to notice it. On the other hand, 
however long one may live, one will never have lived ‘forever.’ ‘Death’ and ‘eternal life,’ then, 
do not have their meaning as future eventualities, but, as we have said, as ultimate ‘telic 
contexts’ through which Dasein may understand itself and its relation to its world. Their meaning 
is hermeneutical-existential. Although, literally construed, both are set ‘in the future,’ the notion 
of ‘future’ here is used as a symbol for what might be called ‘axiological ultimacy.’ Heidegger 
does not use the term ‘telic context,’ but it is Heidegger who has made its meaning clear in his 
analysis of Being-towards-death.  Being-towards-death is a qualification of the self-
understanding of Dasein, and has meaning only as such. According to Heidegger, authentic 
Dasein recognizes itself as (or in the ‘telic context’ of) Being-towards-death. Inauthentic Dasein 
flees from this self-understanding into the life of das Man.  
    Heidegger takes no note of the possibility of an authentic overcoming of Being-towards-death; 
a possibility we find proclaimed at the very heart of the Bible: “I have set before you life and 
death, the blessing and the curse. So choose life that you may live” (Deut. 30:19). The Bible 
cannot here be speaking of physical life and physical death, since it must have been as clear to 
the biblical authors as it is to us that all human beings, regardless of their choices, are subject to 
the latter. ‘Life’ and ‘death’ here, and throughout the Bible, refer to alternate telic contexts under 
which Dasein may live.  
    Briefly stated, Being-towards-death is characterized by Heidegger as accompanied by a state-
of-mind of not-at-homeness and a mood of angst. As we have noted, Heidegger never questions 
the fact that Dasein’s authenticity should be accompanied by such repellent moods; he accepts it 
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as a phenomenological given.  Nevertheless, it clearly makes Dasein into a questionable being; a 
being who is a dilemma to itself; indeed, it is just this dilemma that induces Dasein to flee into 
the inauthenticity of das Man.   
    Though Heidegger evidences little awareness of the possibility of eternal life as proclaimed in 
religion, religion seems to know a great deal about Being-towards-death as developed by 
Heidegger: “He who does not love abides in death,” declares the apostle John (1 Jn 3:10). 
“Wretched man that I am! Who will set me free from the body of this death?”, cries Paul (Rom 
7:24). “[T]he people living in darkness have seen a great light; on those living in the land of the 
shadow of death a light has dawned,” pronounces Jesus (Mt 4:16). And, of course: “The Lord 
God commanded the man, saying, ‘From any tree of the garden you may eat freely; but from the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat from it you 
will surely die’” (Gn 2:16-17).  
    The ‘death’ of which the Bible speaks in these passages is not physical death; it is rather a 
mode of life; a life of being cut off from one’s rootedness in the eternal life of God, hence a life 
of rupture, a life in which one feels oneself to be (now in Heidegger’s terms) ‘not-at-home.’ We 
have called this the life of ‘self-enclosed finitude,’ in which Dasein’s self-concern is wholly 
encased in itself. In contrast, the Bible proclaims the possibility of Being-towards-life, which 
might be characterized as a life of rootedness in the eternal life of God, which is itself a life of 
self-transcending love. It is through love, says religion, that Dasein achieves the infinite 
wholeness finite ek-sistence longs for. Through love Dasein overcomes the self-enclosure of 
death and comes home. The Bible’s understanding of eternal life is expressed in the Great 
Commandment, quoted at the start of chapter seven: “You shall love the Lord your God with all 
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your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your 
neighbor as yourself… Do this and you will live” (Lk 10:25-28, my emphasis).  
    The ontological possibility for such self-transcending love lies in the Oneness of God. In this 
respect, the biblical story of the Creation may be read, not as a metaphysical claim about 
temporal origins, but as a statement concerning the possibility of  love and the overcoming of 
death. That from which Dasein derives its Being is not nothing, says the Bible, but the life of 
God; an infinite life from which every finite life proceeds; in which all “live and move and have 
their being” (Acts 17:28). Hence, the Oneness of God implies the fundamental relationality of all 
things, which Dasein, as “image of God,” is to recognize and open itself to.      
    From the religious perspective, it is only through such recognition, and adoption of the telic 
context of Being-towards-life (i.e., through ‘faith’), that Dasein can resolve the dilemma of its 
finitude and become whole. Further, the imperatives (i.e., the ‘law’) that derive from this telic 
context demand more than a commitment to self-responsibility (anticipatory resoluteness), but a 
commitment to other-responsibility (love of neighbor). The Bible’s hermeneutic of Dasein, then, 
is distinguished from Heidegger’s in this most important respect: it has moral implications 
entirely absent from the latter. One who loves his neighbor as himself cannot become a Nazi. 
    Heidegger’s hermeneutic is grounded in his own phenomenological reflections. The Bible’s 
hermeneutic is based, we are told, on ‘revelation.’ As we discussed briefly in chapter seven, the 
Bible tells us that it is only the one who is “pure in heart” who “sees God”: “No one can see the 
Kingdom of God,” says Jesus, “unless he is born from above” (Jn 3:3). On the face of it, this is 
no different in principle from Heidegger’s suggestion that it is only the one who has answered 
the ‘call of conscience’ who ‘sees’ authentic Dasein.  Epistemologically, then, the Bible’s 
hermeneutic (although, of course, written in an entirely different genre) need not be considered 
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intrinsically less sound than Heidegger’s. One can imagine a depth of disclosedness that would 
reveal, to those privy to it, ontological insights that transcend those available to Heidegger (and, 
indeed, the average human being), from which perspective the biblical texts (some or all) are 
written.
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    The Bible, then, puts forward an interpretation of human Being that affirms, but then qualifies 
in important ways, the interpretation advanced by Heidegger; through which many of the 
ambiguities, paradoxes, and limitations of Heidegger’s account can be resolved. Eternal life, as 
Christianity envisions it, is characterized by peace and joy (Gal 5:22), rather than angst and not-
at-homeness. Again, given the disclosive character of moods, it would seem that only such 
moods could, even in principle, indicate a fully integrated self.  
    This, then, might be thought of as a religious response to Heidegger’s existential analytic of 
Dasein, a response that confirms it in many of its essentials, but then takes us beyond it. In our 
next section we will consider the implications of this response for the philosophical project.   
 
III. Philosophical Inquiry Revisited  
    If philosophy has gotten off track, if authentic philosophical questioning has been ‘forgotten’ 
due to the inauthenticity of Dasein, then the Bible’s alternate understanding of Dasein is of the 
utmost philosophical significance. It would suggest that, though Heidegger may have correctly 
identified the disease, he has failed to identify the cure. This cure is not to be had through a 
commitment to oneself as ‘Being-towards-death,’ but through an acknowledgment of oneself as 
‘Being-towards-life.’ It is only through Being-towards-life, then – i.e., through some version of 
faith – that we can hope to authentically engage in the philosophic pursuit of truth.   
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    And yet, it appears that Heidegger denied this explicitly. In his 1958 conversation with 
Hermann Noack, after Noack remarked that “Heidegger's thinking moves in a dimension which 
alone makes room for doing genuine theological ‘thinking’ once again…” Heidegger responded, 
“Within thinking nothing can be achieved which would be a preparation or a confirmation for 
that which occurs in faith and in grace. Were I so addressed by faith I would have to close up my 
shop – Within faithfulness one still thinks, of course; but thinking as such no longer has a 
task.”245 
    Is this indeed the case? I submit that whether or not thinking has a ‘task’ in faithfulness 
entirely depends upon what we suppose the task of thinking to be. I must confess that I am not 
sure what the task of thinking would be for one who lives in ‘anticipatory resoluteness,’ for there 
Dasein’s ontological potentialities are strictly limited by its finite, worldly, possibilities. In such 
a case, technological knowledge would assume primary importance, for it is through such 
knowledge that Dasein can achieve maximal inner-worldly power and comfort. On the other 
hand, it seems to me that it is just within ‘faithfulness’ that thinking has a task. It is, indeed, the 
very same task we read in Plato at the inception of Western philosophy: to pursue “the greatest 
improvement of the soul” through coming to know and apply ‘the good.’246  
     Jesus says: “When anyone hears the message about the kingdom and does not understand it, 
the evil one comes and snatches away what was sown in his heart” (Mt 13:19, my emphasis). 
Hence, a principal task of thinking within Christian faithfulness is to come to ‘understand the 
message about the kingdom.’ But since the message about the kingdom is a message about the 
ultimate good of Dasein (who is ‘Being-in-the-world-with-others’), such an understanding 
cannot be had without an understanding of self, world, and other. The task of thinking within 
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faithfulness, then, is to understand self, world, and other within the telic context of Being-
towards-life.  
    Does faith, however, prejudice its results by adopting this telic context?  On the contrary, as 
Heidegger writes: “All interpretation . . . operates in the fore-structure [of self/world-
understanding] . . . Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have 
understood what is to be interpreted . . . This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any 
random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of 
Dasein itself . . . In the circle is hidden the positive possibility of the most primordial kind of 
knowing.”247   
    Every thinking moves within the orbit (or spiral) of self-understanding. One who has come to 
see her life as towards-life does not see herself as traversing a lesser, but a greater, orbit of self; a 
self whose farthest reaches touch upon Infinity itself; a self whose responsibilities extend equally 
as far. Every conceivable inquiry is comprehended by the inquiry into the infinite good. Fully 
consummated self-understanding, in this context, is infinite understanding. There is, then, no end 
to the task of thinking within faithfulness. Faithfulness does not entail an end to philosophical 
questioning, such that we can then ‘close up shop,’ it gives such questioning axiological 
direction.  It makes it clear that all inquiries, as the inquiries of a being who is a self-relation of 
infinite concern, are ultimately inquiries into ‘the good.’ To inquire into this is the task of 
thinking.  
    And this task of thinking – as, again, Plato understood – is also a task of becoming.  To know 
the good is to become good, for, as Heidegger’s work has itself made clear, knowing is itself a 
mode of Being.  
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IV. Conclusion  
    From the religious perspective, then, Heidegger’s philosophy appears limited because it fails 
to fully and properly grasp the axiological character of Being, and the ultimate thrust of that 
axiology.  Truth (as dis-closedness of Being) is desirable only because Being, in its axiological 
character, is good.  It is the good of Being that makes death (as the prospect of not being) 
threatening, and, hence, angst-provoking. Da-Sein, as a participant in Being, is at home in Being. 
The ‘possibility of im-possibility’ (i.e., no Being),  as Kierkegaard teaches us, does not render 
Dasein whole, but brings Dasein to despair.  Desperate Dasein, then, flees from itself in order to 
flee from its despair. The solution to this is not an ‘acceptance’ of death – death is precisely what 
Dasein, as concerned for its Being, cannot accept (without doing violence to itself) – its solution 
is some version of faith. Only through faith, says religion, can Dasein fully open itself to Being. 
Only through faith can Dasein stand ‘resolutely’ in the truth.  
    I say ‘some version’ of faith because there are, of course, many versions of what gets called 
faith. Many are, themselves, just further instances of flight into das Man. We have tried to 
indicate what authentic faith might look like in the latter half of this work. Of course much more 
needs to be said; a fuller work would have explored more thoroughly inauthentic modes of faith.  
To think about what authentic faith would be like is yet another of the all-important ‘tasks of 
thinking’ within ‘faithfulness.’ This work has tried to make some modest contribution to that 
effort.    
     
    Heidegger has had much to say about the etymology of the Greek word for ‘truth,’ aletheia. I 
believe it will be worth our while, in closing, to consider the etymology of the English word 
‘truth.’ According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the English word ‘truth’ is related to the 
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Middle English ‘troth,’ whose principal meaning is ‘trust’ (to be-troth someone, for instance, is 
to enter into a relation of trust with her). A truthful account, then, is one that is maximally 
trustworthy. 
    This gives us the axiological meaning of the word ‘truth.’ The true is that which can be 
trusted. The pursuit of truth is the pursuit of that which is trustworthy. It is in this sense, finally, 
that we can understand Christ’s pronouncement ‘I am the truth.’ Christ professes to disclose that 
which can be trusted, and invites us to enter into it in faith. That Plato had a similar 
understanding of truth is evident from his association of the true and the good.
248
 It is just to the 
extent that philosophy has forgotten this association, in my view, that it has forgotten ‘the 
question of the meaning of Being.’ 
    From the religious perspective anyway, Heidegger also seems to have forgotten, or, at least, to 
have not fully remembered, this question. Yet any criticism of Heidegger’s work from this 
perspective must be tempered by the recognition that it is Heidegger himself who has helped us 
unveil the existential meaning of the Judeo-Christian message, in terms of which such criticism 
might be made.  Had we more time, we might have elaborated in greater detail the many 
existential distortions – distortions of authoritarianism, dogmatism, superstition, legalism, 
literalism, exclusivism, judgmentalism, elitism, bigotry, and, again and again, the most egregious 
uncharitableness – that have, throughout history, marred the face of Western religion. From such 
distortions Heidegger, perhaps, had no choice but to turn away. It is, finally, a tribute to his work 
that it has provided us the wherewithal to turn back.
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apparently, to imply objective otherness. He discusses, but then all but dismisses, the metaphorical significance of 
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individual or character” (see Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, 14, where Inwood discusses Friedländer’s claims). 
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